By Ashton Rome
The multiple deep crises we currently face are producing huge fractures in the capitalist system's regular operation. In Wage Labor and Capital, Marx wrote that crises “carry the most frightful devastation in their train, and, like an earthquake, cause bourgeois society to shake at its very foundations.” The more fundamental the crisis, the more profound that everyday life and economic and political relationships are disrupted. Crises produce phenomena like we see today: the open calls for political violence, protests, and the growth of socialist and far-right groups; and the shifts in power within the global economic system. These phenomena play themselves out within political parties as the ruling classes and subordinate classes struggle to determine what direction the crisis will resolve itself. Within this process, the ruling class may attempt to reconfigure its hegemony through new political alliances and reformations, and new interplays between force and consent to bring social peace. This is what we see playing out as we see the realignment within the Democratic Party – or, more specifically, the shift of the traditional Republican establishment to Biden and the Democratic Party.
Organic Crisis
Gramsci used the term ‘organic crisis’ to describe periods where the capitalist system produces a crisis where the ruling class and its system can no longer function as it normally does. The crisis occurs at all levels of society – economic, social, political, and ideological. Because the ruling class cannot resolve the crisis, it poses challenges to the fundamental ideas, values, and organizations on which the previous order was maintained. A ‘crisis of representation’ also emerges where traditional parties are hollowed out because they lack legitimacy; and with them, the rules, norms, and legal constructions that they built. The depth of the crisis means that it is usually not enough to defend or conserve the “normal” but to construct a new settlement. The new settlement needs legitimation which simultaneously appeals to a new set of values and the “common sense” (ideology, beliefs, etc). They require cross-class alliances. Realignments typically occur in relation to crisis, as political parties attempt to respond to the new political, economic, and ideological conditions. They can occur as new parties emerge, or within traditional parties themselves.
The crises of the 1920s to the 1940s in the United States, for example, were resolved partially in the New Deal system - a coalition of unions, the black and white working class, white southern farmers, and intellectuals. To secure a U.S. global hegemony, the Brenton Woods system and security agreements like NATO were constructed. Once that system entered crisis, the ruling class used it as an opportunity to reshape relations which in the U.S. and Britain was settled firstly as Thatcherism and Reaganism and later on ‘Third Way’ and ‘New Labour’ as tech and financial service became dominant forces in the economy.
The Fascist Threat
There are debates today, like in 2016, about whether Trump is simply a right-wing populist, fascist, or traditional Republican. Furthermore, many have looked at whether he has a party apparatus or is an isolated leader. Many of those that are quick to call Trump a “fascist” reject the demands of the workers movement and especially their role in any anti-fascist struggle. For them, the key is securing the prevailing capitalist system through a vote for Biden. A discussion about the relationship of elites to parties is important for what it can reveal about the depth of the crisis, the balance of power between classes, and whether the ruling class sees the possibility of resolving it using existing institutions. The movement of part of the Republican establishment to Biden and the Democrats should not be looked at as temporary, but instead a representation of changing alliances in the face of multiple deep crises.
The danger lurking in a crisis period is that if the ruling class is not capable of maintaining power through its normal means, and the working class cannot take power, due to defeats, lack of organization and leadership, the emergence of ruling-class politics in the form of the far right becomes inevitable. The far-right in the form of authoritarian populism or outright fascism requires a crisis that radicalizes all subordinate classes, and a crisis of representation and authority, allowing its leader to speak in a sense "directly to the people" against a corrupt establishment. Trump proclaims to the middle and working class that the global elite and party establishment have embarked on policies of globalization which has offshored jobs and brought in cheap labor to drive down wages. According to the discourse of authoritarian populists like Trump, the existing institutions subvert the interests of the people and a leader, who reflects the will of the people, is needed to “make America great again”.
The movement from authoritarian populism to fascism as seen in Germany and Italy occurs when there is a socialist movement or more correctly the illusion of a strong socialist movement, which is threatening enough to mobilize an anti-socialist movement. It also requires a mass base to draw support from. As well it requires a ruling class convinced that it cannot rule through the existing democratic state apparatus. A September 22 poll from USA TODAY/Ipsos Poll that revealed that roughly 64% percent of respondents believe “protesters and counter-protesters are overwhelming American cities” should bring concern.
This is a laughable overestimation of the strength of the socialist movement today but one echoed by right wing media, Trump, the Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau Investigations (FBI) in particular. Unfortunately, the left enters this crisis in a position of weakness, despite the 2008 and 2016 periods of radicalization that produced the 2018/19 strike wave, massive increases in membership of left groups, a near win for a self-professed "democratic socialist" presidential nominee, and the recent election of several left democrats throughout the country.
