nuclear

The Rosenbergs: Traitors or Heroes?

By Stephen Millies


Republished from Struggle La Lucha.


In his funeral eulogy for Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, W.E.B. Du Bois declared, “They died because they would not lie.” The Rosenbergs were burned to death in the electric chair by the U.S. government on Juneteenth 1953.

Du Bois, the legendary Black scholar, also arranged the adoption of the Rosenbergs’ two young children, Michael and Robert. The Jewish orphans were adopted by Anne Meeropol and Abel Meeropol. Abel wrote “Strange Fruit,” a song about lynching that Billie Holiday made famous. 

The Rosenbergs were blamed for the Soviet Union being able to develop an atomic bomb. Their frame-up and execution for espionage during the Korean War was the peak of the anti-communist witch hunt in the United States. 

The ruling class was in a frenzy because of the Chinese Revolution. The Soviet Union’s ability to defend itself against the Pentagon’s nukes made the banksters even more mad.

The FBI and corporate media insisted the Soviets “stole the secret” of the atom bomb. The real secret was revealed when the U.S. dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, on Aug. 6, 1945. By incinerating 100,000 people, including 30,000 Korean slave laborers, the Pentagon showed it was possible to develop nuclear weapons.

Showing it was what made it knowable. Some of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project — the code name for the U.S. atom bomb project — gave the Soviets five years to match the U.S. effort. 

The rub wouldn’t be in the theoretical work. U.S. scientists knew the Soviet Union had capable physicists.

Among them was Lev Landau, who would win the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1962. Even before the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian chemist Dmitri Mendeleev had devised the periodic table of the elements.

U.S. scientists thought the Soviets would have difficulty in making extremely pure chemicals and seals to lock in corrosive gases. Because of socialist economic planning, the Soviet Union was able to concentrate its efforts and explode a nuclear device on Aug. 29, 1949. It took four years, not five, to produce.

Decades of lies

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover immediately set out to nab the “communist spies” that smuggled secrets. How else could those “stupid people” in the Soviet Union have produced nuclear weapons? 

U.S. schoolchildren were taught their country was the land of great inventors like Thomas Edison. Newspapers told their readers that only the U.S. could have built the bomb.

Thirty years later, President Ronald Reagan said there wasn’t a Russian word for freedom. (There is. It’s svoboda.) 

So U.S. capitalists were astonished when the Soviet Union sent the first artificial satellite into space on Nov. 7, 1957 — the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Claims that the Sputnik satellite was the result of spying fell flat. The Pentagon wasn’t able to launch its own satellite until months later, on Jan. 31, 1958.

It would have been much more difficult to execute the Rosenbergs after Sputnik. It shattered the bigoted conception that 150 different nationalities in the Soviet Union couldn’t do science.

Today another big lie is being told. The People’s Republic of China is being blamed for the COVID-19 pandemic.

With no evidence, the media and even comedians like Jon Stewart are claiming the coronavirus “leaked” from a Wuhan laboratory. This is a blood libel similar to blaming Jewish people for plagues in medieval Europe or the racist myth that immigrants bring diseases to the U.S.

Building a frame-up

The FBI framed the Rosenbergs and a co-defendant, Morton Sobell, by connecting dots and forging evidence. At the end of World War II, the Communist Party in the United States had around 75,000 members, according to the University of Washington’s “Mapping Social Movements” project, including thousands of Black members. They fought racism and built unions.  

Over 10,000 party members were members of the U.S. armed forces. Some party members had government jobs, including the electrical engineer Julius Rosenberg, who was employed at Fort Monmouth army base in New Jersey.

The Manhattan Project had 130,000 employees. U.S. army counterintelligence agents constantly spied on them. 

Even J. Robert Oppenheimer, considered to be the father of the atomic bomb, was a suspect. The army hesitated appointing Oppenheimer to lead the Manhattan Project’s Los Alamos laboratory because of his left-wing associations before the war.

Yet with thousands of U.S. Army and FBI agents prowling around, nobody claimed to have found any spy rings until after the Soviets exploded their bomb.

Julius Rosenberg was fired from his civilian job with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in January 1945 as a suspected communist. (He actually resigned his membership in 1942.) But Julius wasn’t arrested until July 1950.

At the time there were still around 40,000 Communist Party members. Hundreds of thousands of people had worked with the CP or the Young Communist League.

That was a big talent pool for Hoover and his FBI agents to construct a frame-up by matching people with left-wing backgrounds. They found out that Julius Rosenberg’s brother-in-law David Greenglass, an ex-YCL member, had worked as a machinist at Los Alamos. 

Presto! The “Rosenberg spy ring” was invented.

Under threat of the death penalty, David Greenglass told prosecutors whatever they wanted. His lying testimony sent his sister Ethel Rosenberg to the electric chair. It took five jolts of electricity to kill her.

Show trial

The Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell were convicted in a show trial. Although at the time a quarter of New York City’s population was Jewish, not a single Jewish juror was chosen.

One of the federal prosecutors was Roy Cohn, who had illegal “ex parte” conversations with presiding Judge Irving Kaufman in which Cohn urged the death penalty. After serving as Senator Joe McCarthy’s sidekick, Cohn became a lawyer and mentor for Donald Trump.

The evidence was flimsy. David Greenglass produced three crude sketches. One looked like a pie chart. A baby carriage couldn’t have been made from them, much less an atomic bomb.

Greenglass said his spy contact was Harry Gold, a chemist and pathological liar who admitted that he “lied for a period of 16 years.” Gold also claimed to be a courier for Klaus Fuchs, a scientist at Los Alamos.

Fuchs confessed he was a spy to a Scotland Yard detective and was jailed in Britain. Fuchs identified Gold as his contact from a picture.  

Fuchs’ statement and identification of Gold is questionable. Fuchs never confronted Gold in a U.S. court and thus couldn’t be cross-examined. It’s striking that the convictions of Greenglass, Gold and Fuchs would have been impossible without their confessions.

The FBI even suspected future Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman, who had been Fuchs’ roommate at Los Alamos. FBI agents changed their mind only because Feynman was completely non-political.

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Morton Sobell was indicted because he was a schoolmate of Julius Rosenberg at New York’s City College and a former YCL member. The only witness against Sobell was Max Elitcher, who claimed vaguely to have seen Sobell visit Julius Rosenberg while carrying a container that could have had film in it. 

He then said he had no idea what was in the container, yet Sobell was sentenced to 30 years in prison.  He served 17, including five years at Alcatraz.

The prosecution stressed that Sobell and his family went to Mexico after David Greenglass was arrested. If Sobell was such a master spy, wouldn’t the Soviets have tried to help him escape?

Instead Mexican secret police kidnapped Sobell and turned him over to FBI agents at the border.

A key piece of evidence was forged. A hotel card from the Albuquerque Hilton was introduced to prove Harry Gold was in town to meet David Greenglass on June 3, 1945.

Miriam and Walter Schneir were authors of “Invitation to an Inquest,” a detailed exposé of the Rosnberg-Sobell case. They looked at copies of the card. It had different date stamps on the front and back despite Gold having checked in and out on the same day. 

When the Schneirs sought to examine the original card, the FBI told them that the evidence was destroyed, even though J. Edgar Hoover called the Rosenberg case “the crime of the century.”

Smearing the dead

Millions of people around the world rallied around the Rosenbergs. They saw parallels between their frame-up and the anti-Jewish persecution of French army officer Alfred Dreyfus decades before.

The American Jewish Committee, which represents the small section of the Jewish Community that’s capitalist, didn’t think so. Writing in the AJC’s Commentary magazine, historian Lucy Dawidowicz endorsed the Rosenbergs’ execution. 

Today when Jewish youth join marches supporting Palestinian liberation, Commentary magazine supports bombing and starving Gaza.

The publication of “Invitation to an Inquest” in 1965 sparked new interest in the Rosenberg and Sobell cases. The U.S. deep state counterattacked, particularly after the overthrow of the Soviet Union.

The FBI and CIA say they have proof that the Rosenbergs and Sobell were guilty. They point to the “Venona Project,” which consists of allegedly deciphered messages between Soviet agents in the U.S. and their Moscow headquarters. The documents claim to show that the Rosenbergs, Sobell and dozens of other people in the U.S. were Soviet agents.

Why should anybody believe U.S. spy agencies? These are the folks that told the world that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Even if the Venona papers are genuine, the rub is matching code names with individuals.  One of the alleged code names for Julius Rosenberg was “liberal.” Does that sound like a name for an accused communist super-spy? 

The code name linked to Morton Sobell described him as having a wooden leg, which he didn’t have. There was no code name for Ethel Rosenberg.

The Venona Project smeared a series of liberals who couldn’t defend themselves since they were dead. That was the case of the economist Harry Dexter White, who worked in the U.S. Treasury Department.

The deep state and the ultra-right use the Venona papers to support Joe McCarthy’s phony charge that President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration was filled with communists.

The documents have also been used to rehabilitate Elizabeth Bentley’s tarnished reputation. The professional liar gave dishonest testimony against the Rosenbergs, defendants in other trials and before a series of congressional witch-hunting committees.

Typical of the so-called “red spy queen” was her claim to have given the secret date of the Normandy landings to the Soviets. Actually, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower informed the Soviets of when D-Day would occur. He did so because he wanted them to launch an offensive and prevent German troops from being withdrawn from the Eastern Front.

Never forget the Rosenbergs

“I consider your crime worse than murder,” declared Judge Kaufman when he sentenced the Rosenbergs to the electric chair  

Worse than the killers of the 14-year-old Emmett Till? The two racists who tortured the Black youth to death got off scot-free. 

Gen. Douglas MacArthur wanted to drop dozens of atom bombs on Korea and China. Judge Kaufman blamed the Rosenbergs for the U.S. not being able to do so.

Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote in his memoirs that the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs wanted President John F. Kennedy to approve a plan to launch nuclear first strikes against the socialist countries.

The whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg revealed that the Pentagon plan would have killed 600 million people. 

What if the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell had helped the Soviets build an atom bomb? It was only because the Soviet Union — and later the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — were able to develop a deterrent to the Pentagon’s arsenal of atomic and hydrogen bombs that a nuclear holocaust was averted. 

But the Rosenbergs and Sobell didn’t have the ability to penetrate the Manhattan Project. The FBI wanted them to finger dozens of liberals to back up Joe McCarthy’s fantastic claim of “20 years of treason” under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. 

The courage of Ethel Rosenberg, Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell prevented this nightmare.

Ethel Rosenberg was electrocuted for supposedly typing reports. She was arrested almost a month after Julius Rosenberg was jailed to put pressure on him to lie.

David Greenglass later admitted he lied about Ethel Rosenberg’s typing. Justice demands that Ethel Rosenberg be given a presidential pardon.

When Morton Sobell was 91 years old, he was badgered by New York Times reporter Sam Harris into saying he and Julius Rosenberg offered information to the Soviets. It was from their jobs as electrical engineers, not from the Manhattan Project.

Twenty-seven million Soviet people died defeating Hitler. Yet during World War II both Britain and the United States refused to share new anti-aircraft weapons and radar with the Soviets.

If Morton Sobell and Julius Rosenberg did indeed help the Soviets, it wasn’t espionage to help a gallant ally. It was whistleblowing, like Daniel Ellsberg did when he released the Pentagon Papers or the truth-telling by Chelsea Manning about U.S. war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The best way to honor the Rosenbergs is to fight even harder to free Mumia Abu-Jamal, Leonard Peltier, Ruchell Cinque Magee, Sundiata Acoli, Mutulu Shakur and dozens of other political prisoners.

One way to do so is to donate to the Rosenberg Fund for Children, which helps the children of political prisoners, at RFC.org.

Hegemonic Silence and the Nuclear Question

By Marcus Kahn

Imagine a NASA rocket loaded with astronauts reaches another galaxy. They find a planet inhabited by billions of advanced sentient beings and begin to observe them from above. The scientists learn that these beings, delineated into warring factions, have developed a technology capable of destroying their world hundreds of times over, and have set those weapons up in such a way that not only can they be launched at a moment’s notice and detonated within minutes, but are also prone to error and entail massive risk. But when the scientists tune in to the planet’s communications, conversational and broadcasted, they become deeply perplexed. The inhabitants barely speak of the suicidal threat they pose to themselves. They hardly seem to be thinking about it. This is the conundrum posed by nuclear weapons. 

How can such extreme potentialities lie largely unquestioned and undiscussed? 

The term socialization captures our gravitation to conformity, how we acquire norms through the pressures of our environment. That first day of school is scary and unfamiliar, but by the time you reach high school you are sitting and getting up according to a bell schedule without a second thought. Indoctrination adds in a directional quality; socialization that occurs along the contours of norms prescribed by dominant forces, to be internalized and replicated as unconscious obedience. By the time you graduate high school, you have received a social science education that has prepared you to support the status quo. Both terms ring true.  It may be human to err, but in an imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy it is human to normalize the unconscionable and transmute it into a commonsense assumption. The comprehensiveness of this process is most evident in our apparent equanimity to the prospect of complete annihilation, in our hegemonic silence. 

The boundaries of debate around nuclear weapons are closely gatekept by the state, ostensibly in the interests of security. Information on oscillations in the nuclear weapons threat is classified, reserved for state actors with adequate clearance who distribute updates to select media outlets, if not directly to the public. What the public receives is highly filtered. 

The Kennedy administration’s public narrative around the Cuban Missile Crisis crystallized into typical presidential hagiography in the intervening sixty years despite being thoroughly contradicted by subsequent academic research (pro tip: don’t record everything you say in the Oval Office if you want to deceive the American public in perpetuity).   The visual trope of a mushroom clouds in a cartoon is more familiar than the destruction and confusion on the ground in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Our imagination lacks essential context when it comes to conceptualizing the nuclear threat. 

However, even in a coherent and powerful doctrinal system, dissent and counter-narratives can slip through chinks in the institutional armor. Much like the scientific consensus around climate change, members of the scientific community have stepped outside the invisible boundaries of dominant system-supportive narratives. But these boundaries can be ideologically policed. In the 1980s, Carl Sagan published a study alongside a group of well-reputed scientists that argued even a limited nuclear war would lead to a catastrophic nuclear winter. Because their conclusions would have galvanized the peace movement and altered public perception of nuclear war planning, the scientists were subsequently marginalized and their work dismissed.  

These narrative trends skew public perception away towards deterrence strategies and away from a critical abolitionist stance. New York Times columnist David Brooks, during an uncharacteristic foray into epistemology, unknowingly identifies the scope of a doctrinal system in an article titled “How to Destroy Truth.” Brooks argues that “propositional knowledge” that “we acquire through reason, logical proof, and tight analysis” constitutes one of two reservoirs of collective knowledge. This body of knowledge is produced by “a network of institutions — universities, courts, publishers, professional societies, media outlets — that have set up an interlocking set of procedures to hunt for error, weigh evidence and determine which propositions pass muster.” To read between the lines, Brooks implicitly argues that powerful institutions determine the nature of truth in modern society. That which “passes muster” is legitimized, and if broadly accepted, eventually internalized within the canon of collective assumptions.