So far, compared to the tasks ahead, the left has not been able to translate those gains into the needed mass movements or independent working organizations like unions or a workers' Party, which could be used to shift the balance of power. The unfortunate thing is that we have yet to shift the balance of power leftward from a four decades-long slip rightward. If Trump and his brand of authoritarian populism has captured the Republican Party, during this period of crisis, it would mean that the far right has a powerful tool to beat back any counter-hegemonic movement.
The 2020 Realignment
When it was evident in 2016 that Trump was the nominee, some delegates and establishment figures like Erick Erickson conspired to block his nomination. Many were skeptical of Trump's lack of political experience. Many were concerned about the unrest that his racist scapegoating of immigrants and his history of sexual violence and sexism would cause. Others were and still are concerned by his flirtations with the alt-right and fascists, and especially of his outright criticism of the Post-9/11 national security state and neoliberal commonsense. Trump represents to them a wild card that can not be easily managed. For the ruling class that supported him, Trump's outsider status was suited for the task of maintaining the current order. Once his nomination was official, about 20% of Republican House members refused to endorse him, and a significant numbers of establishment Republicans like Richard Hanna of New York and Meg Whitman rallied around Clinton.
The Republican Party is now the Party of Trump. Since assuming the office Trump has confirmed part of the establishment's fears and relaxed them in other regards. He has worked to build a cabinet of loyalists and effectively remade the Party into his own. For the first two years he had to battle the party establishment like John McCain and Jeff Flake, but by 2019 Trump built a cabinet of loyalists and won the trust of many that opposed his initial run. This was exemplified by the fact that every Republican member of the House opposed his impeachment. Also, by 2019, congressional GOP had become more and more aligned with Trump, as opposition members retired and were replaced by more pro-Trump figures. As well the 2020 Republican Party is simply Trump’s platform from 2016. Trump in office was able to reassure the establishment by governing largely according to neoliberal orthodoxy as with his Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and record stock market.
For the ruling class that supports Trump, he is useful. Trump's populism and discourse avoids naming and placing blame squarely on the capitalist system at the heart of the Great Recession and the austerity regime that gave rise to the anger that brought him into office. Trump, like other populists makes vague promises to various sections of society to win office and once in power, works to secure the position of the ruling elite and old power structure. Trump's scapegoating divides the subordinate classes. His discourse whips up sections of the state and mostly middle class into action and violence against counter-movements like the left. This is crucial in a period of increasing polarization of wealth and more unequal distribution of wealth and goods.
The COVID19 pandemic, in accelerating crisis of legitimacy, and the dramatic decline of the Post World War 2 global system of governance has begged serious questions of Trump. The ruling class is concerned about the decline of the Post World War 2 institutions and alliances like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (U.N.), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other multilateral cooperation that have sustained U.S. global hegemony. Though Trump has continued Obama's Pivot to Asia meant to challenge China's growing military and global influence, Trump has also undermined the alliances thought to be needed to accomplish it.
For years, Trump has allegedly spoken about withdrawing from NATO, and has questioned the U.S. commitment to allied states in the case of war. Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement, Paris Agreement, took the U.S. out of the World Health Organization, and supported the commitment of right-wing populist figures in Europe to abandon the European project.
At the same time, to some, Trump simply represents a hyper-realism about the possibility and sustainability of the post-World War 2 international order. Trump reflects a realization of the limits of American power and the domestic frustration of foreign conflicts brought by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. hegemony since WW2 is built on its monetary dominance, control of international institutions, expanding domestic consumer market, and through its full spectrum dominance (land, sea, air, space and cyber). The 2008/9 crisis exposed the limits of the U.S.'s ability to maintain that structure in the same way.
The ruling order is also concerned by the polarization and infights within and amongst governmental institutions like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), FBI and intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence, Agency (CIA). Some are concerned by Trump’s alleged usurping of the independence of Homeland Security and DOJ as seen in a recent IG complaint which alleges that top political appointees in the DHS repeatedly instructed career officials to modify intelligence assessments on the George Floyd protests to suit Trump's agenda.
With COVID, Trump's decisions have reflected a breakdown of normal governance. Trump and his administration, along with Democratic leadership, were able to inject Wall Street and the rich with $135 billion in tax breaks, $2.2 trillion in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES) in late March, $500 billion Federal Reserve program, and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). Trump, however, has strayed away from mainstream capitalist economists and refused to continue negotiations on a second round of stimulus whilst promoting conspiracy theories and misinformation around the virus.