Is the Iran Nuclear Agreement Dead?

By Mazda Majidi

Republished from Liberation News.

On Aug. 6, Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian called on the United States to have a “realistic response” to Iran’s proposals in the ongoing negotiations on the JCPOA, or Iran nuclear agreement. Meanwhile, the Europeans, who are acting as intermediaries in the U.S.-Iran negotiations said in a statement: “The text is on the table. There will be no re-opening of negotiations. Iran must now decide to conclude the deal while this is still possible.”

If we follow U.S. media coverage, it is easy to adopt the false narrative that the ongoing negotiations are at a standstill because the new “hardline” administration of Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi is not really negotiating in good faith. The Europeans, supposedly the impartial deal brokers, have done much to bolster this narrative, obfuscating the obvious reason why the deal needs to be renegotiated to begin with. 

Russian and Chinese officials, the other signatories to the agreement, have made realistic statements throughout, pointing to the fact that the United States broke the agreement and the onus is on the U.S. to make amends for it. But, as portrayed in the U.S. media, Russia and China are pariah states whose words are unreliable, while the friendly European junior imperialists are to be trusted.

And then, there is the U.S. sponsored settler state in the Middle East, Israel, a nuclear-powered state whose every statement of concern about Iran’s non-existent nuclear weapons is taken as legitimate.

What is the JCPOA?

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is an agreement signed on July 14, 2015, under the Obama administration. The signatories are Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — Germany and the European Union.

According to the JCPOA, the United States and others recognized Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. This is a right guaranteed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but one that imperialist powers had effectively refused to recognize up until then. Iran would implement the “Additional Protocol,” giving the International Atomic Energy Agency more powers to monitor its nuclear facilities. 

Additionally, Iran would reduce two-thirds of its uranium enrichment activity and ship out all of its enriched uranium above 300 kg abroad. The Fordow facility, built inside a hollowed-out mountain and virtually impenetrable by aerial bombardment, would remain operational, but only as a research center. The heavy water plant at Arak would continue operating, but redesigned to make it impossible to produce weapons-grade plutonium, if that were the intent.

Once the IAEA confirmed that these steps were taken, the United States would lift all nuclear-related economic sanctions, including oil embargos and financial restrictions.

The JCPOA worked for the remainder of President Obama’s administration. By all accounts, Iran complied with the agreement throughout. But, in October 2017, the administration of President Donald Trump unilaterally and illegally pulled out of the JCPOA and re-imposed sanctions on Iran in direct violation of the agreement.

How did Biden approach the JCPOA once elected?

Following the 2020 U.S. elections, many were hoping that President Joe Biden would quickly undo the Trump violation of the JCPOA, have the United States live up to its commitments and remove the sanctions on Iran as required by the agreement. It didn’t take long, however, until it became clear that the Biden administration was going to play hard ball.

First, Secretary of State Antony Blinken demanded that Iran return to compliance before the United States would. This was a ridiculous demand on its face as it was incontestable that it was the Trump administration that had violated the agreement, not Iran. In fact, even after Trump’s violation of the agreement, Iran had remained in compliance for about a year in a show of good faith.

In subsequent months, the United States raised the issue of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Iran has made scientific advances, making its missiles capable of reaching Israel. To the U.S. and Israel, this is unacceptable.

It is certainly fine for Israel to own nuclear bombs and missiles capable of delivering them to Iran any time. It is also perfectly acceptable for Israeli officials to threaten Iran day and night. But for Iran to have any means of defending itself, or showing that it can strike back, is unacceptable in imperialist circles.

In the next stage of the negotiations, the United States and Europe have continuously raised the objection that Iran is raising demands that are outside of the JCPOA, specifically Iran’s demand that the United States drop Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. If the United States dropped its demands that were outside of the JCPOA framework, the line goes, Iran should drop the demand of the United States dropping the IRGC from the terrorist list.

In an April 24 call with Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Biden conveyed that the U.S. decision to maintain the IRGC on the terrorist list is final and that the U.S. would make no more concessions to Iran.

But this goes to the very heart of the JCPOA. Removal of sanctions was Iran’s sole incentive for entering the agreement. The designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization enables the United States to impose widespread economic sanctions on Iran, irrespective of the JCPOA. In fact, on March 20, 2017, the Trump administration formally certified that Iran was in compliance with JCPOA, but added that the country will be subject to non-nuclear, terrorism-related sanctions. The Trump administration refused to recertify Iran’s compliance in October 2017, however, citing multiple violations.

Economic importance of Revolutionary Guards

The IRGC is a major wing of Iran’s military. Much like the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, but on a much larger scale, the IRGC is involved in construction projects all around the country. In fact, as sanctions have driven out foreign investments and put a damper on domestic investments, the economic prominence of the IRGC has increased.

Without the removal of the IRGC from the U.S. terrorist list, Iran will effectively have to return to compliance, agreeing to restrictions on its nuclear program that other countries do not, while getting nothing in return. Pointing to the role of the IRGC in various economic projects, there will be no meaningful relief of sanctions.

Which side is hardline?

What the United States is presenting to Iran is this: Return to compliance with the JCPOA, allow unannounced inspections of your nuclear facilities to take place on demand, allow cameras to monitor some of your military sites 24/7, ship your enriched uranium out of the country, shut down the Fordo uranium enrichment facility — the only one that is impenetrable to a U.S./Israeli bombing. In return, the United States will see what it can do about removing sanctions on entities that it does not perceive as being in any way related to the IRGC. And, by the way, if a Republican administration gets elected in 2024, we are going to pull out of the JCPOA again.

With these being the effective terms of the negotiations to revive the JCPOA, it speaks to the highly biased coverage of the corporate media that the dominant narrative is that Iran’s new hardline administration does not want an agreement.

The task of socialists and other antiwar activists in the United States is to expose our government’s criminal foreign policy, whether it comes in the form of invasions, occupations and other military interventions, sanctions, coups, or funding right-wing opposition forces in targeted countries.

The U.S. imperialist ruling class is not there to benefit the working class, but to benefit its sponsors, big capital. The enemies of the Pentagon and the State Department are not the real enemies of the American people. The danger of future war and annihilation does not come from Iran, which has no nuclear weapons and a small fraction of the military might of the terrifying U.S. military. It is the U.S. government that is the primary danger to peace among the people on earth and to life on the planet itself.  

The Question of War with North Korea: A Geopolitical Breakdown

By Devon Bowers

The summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un while photo worthy, was a disaster. Yet, it wasn't due to Trump 'getting played' as so many in the media would have one think, but rather was due to the US wanting to make demands without offering any concessions.

North Korea released a statement early July 2018 in which they "accused the Trump administration on Saturday of pushing a "unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization' and called [the meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo] 'deeply regrettable." [1] More importantly, after the summit, President Trump went and said that North Korea was still an "extraordinary threat,"[2] despite the whole intention of the summit being to lower tensions between the two nations. Given the fact that war between the two (and allied nations) may still break out, it would be pertinent to discuss what such a war would look like, starting with interested parties.


The United States

The US has been deeply involved in the Korean peninsula for the past nearly seven decades and currently has around 28,000 personnel deployed there. [3] While times have changed, the US still retains major interests with regards to the peninsula.

Generally, US concerns with NK include "verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program," the halting of "nuclear or ballistic missile proliferation,"[4] and reduction of tensions with Japan.

The US is especially concerned with North Korea's nuclear program, as can be seen in their training exercises. In December 2017, US troops trained in exercise Warrior Strike IX which "[putting] them on North Korean soil, with the objective of 'infiltrating' and 'removing weapons of mass destruction." [5] Such exercises are nothing new, as in March 2013, the US began its Winter Wargame in which they simulated "how many American troops would be needed to go in and secure North Korea's nuclear arsenal if Kim's regime collapsed." [6]

Collapse is also a concern as it "would have severe implications for trade and the regional-if not global-economy" and "the potential for major strategic consequences (including control of the North's nuclear arsenal) and a massive humanitarian crisis, not to mention long-term economic and social repercussions, loom large." [7] Such drills are of major concern for the North Korean leadership which has always condemned such exercises and sees them as dangerous and provocative.

Nuclear weapons are extremely important for the North Korean government as not only are the drills seen as a threat, but, looking around the world, they have right to be concerned. In private meetings, North Korean officials "have often stated that they do not intend to become 'another Iraq' or 'another Libya'- countries that, in the North Korean view, succumbed to the United States because they did not have a 'nuclear deterrent."[8] This is further supported by that fact that Donald Greg, US ambassador to Seoul under President Obama, was told by the North Koreans, "we noticed you never attack anyone with nuclear weapons so that's why we developed them" and issued a statement after the attack on Libya, which read, in part:

The situation in Libya is a lesson for the international community. It has been shown to the corners of the earth that Libya's giving up its nuclear arms, which the U.S. liked to chatter on about, was used as an invasion tactic to disarm the country by sugarcoating it with words like 'the guaranteeing of security' and 'the bettering of relations. [9] (emphasis added)

Despite the government being labeled such things as 'insane' and 'crazy' they are acting quite rationally using their nuclear program as a deterrent from unwanted US interference and invasion.

The reliance on nuclear weapons makes sense, given past incidents involving the US, such as the Chenonan incident in 2010, where the South Korean ship, the Cheonan, sunk and blame was immediately laid at the feet of North Korea.[10] This is despite some people questioning the evidence being presented to the public [11] and questions being raised even in South Korea's own official reports. [12]

There was also the Sony hack in December 2014. North Korea was accused of hacking the corporation when they released The Interview, a comedy film that was critical of the North Korean government. As soon as the hack occurred, NK was already being blamed, with the FBI saying that "it determined North Korea was responsible based on an analysis of the malware involved and its similarities to previous attacks the U.S. government [attributed] to North Korean-allied hackers, including an assault on South Korean banks and media outlets in 2013." [13] In response to the hack, the US placed sanctions on NK. [14] However, what is interesting in regards to all of this is that it is quite questionable if North Korea was in fact the source of the hacking.

If you are a victim of hacking, especially on a national level, it can be quite difficult to determine who is responsible. Bruce Schneier, a fellow and lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School, noted in an Atlantic article:

Ordinarily, you could determine who the attacker was by the weaponry. When you saw a tank driving down your street, you knew the military was involved because only the military could afford tanks. Cyberspace is different. In cyberspace, technology is broadly spreading its capability, and everyone is using the same weaponry: hackers, criminals, politically motivated hacktivists, national spies, militaries, even the potential cyberterrorist. They are all exploiting the same vulnerabilities, using the same sort of hacking tools, engaging in the same attack tactics, and leaving the same traces behind. They all eavesdrop or steal data. They all engage in denial-of-service attacks. They all probe cyberdefences and do their best to cover their tracks.[15] (emphasis added)

Due to many different actors utilizing similar tactics and techniques to obtain information, quickly pointing fingers seems to do a disservice.

While the military realm of North Korea has been aggressive, the diplomatic realm has been something of a mixed bag.

President Obama's main goals with regards to NK were to 1) keep Six Party Talks open, however, with the caveat that NK take 'irreversible' steps to denuclearize first, 2) insist that the Talks be preceded by an improvement in relations between the two Koreas, and 3) respond "to Pyongyang's provocations by tightening sanctions against North Korean entities, conducting a series of military exercises, and expanding U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation." [16] This was a policy of 'strategic patience' which was essentially a carrot-and-stick approach of handling North Korea, where talks and deals could be made in times of peace, but when problems mounted, sanctions would come into play. There were some major problems with this, as rather than focusing on denuclearization of North Korea, the Obama administration seemed more concerned about non-proliferation of WMDs. This is supported by statements from US officials such as "Jeff Bader, former Senior Director on the East Asian Affairs in the National Security Council, [who] stated in an interview that while pursing bilateral talks with North Korea, the United States would focus on reducing, delaying and freezing the North Korean nuclear program, leaving complete denuclearization in the hands of history."[17]

Obama's strategy didn't work from the get-go as North Korea left the six party talks after "Pyongyang test-fired a modified Taepo Dong-2 three-stage rocket, ostensibly as part of its civilian space program" to which the UN Security Council "issued a presidential statement April 13 [2009] calling the test a violation of Resolution 1718, and expanded sanctions on North Korean firms shortly afterwards." [18] Furthermore, this focus on proliferation rather than denuclearization allowed North Korea to make gains in its program, most notably, by conducting "two underground nuclear explosions and several banned missile tests" [19] in April 2013.

Relations deteriorated further in April 2016 with President Obama stating that "we [the US] could, obviously, destroy North Korea with our [nuclear] arsenals."[20] This was in the context of increased tensions as just a month earlier (March 2016) the US and South Korea launched two military drills, one of which was Operation Key Resolve which tested "the new U.S.-South Korean military strategy operation plan, Operations Plan 5015, which aims to deter North Korea's possible use of weapons of mass destruction by preemptive attack." [21] From NK's perspective, the exercise was "offensive rather than defensive and is aimed at occupying [North Korea] by preemptive strike." It was further noted:

The aggressive nature of the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises is also apparent in setting their targets, like examination of feasibility of operations like "removal of the leadership," "occupying Pyongyang," "regime change," "preemptive nuclear strike" and "decapitation raids," which can never be found in other countries' joint military drills. [22]

While idea of war was in the background, the US 2016 presidential elections brought someone who, at least at first, seemed to strike a different tone on the matter.

The 2016 elections saw the explosion of unlikely presidential candidate Donald Trump, who brought some unconventional thinking to the political arena. In May 2016, Trump said that he would be "willing to talk to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to try to stop Pyongyang's nuclear program, proposing a major shift in U.S. policy toward the isolated nation." [23] The following month, he said that he would be willing to have Kim Jong-Un come to the White House, arguing "What the hell is wrong with speaking?" [24] This was not just a "major shift" from US policy, it was utterly unheard of.

Unfortunately, these ideas weren't to last as when Trump became President he began to condemn North Korea, saying that "the 'greatest immediate threat' to the US is North Korea and its nuclear program" [25] In August 2017, in a war of words between the two leaders, President Trump said to reporters that "North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States" and that "They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen." [26] Such comments only aided in further straining already tense relations between the two nations, but the even larger problem seems to be the people who are surrounding him, namely John Bolton.