The Ruling Class Case for Biden
One of the main tasks of the ruling class is to figure out how best to place the cost of the crisis on the backs of ordinary people without arousing their anger. One section of the ruling class sees the Democratic Party and Biden as the last hope of preserving the neoliberal order, using traditional institutions of power, negotiation, and reform. Having survived a 'civil war' that first erupted after the failed 2016 presidential election, the Party has shown itself able to manage the crisis and bring legitimacy back to the system. With Biden as the nominee and the establishment still retaining their leadership, the Democratic Party has seemingly accomplished the impossible – a revival of centrism in the midst of its collapse.
The economic crisis and pandemic have exacerbated the ruling class fear of a resurgence of labor militancy like in the 1930s and 1960s. The last economic crisis brought waves of protests, new political formations, and levels of organization. In 2008, Obama was able to use rhetoric and symbolism, along with repression, to stop the emergence of large-scale mass movements. Similarly, Trump has used his outsider status and promises to a portion of the bottom 90%, scapegoating, and repression to avoid creating mass movements. This ‘peace’ was initially helped to be achieved by low unemployment. The crisis and the potential for an explosion of movements has brought urgent questions about whether the ruling class can govern in the old way or if something new is needed. They hope that Biden will be able to bring a political equilibrium using the concessionary and coercive powers of the state. In the same way, on the economic front, there is a hope that Biden will be more “rational” and listen to his advisers, appointed from the banking industry and Ivy League institutions.
Biden and the Democratic Party may have enough union and social movement support to conceivably tame any movements that threaten to go outside of its boundaries. This is mostly because the Democratic Party elites hopes to utilize ‘lesser evilism’ and ‘popular front’ type anti-fascism strategies to defend the state. It is also because the reformist character of the left wing of the party feels that it needs a left consensus in the halls of power to put forth its agenda. To keep their positions, they will need to play it safe with the establishment or risk being primaried or facing discipline from the Party. They also hope that the left of the Party and labor unions will translate concessions into “reforms”, which will placate the working masses. But as Gramsci once warned, “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”
As such, Biden has received numerous establishment Republican, national security, and finance establishment support heading into the 2020 election. At this years' Democratic National Convention, more of the establishment than 2016 came out in support of Biden; these included: Cindy McCain, John Kasich, Susan Molinari, and Meg Whitman, former eBay and Hewlett-Packard CEO, and former Republican Secretary of State Colin Powell. On the final day of the convention, groups of over one hundred McCain 2008 and thirty Romney 2012 campaign staffers endorsed Biden, in addition to a group of nearly two dozen George W. Bush campaign and administration staffers.
In addition, Biden received the endorsement of seventy-three former U.S. national security officials in the Republican administrations, including former heads of the CIA and FBI and Trump administration officials. A group of a hundred prominent Republicans and independents, including Todd Whitman, former Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder, and former Massachusetts Gov. Bill Weld, launched ‘Republicans and Independents for Biden’ to campaign for Biden. With his support in the union and social movement, Biden is the only candidate that can seem like a political alternative to one element of their base, and a person capable of preserving the existing status quo to another. Although cross-party endorsements have been common in the last few conventions, the alliances have been temporary.
Trump and Authoritarian Populism’s Stable Base
Trump has been able to build a solid base amongst downwardly mobile white working and middle classes. It should be noted that working-class whites are not Trump’s only base or even main base. Though for example, neoliberalism was, as David Harvey argues a “political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites”, it required a new “common sense” and a cross-class alliance. Typically, periods of crisis lay bare the contradictions inherent in capitalist society and more specifically within uneasy coalitions such as Trump’s.
The middle class may feel dominated by banks and sections of big business, and workers may grow angry at the austerity that is a part of the ‘recovery’. One can see that the recovery packages were aimed at delivering for big business by giving bits to different sections of the base. When anger broke out that the 80 percent of the stimulus tax cuts went to millionaires and the Small Business Association’s Paycheck Protection Program largely went to powerful companies instead of providing relief to millions of American small businesses, Trump was able to divert the anger instead to the alleged intransigence of the Democratic Party and at governors who wouldn’t reopen the economy. It should be noted that the nativism Trump embodies was once relegated to a small faction of the Party (paleoconservatives such as Pat Buchanan), but has since been mainstreamed as neoliberalism has devastated their living standards. The nativism, as well as nationalism, acts in a way like W.E.B. Dubois’s “psychological wage”, used to maintain the middle class of the base that feels beaten down.
This nativism allowed Trump to secure so many union votes that Hillary Clinton lost Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Despite COVID and massive unemployment, Trump's approval rating has averaged around 40%. By comparison, a CBS News/New York Times poll showed President Bush’s final approval rating was twenty-two percent, due to views on the Iraq war and Great Recession. This shows that Trump and his authoritarian populism has a solid base, which could be mobilized. Conversely, an important caveat is there are indications from national polls and from swing states that working-class white voters aren’t as likely to vote for Trump as in 2016.