John Bolton isn't just known for his role in promoting the 2003 Iraq War, but is generally known as a major foreign policy hawk with neoconservative credentials. Not too soon before becoming National Security Adviser to President Trump, he penned an article for the Wall Street Journal entitled "The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First," where he says, in part:

The threat [from North Korea] is imminent, and the case against pre-emption rests on the misinterpretation of a standard that derives from prenuclear, pre-ballistic-missile times. Given the gaps in U.S. intelligence about North Korea, we should not wait until the very last minute. That would risk striking after the North has deliverable nuclear weapons, a much more dangerous situation. (emphasis added)

Necessity in the nuclear and ballistic-missile age is simply different than in the age of steam. What was once remote is now, as a practical matter, near; what was previously time-consuming to deliver can now arrive in minutes; and the level of destructiveness of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is infinitely greater than that of the steamship Caroline's weapons cargo. [27]

It is interesting to note that despite the title, no actual legal argument is made in the article. Still, Bolton argues that due to the idea that at some point in the future North Korea is going to engage in a military, possibly nuclear, attack on the United States, that the US thus has the right to attack North Korea.

Thinking such as this should worry everyone as this is the kind of person who is giving President Trump advice and there is no one to seriously push back on it for the most part. While Steve Bannon and his cohorts aren't good people by any means, at least they represented something of an anti-interventionist front, especially when one looks at Bannon's comments regarding the North Korea situation and how it could only be solved politically.[28]

Relations between the two countries seemed as if they might improve slightly with the summit in June 2018 between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. However, as aforementioned, this went awry due to US demands without concessions. What should be noted, however, is the media's response to the summit, with articles such as Kim Jong Un has played Trump like a Stradivarius by Max Boot in the Washington Post and How Donald Trump Got Played By a Ruthless Dictator by Andy Kroll of the Rolling Stone. Many in the media, in print and television, were incessantly talking about how President Trump was going to 'get played' by Kim. Effectively, the arguments revolved around 1) by even meeting with Kim, Trump was putting North Korea on the same level as the US, 2) that diplomacy with North Korea won't work due to them having reneged on such efforts in the past 3) that Trump 'got nothing' from the summit, and 4) it was a mistake to stop the war games. Each of these arguments should be examined in more detail.

Addressing the first point, that talking to North Korea legitimizes them, such an argument doesn't make sense. The United States and rest of the world already recognizes NK as a sovereign nation, thus giving them legitimacy. However, this argument is more about how the US shouldn't legitimize the North Korean government and the horrid things it has done. To rebut that, one only has to look at who the US allies itself with, such as Saudi Arabia. People are hand wringing about acknowledging NK, when they are silent about how the US is buddy-buddy with Saudi Arabia, a nation that is currently bombing the ever-loving hell out of Yemen to the point where the Yemeni people are starving [29] and Saudi Arabia is said to have committed war crimes [30] and, some speculate, is possibly engaging in genocide. [31] On top of that, the US has a history of and continues to provide aid to dictators. [32] Thus, the argument that due to Kim Jong-Un's government oppressing the North Korean people means the US shouldn't talk to him doesn't hold water as the US is fine talking to and even aiding oppressive governments around the world.

The idea that diplomacy won't work with North Korea reneging on deals in the past is quite plausible, however, ignores certain details. The only time the US made major gains with North Korea was when engaging in serious diplomacy, as President Bill Clinton did. In 1994, the US and North Korea settled upon the Agreed Framework.

Just four pages long, the agreement said that North Korea would shut down its main nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, abandon two others, and seal fuel that could potentially be used to create a nuclear weapon. In exchange, the U.S. would provide oil to make up for the fuel lost from the dismantled plants and would build two new "light fuel" plants from which it would be harder to extract nuclear materials. If North Korea did try to get fuel out of the new plants, it would be easy for nuclear watchdogs to identify-and hard to hide. In addition, the agreement promised that the U.S. would lift economic sanctions and its diplomatic freeze on North Korea and agree that it would not use nuclear weapons of its own on North Korea. [33]

This represented a major milestone of progress in US-North Korean relations and proved that diplomacy with North Korea actually worked. Unfortunately, the US Congress refused to provide funding for the project and thus the light fuel plants were never built. Some may bring up the fact that North Korea continued its uranium enrichment program and thus broke the deal, however, that's not entirely accurate. "The Agreed Framework covered only North Korea's plutonium program; it said nothing about uranium enrichment. North Korea maneuvered around the agreement but didn't violate it"[34] and they did this only after four years of the US not holding up its end of the bargain.

The position that President Trump got nothing from the deal is true, but not for the reasons people are arguing, such as him 'getting played' by Kim Jong-Un. From the get-go, the US wasn't making concessions. Specifically, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said before the summit that "the United States [had] not made any concessions to the regime and will continue to hold firm until Pyongyang takes 'credible steps' toward denuclearization." [35] The US retained this stand even after the summit as Pompeo said that the US wouldn't ease sanctions on North Korea until they denuclearized. [36] During the entire situation, as Washington Post columnist Marc A. Thiessen notes:

Trump made no real concessions in Singapore. He did not lift sanctions, unfreeze North Korean assets or send secret planes loaded with hard currency to Pyongyang. He did not sign an agreement ending the Korean War or offer Pyongyang diplomatic recognition. All the president did was, as a goodwill gesture, suspend military exercises with South Korea - a decision he can easily reverse. [37] (emphasis added)

Demands without concessions, diplomacy does not make.

With regards to the war games, as was just noted, it is something that can be reversed without much hassle. It is important as the North Korean government sees these war games as provocative and that the US and South Korea are preparing to invade it. By not having them, it helps to create an environment where the two parties can begin to discuss and talk out the situation, without the ever-present specter of war behind them.

While far away, there are much closer nations that are quite interested in the peninsula, namely, China, Russia, and Japan.


China

China not only borders North Korea, but has a long history with the nation, going back to their intervention in the Korean War on the side of the North. While the times have changed, China still remains heavily invested in North Korea.

Generally, the Chinese main priority is stability on the peninsula, especially with regards to the North Korean leadership and the country as a whole as they see North Korea as a buffer between them and the American-backed South Korean government. North Korea's stability is vital to Chinese interests as there would be major political, economic, and humanitarian ramifications were to North Korean government to be destabilized or collapse altogether. "However unpredictable and annoying the North Korean government may be to Beijing, any conceivable scenario other than maintaining the status quo could seriously damage PRC interests."[38] To this end, "China's food and energy assistance can be seen as an insurance premium that Beijing remits regularly to avoid paying the higher economic, political, and national security costs" [39] of a collapse or war.

On the question of nuclear weapons, China is rather wary of North Korea's nuclear program as they are worried that it could potentially create a nuclear arms race of sorts, inspiring nations such as Japan and Taiwan to pursue their own nuclear weapons/deterrents in doing so put the entire region on edge. Additionally, the Chinese government wants to avoid such proliferation as it could result in nations being more able to defend their national interests when engaged in conflicts with China, such as debates over the South China Sea. [40]

China supports the reunification of the Korean peninsula, however, they favor a peaceful environment to first be fostered without the interference of outside nations such as the United States. They support this via " direct dialogue, reconciliation and cooperation between the two [Koreas] and [encourage] economic cooperation and prosperity as key factors in achieving unification,"[41] furthermore, to these ends, they don't favor increased sanctions on North Korea as the view is that doing so creates a more hostile environment. On top of all this, reunification allows for a war to be avoided, which, if initiated by the US or South Korea, would force China's hand as China is bound to aid North Korea under the "1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which states that China is obliged to defend North Korea against unprovoked aggression." [42] Furthermore, a war would harm Chinese investments and put their buffer zone at risk.


Russia

Russia, while seemingly far away, actually holds an eleven mile border with North Korea and thus is paying close attention to and attempting to influence the situation.