It should be noted as well that 2016 showed most of Trump’s supporters were largely affluent Republicans and come from the middle class. This is consistent with most authoritarian populists whose base is typically the middle class, who during times of crisis vacillate between the working class, which is engaging in struggle, and the capitalist class seeking to restore its order. Clearly, Trump, like other authoritarian populists, win support from sections of working class as well. This fact informs the prospect and strategy of building a socialist movement.
Right-wing populists use their platform to win the support of different classes to get into office. Once in office they accommodate to the old power structure and big business whose interests they try to protect, and whose financial support they require. Within the classical authoritarian populism of Italy, once in power, they supported the development of cartels and monopolies like FIAT and Montecatini.
There is nothing new about working-class whites supporting a Republican. The movement of working-class whites away from the Democratic Party occurred as the Civil Right's movement embraced the Democratic Party and its power was in decline. The Republicans starting in the 1950s were able to exploit the divisions that began to appear within the Democratic Party due to the Party's national leadership calling for de-segregation, while the Southern Party opposed it. The New Deal coalition undercut the Republican Party's traditional support in the industrial Northeast while maintaining the Democratic Party's base in the South. This left Republicans in the wilderness as exemplified by the fact that the Republicans only managed to win the White House in 1952 and 1956 (Pres. Dwight Eisenhower) and in 1968 and 1972 (Pres. Nixon) and controlled the Senate for only four years, 1947 to1949, and 1953 to 1955.
Trump was able to capitalize on the disappointment of Obama's failures to deliver on his progressive platform by partially playing on the racism latent in U.S. society. Obama's 2008 "Coalition" was unprecedented because it was built on a new consensus and a new set of alliances that brought in white working-class voters from the Midwest. With his 2008 victory, Obama included a big majority in the House and a post-neoliberal consensus that many thought would be the basis for a reversal of the 40 years of economic policy. Even though Obama lost the white working class vote by 18 points, this was a significant improvement over 2004 when they lost them by 23 points and he was able to win because of the turnout of voters of color and students. Obama’s election and subsequent base were buoyed by a movement to the left on war and health care issues and a discrediting of the neoliberal orthodoxy. If the New Deal Coalition was broken by “race” and white backlash to Civil Rights in the 1960s, Obama's victory seems to have meant a decrease in importance to “race” and the beginning of an economic populism.
Many people today forget the astronomical expectations of Obama when he got into office. Obama’s election occurred during the biggest recession since the Great Depression, which challenged the neoliberal “common sense” of the past four decades. Obama’s popularity was nearly 80 percent on the eve of the election. His utterance that the “age of conservatism is through” seemed real. A USA Today/Gallup before the election showed that most Americans believe that Obama would be able to achieve every one of his ten major campaign promises, “from doubling the production of alternative energy to ensuring that all children have health insurance coverage.” However, because Obama and the Democratic Party weren’t willing to deliver a definitive break from neoliberalism, and the left wasn’t able to present a real political alternative, a year later, the Right were able to begin gain back seats and lay the basis for right populism.
Trump was able to win the backing of some white workers largely through playing on their disappointment and promises to reverse the past forty years of austerity and neoliberalism. Through theatrics and vague populist statements, Trump imbues the aura of fighting for working people instead of trimming around the edges like Obama. A 2017 Harvard Business Review textual analysis of Trump’s campaign speeches showed that the word “workers” appeared more frequently than any other word other than “donors”, even going as far as promising to make the Republican Party a “Workers’ Party” .
The Republican establishment and the left backing Biden are on an impossible quest to defend institutions that no longer have legitimacy. Democrats like AOC are happy to frame the contest as one between ‘fascism’ on one hand and ‘democracy’ on the other. The left backing Biden tend to be reformist who see crises as cyclical but short term and don’t require radical change or the self activity (strikes, protests, etc) of working people. The capitalist economic and political systems are crisis prone, and will cause misery and pain in the service of finding a resolution. The huge unemployment rate, skyrocketing sovereign debt, global pandemic, and crisis of legitimacy, not to mention the ecological crisis, make it likely that this Recession will be deeper than even 2008.
As we have learned in other periods, things getting worse do not necessarily lead to increases in political struggle and victories for the left. The crisis of the 1970s brought a neoliberal settlement – a victory for the Right and capital. The threat of fascism today can only be countered by a political strategy. Recognizing that the balance of power is by far stacked against the workers movement, the left must urgently provide the basis for a political alternative. The left must have an answer to unemployment, COVID, and the threat of war outside of simply defending capitalist institutions from the far right that seeks to remake them. It means taking away the fascist base.