They too, see North Korea as an important buffer. The Russian National Committee of the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific noted that "the most relevant objective is not attaining a predominate position in Korea, but rather the prevention of the entire peninsula falling under the influence of another state, especially one that is not on truly friendly terms with Russia" [43] and thus it is to their advantage that North Korea act as a buffer state to US interests.

Russia is concerned about NK's nuclear program, however it doesn't have the primary prominence that it does for the United States or South Korea. Rather that lies with increasing Russian influence in North Korea and their military concerns.

Specifically, Russia wants to maintain and grow its relationship with North Korea, primarily in the economic and cultural exchange areas. Such views affect their support for sanctions as promoting them could negatively affect Russia's long-term interests. [44] Russia's economic interests prevent it from honoring its United Nations commitment to economically sanction Pyongyang as it would interfere with their access to North Korean markets and diminish their influence on North Korea. [45] With regards to economics, Russia wants to woo North Korea away from their intense dependence on China, utilizing their special economic zones, such as Rason, which is a home for foreign investment. Like the Chinese, they also want stability in North Korea as it would " open up opportunities to tap into the energy market on the peninsula itself, and further establish regional economic partnerships,"[46] possibly allowing Russia to slightly blunt some of the sanctions put on it after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Militarily, they are worried about the US's National Missile Defense plan, which " if fully implemented, would enhance US nuclear superiority over Russia's smaller, less sophisticated nuclear arsenal" [47] and so the Russians want to reign in North Korea's nuclear program as it gives the US justification for continuing to develop and deploy missile defenses which could potentially give the US an upperhand and even dominance with regards to nuclear superiority vis-à-vis Russia.

There are also concerns about a collapse of the North Korean government which could potentially "increase the likelihood that its nuclear weapons-grade material would end up on the black market, available to transnational criminal organizations as well as terrorist networks." [48] This is of major concern for the Russians given their bloody history with Chechen terrorists which engaged in an act of radiological terrorism in the 1990s [49], in addition to their terrorist acts more generally. [50] Therefore, it is in Russian interests to work to limit North Korea's access to nuclear material and ensure that access is in line with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.


Japan

The Japanese have had long-standing problems with North Korea, specifically with regards to North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens, an issue that remains unresolved.

"From 1977 to 1983, several Japanese citizens living in coastal regions disappeared under strange circumstances," [51] with the truth being revealed in 2002. That year, then-Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, met with then-leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-Il to address outstanding problems between the two countries, which resulted in the Pyongyang Declaration which dealt with several problems, everything from the historical, such as Japan apologizing for the harm done during its colonial rule of Korea to the status of Korean nationals living in Japan. Plans were made to continue talks in October 2002. Unfortunately, things went south when "Pyongyang revealed that 13 Japanese nationals had been taken from Japan and eight of them had died in North Korea" [52] and, post-summit, announced that the five survivors would be temporarily allowed to return to Japan.

The survivors returned to Japan on October 15, 2002 and were greeted with massive enthusiasm from the Japanese public. Initially, it was reported that they would stay for only two weeks, but then the Japanese government allowed them to permanently stay in Japan, after advocacy from the families of the survivors and politicians. Pyongyang was furious at this announcement, as they viewed it as Japan backing out of sending the survivors back to North Korea.

Despite this, the October 2002 talks continued as scheduled, yet focused purely on the abduction issue. When Japan pressed North Korea for information regarding the deaths of the eight other abductees, they were rebuffed. In response, Japan suspended negotiations for nearly two years, resuming them in May 2004, when Koizumi visited Pyongyang again to restart talks, yet nothing of value was gained.

This entire issue launched political careers, such as with Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, of the Liberal Democratic Party, who assumed position in 2006 and, along with his allies, made the abduction issue front and center. [53] He has pushed for major changes to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which doesn't allow the nation to have a military that can engage in offensive operations. In order for it to go through, the measure would have to pass by a two-thirds majority in the Parliament and be subject to a referendum. Currently, there are problems as "it's unclear if Mr. Abe's coalition partners would back the proposal, and [Liberal Democratic Party] leaders acknowledge they don't expect to win support from major opposition parties" and much of the public is "wedded to the country's pacifist ways, and polls suggest a majority aren't ready for Article 9 to change." [54] If Japan's constitutional change were to go through, it would allow Japan's military to acquire cruise missiles and long-ranged air launched missiles which would let Japan attack military bases in North Korea from a distance. [55]

The military threat of North Korea is quite real to the Japanese, who have already had to deal with North Korea missiles being fired near them. Conventionally, there is "the threat posed by North Korea's guerilla incursions, incursions into Japanese territorial waters as well as attacks on Japanese nuclear power facilities along the coast of the Sea of Japan." [56] In terms of missiles, while Japan "continues to invest funds and other resources for the development of a regional missile defense system in order to protect the Japanese territory from North Korean rogue missiles," [57] there are still problems as "the 22 ballistic missiles [North Korea] has tested since February [2017] have all been fired toward Japan, whose capital Tokyo lies just 800 miles from Pyongyang." [58] Such a situation leaves the public and government seriously concerned about both North Korea's missile and nuclear programs.

In order to confront concerns about North Korea, not only is Japan increasing its military[59] , but it is also changing its military organization.

Specifically, the Ground Self-Defense Force is going to be put under a single, unified command and the establishment of an amphibious brigade. Michael Green, the senior vice president for Asia and the Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that this is in response to a reinterpretation of Article 9 in which Japan's military can be used for 'collective self-defense' which "will allow Japanese forces to plan for and potentially participate in joint military operations with the U.S. beyond Japan's home island" and let Japan "engage in anti-submarine warfare, missile defense or other missions in close support of the United States."[60] This is all being done in response to the North Korean missile threat, but also China's probing of Japanese waters.

Given all this, the question must be asked: What would a war with North Korea look like on some level?

As to why a war would start, it would most likely be accidental, with either North Korea or South Korea/the US misinterpreting the moves of the other party[61] and while therefore unlikely, is still a possibility and thus should be examined.

In terms of numbers, North Korea's military is as follows:

- 1,190,000 active, 6,300,000 reserve and 189,000 paramilitary personnel[62]

- "[A]bout 820 combat aircraft, 30 reconnaissance aircraft, and 330 transport aircraft"[63]

- 4,300 tanks and 2,000 special forces soldiers [64]

- 4,000 armored fighting vehicles, 13,000 artillery pieces, 4,500 self-propelled guns, and 5,000 rocket artillery pieces [65]

- 967 naval assets, mainly based in submarines (86) and patrol craft (438)[66]

While some may lambaste the North Korean military as not being a serious threat due to the US and South Korean militaries being better trained and equipped, it doesn't mean that they still can't do damage. As has been noted in the past, NK's artillery could do massive damage to Seoul [67], the South Korean capital, especially if they utilize chemical weapons that North Korea is thought to possess.[68] There are also the special forces soldiers, which are trained to "cover infiltration into the forward and rear areas to strike major units and facilities, assassinations of key personnel, disruption of rear areas and hybrid operations."[69] Thus, in case of a war, major havoc could be wrought in terms of physical destruction and the targeting of political, economic, and military sites.

Furthermore, the actual conditions of war for North Korea would be different. The likelihood of North Korea initiating a war is extremely slim, given the fact that they wouldn't want to have to go up against both the US and South Korea without aid from Russia or China, as China noted in 2017 that engaging in aggressive acts would forfeit Chinese support. [70] Therefore, any war would be initiated by the US and its allies, thus turning it into a defensive war. North Korea's goals would be simply to survive and push back the invasion, with nuclear weapons being used as a last resort, where as the invading nations would have to either do an incursion into North Korea or more likely a toppling of the North Korean government and post war occupation, something that would be much more difficult and costly in terms of money, lives, and material.

In terms of logistics, a North Korean-started war is questionable as well as it isn't even particularly known if they have the capabilities to maintain supply lines far into South Korea. The United States, on the other hand, would have serious logistical problems supporting a war on the peninsula as they already "[don't] have the ability to evacuate [their] own anticipated wounded quickly," with the New York Times noting in February 2018 that the US has "limited ability to evacuate injured troops from the Korean Peninsula daily - a problem more acute if the North retaliated with chemical weapons." [71] Thus, there could be serious problems with resupply, which would hamper fighting effectiveness. This doesn't take into account that current war plans have the US mobilizing "nearly 700,000 US soldiers [that] would be mobilized alongside 160 ships, 1,600 aircraft," [72] all of which would take time to prepare and actually put into theater.

There is also the question of outside nations. In case of a war, China would activate anti-missile systems near their border with North Korea and provide humanitarian aid, however Song Zhongping, a military expert and a TV commentator, noted that "defensive action could lead to engagement if US action on the Korean Peninsula threatens China's core interests." [73] Russia, too, is prepared militarily. In 2017, Russia's Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, stated that "Russia was getting ready for a military standoff between its unruly neighbor and other states around the world" and "We are assessing this and preparing ourselves. We will not be taken by surprise." [74] Thus, it seems everyone is getting prepared for a possible battle.

While the situation with North Korea seems to have stabilized for now, as we know, the situation can change at a moment's notice. The question of war still lingers in the air.


This was originally published on AHTribune.com.


Notes

[1] Gardiner Harris, Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korea Criticizes 'Gangster-Like' U.S. Attitude After Talks With Mike Pompeo," New York Times, July 7, 2018 ( https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/07/world/asia/mike-pompeo-north-korea-pyongyang.html )

[2] BBC, Trump says North Korea still 'extraordinary threat'https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44584957 (June 23, 2018)

[3] Tom Vanden Brook, "Pentagon bases about 28,000 U.S. troops in South Korea," USA Today, June 5, 2018 ( https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/05/u-s-bases-28-000-troops-south-korea-summit-june-12/671126002/ )

[4] Emma Chanlett-Avery, Dick K. Nanto, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, Congressional Research Service, (January 22, 2010), pg 13

[5] Alex Diaz, "US commandos train to capture North Korean nukes," Fox News, December 20, 2017 ( http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/12/20/us-commandos-train-to-capture-north-korean-nukes.html )

[6] Colleen Curry, "U.S. Wargames North Korean Regime Collapse, Invasion to Secure Nukes," ABC News, March 29, 2013 ( http://abcnews.go.com/International/us-wargames-north-korean-regime-collapse-invasion-secure/story?id=18822930 )

[7] Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mi Ae Taylor, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation , Congressional Research Service, (May 6, 2010), pg 2

[8] Evan J. R. Revere, Facing the Facts: Towards a New U.S. North Korea Policy, The Brookings Institute, https://www.brookings.edu/research/facing-the-facts-towards-a-new-u-s-north-korea-policy/ (October 16, 2013), pg 12

[9] Geoffery Ingersoll, The Iraq Invasion Convinced North Korea That It Needed Nukes," Business Insider, April 3, 2013 ( https://www.businessinsider.com/the-iraq-war-spurred-dprk-nuke-research-2013-4 )

[10] Jack Kim, "North Korea torpedoed South's navy ship: report," Reuters, April 21, 2010 ( https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-ship/north-korea-torpedoed-souths-navy-ship-report-idUSTRE63L08W20100422 )

[11] David Cyranoski, Did a North Korean torpedo really sink the Cheonan?, Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/questions-korean-torpedo/

[12] Barbara Demick, John M. Glionna, "Doubts surface on North Korea's role in ship sinking," LA Times, July 23, 2010 ( http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/23/world/la-fg-korea-torpedo-20100724 )

[13] Alex Altman, Zeke J. Miller, "FBI Accuses North Korea in Sony Hack," Time, December 19, 2014 ( http://time.com/3642161/sony-hack-north-korea-the-interview-fbi/ )

[14] Zeke J. Miller, "U.S. Sanctions North Korea Over Sony Hack," Time, January 2, 2015 ( http://time.com/3652479/sony-hack-north-korea-the-interview-obama-sanctions/ )

[15] Bruce Schneier, "We Still Don't Know Who Hacked Sony," The Atlantic, January 5, 2015 ( https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/we-still-dont-know-who-hacked-sony-north-korea/384198/ )

[16] Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Mark E. Manyin, Mary Beth Nitikin, Ian E. Reinhart, U.S.-South Korea Relations, Congressional Research Service, (February 5, 2013), pg 9

[17] Dongsoo Kim, "The Obama administration's policy toward North Korea: the causes and consequences of strategic patience," Journal of Asian Public Policy 9:1 (December 2015), pg 40

[18] Arms Control Association, The Six Party Talks At A Glancehttps://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks

[19] Matt Spetalnick, Anna Yukhananov, "Analysis: North Korea tests Obama's 'strategic patience," Reuters, April 19, 2013 ( https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-obama/analysis-north-korea-tests-obamas-strategic-patience-idUSBRE9380YR20130409 )

[20] David Blair, "'We could destroy you,' Obama warns 'erratic' North Korean leader." The Telegraph, April 26, 2016 ( https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/26/us-developing-missile-shield-to-guard-against-nuclear-attack-fro/ )

[21] Kent Miller, Jeff Schogol, "315,000 U.S. and South Korean troops begin massive exercise as North threatens war," Marine Corps Times, March 5, 2016 ( https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2016/03/05/315000-u-s-and-south-korean-troops-begin-massive-exercise-as-north-threatens-war/ )

[22] Jon Min Dok, Suspend the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises for peace , NK News, https://www.nknews.org/2016/03/suspend-the-u-s-south-korea-joint-military-exercises-for-peace/ (March 15, 2016)

[23] Emily Flitter, Steve Holland, "Exclusive: Trump would talk to North Korea's Kim, wants to renegotiate climate accord," Reuters , May 17, 2016 ( https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-exclusive/exclusive-trump-would-talk-to-north-koreas-kim-wants-to-renegotiate-climate-accord-idUSKCN0Y82JO )

[24] Jeremy Diamond, "Trump says he would host Kim Jong Un in U.S.." CNN, June 15, 2016 ( https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/15/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-kim-jong-un/index.html )

[25] Wolf Blitzer, Jeremy Diamond, Jake Tapper, "Top source: Trump believes North Korea is greatest threat," CNN, February 28, 2017 ( https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/28/politics/north-korea-obama-trump-threat/index.html )

[26] Peter Baker, Choe Sang-Hun, "Trump Threatens 'Fire and Fury' Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.," New York Times, August 8, 2017 ( https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html )

[27] John R. Bolton, The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First, Gatestone Institute, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/11978/north-korea-first-strike (March 2, 2018)

[28] Robert Kuttner, "Steve Bannon, Unrepentant," The American Prospect, August 16, 2017 ( http://prospect.org/article/steve-bannon-unrepentant )

[29] Zeeshan Aleem, "Saudi Arabia's new blockade is starving Yemen," Vox, November 22, 2017 ( https://www.vox.com/world/2017/11/22/16680392/saudi-arabia-yemen-blockade-famine-casualties )

[30] Rasha Mohammed, Rawan Shaif, "Saudi Arabia Is Committing War Crimes in Yemen." Foreign Policy, March 25, 2016 ( https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/25/civilian-casualties-war-crimes-saudi-arabia-yemen-war/ )

[31] Randi Nord, "Is What's Happening in Yemen Really Genocide?" Mint Press News, June 4, 2018 ( https://www.mintpressnews.com/yemen-genocide/243247/ )

[32] Rich Whitney, "US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of World's Dictatorships," Truthout, September 23, 2017 ( https://truthout.org/articles/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-world-s-dictatorships/ )

[33] Erin Blakemore, Bill Clinton Once Struck a Nuclear Deal With North Korea, History.com, https://www.history.com/news/north-korea-nuclear-deal-bill-clinton-agreed-framework (April 17, 2018)

[34] Fred Kaplan, "Sorry, Trump, but Talking to North Korea Has Worked," Slate, October 10, 2017 ( http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2017/10/it_is_possible_to_negotiate_with_north_korea_bill_clinton_did_it.html )

[35] Karoun Demirjian, John Hudson, "Pompeo promises 'zero concessions' to North Korea until 'credible steps' are made," Washington Post, May 23, 2018 ( https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pompeo-promises-zero-concessions-to-north-korea-until-credible-steps-are-made/2018/05/23/3ad505e4-5e90-11e8-9ee3-49d6d4814c4c_story.html?utm_term=.153314b69298 )

[36] The Mainichi,US: No sanctions relief before North Korea denuclearizes https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180615/p2g/00m/0fp/012000c (June 15, 2018)

[37] Marc A. Thiessen, "On North Korea, Trump deserves more latitude and less attitude," Washington Post, June 15, 2018 ( https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-deserves-more-latitude-and-less-attitude/2018/06/15/3be1edde-6fee-11e8-bd50-b80389a4e569_story.html?utm_term=.d85c6087ab39 )

[38] Dick K. Nanto, Mark E. Manyin, China-North Korea Relations , Congressional Research Service, December 28, 2010, pg 7

[39] Ibid. pg 9

[40] Ibid, pg 8

[41] Walter Diamana, Strategic Alliance: China-North Korea, International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2015/07/02/strategic-alliance-china-north-korea/ (July 2, 2015)

[42] Ibid

[43] Russian National Committee of the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, "The Korean Crisis Management: A Russian Perspective," Korea Review of International Studies 13:2 (2010), pg 83

[44] Ibid. pg 85

[45] Anthony V. Rinna, "Russia's Relationship With North Korea: It's Complicated," The Diplomat, February 1, 2018 ( https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/russias-relationship-with-north-korea-its-complicated/ )

[46] Jacqueline Westermann, Australia, don't underestimate Russia's interests in Korea , The Strategist, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-dont-underestimate-russias-interests-in-korea/ (May 9, 2018)

[47] Geetha Govindasamy, Chang Kyoo Park, Er-Win Tan, "The Revival of Russia's Role on the Korean Peninsula," Asian Perspective 37:1 (2011), pg 141

[48] Ibid

[49] Jeffrey Bale, The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/chechen-resistance-radiological-terror/ (April 1, 2004)

[50] Preeti Bhattacharji, Chechen Terrorism (Russia, Chechnya, Separatist), Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chechen-terrorism-russia-chechnya-separatist (April 8, 2010)

[51] Adam Edelman, "Japanese citizens simply vanished. North Korea had abducted them. But why?" NBC News, June 11, 2018 ( https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/japanese-citizens-simply-vanished-north-korea-had-abducted-them-why-n881546 )

[52] Tsuneo Akaha, "Japanese Policy Towards The North Korean Problem," Journal of Asian and African Studies 42:3 (2007), pg 302

[53] Norimitsu Onishi, "Japan Rightists Fan Fury Over North Korea Abductions," New York Times, December 17, 2006 ( https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/world/asia/17japan.html )

[54] Byron Tau, "Abe's Window of Time for Amending Japan's Pacifist Constitution Narrows." Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2018 ( https://www.wsj.com/articles/abes-window-of-time-for-amending-japans-pacifist-constitution-narrows-1534075201 )

[55] Kosuke Takahashi, "Japan Needs Constitution Change to Have Capabilities to Strike Enemy Bases," Japan Forward, December 23, 2017 ( https://japan-forward.com/japan-needs-constitution-change-to-have-capabilities-to-strike-enemy-bases/ )

[56] Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Mark E. Manyin, Weston S. Konishi, Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 25, 2009, pg 9

[57] Ibid

[58] Charlie Campbell, "'This Is All We Can Do': How the Japanese Are Preparing for a North Korean Nuclear Attack," Time, September 20, 2017 ( http://time.com/4949262/north-korea-japan-nuclear-missiles-drills/ )

[59] Tom O'Connor, "North Korea Crisis: Japan is Growing Its Military For The First Time Since World War II Because Of Kim Jong Un," Newsweek, September 21, 2017 ( https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-crisis-japan-bigger-military-role-ashes-war-669217 )

[60] World Politics Review, Japan Aims to 'Lock' the U.S. in Asia With a Sweeping Military Revamp https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/24549/japan-aims-to-lock-the-u-s-in-asia-with-a-sweeping-military-revamp (April 11, 2018)

[61] Elias Groll, Dan De Luce, Jenna McLaughlin, Armageddon by Accidenthttps://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/armageddon-by-accident-north-korea-nuclear-war-missiles/ (October 18, 2017)

[62] Defense-Aerospace, North Korea's Military: How Does it Actually Stack Up?http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/186531/how-does-north-korea%E2%80%99s-military-compare-to-south-korea%E2%80%99s%3F.html (September 5, 2017)

[63] Alex Lockie, "North Korea has a massive air force - here's why it's basically a joke," Business Insider, June 21, 2018 ( https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-has-a-massive-air-force-heres-why-its-basically-a-joke-2018-6 )

[64] Dave Majumdar, North Korea's Army by the Numbers: 4,300 Tanks and 200,000 Lethal Special Forces, The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/north-koreas-army-by-the-numbers-4300-tanks-200000-lethal-24301 (February 1, 2018)

[65] Armed Forces, Korean Armed forceshttp://armedforces.eu/North_Korea

[66] Global Firepower, 2018 North Korea Military Strengthhttps://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=north-korea

[67] Stratfor, How North Korea Would Retaliatehttps://worldview.stratfor.com/article/how-north-korea-would-retaliate (January 5, 2017)

[68] Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/chemical/ (April 2018)

[69] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/north-koreas-army-by-the-numbers-4300-tanks-200000-lethal-24301

[70] Simon Denyer, Amanda Erickson, "Beijing warns Pyongyang: You're on your own if you go after the United States," Washington Post, August 11, 2017 ( https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-warns-north-korea-youre-on-your-own-if-you-go-after-the-us/2017/08/11/a01a4396-7e68-11e7-9026-4a0a64977c92_story.html?utm_term=.3d010f091b13 )

[71] Robert Beckhusen, The U.S. Military Is Not Prepared to Hunt This Many North Korean Missiles , War Is Boring, https://warisboring.com/the-u-s-military-is-not-prepared-to-hunt-this-many-north-korean-missiles/ (March 5, 2018)

[72] Robin Harding, Bryan Harris, "US rhetoric on North Korea runs into logistical reality," Financial Times, December 27, 2017 ( https://www.ft.com/content/1cf44ab8-de1a-11e7-a8a4-0a1e63a52f9c )

[73] Deng Xiaoci, "China should prepare to defend against war in Korean Peninsula: expert," Global Times, December 17, 2017 ( http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1080722.shtml )

[74] Dan Falvey, "Russia plan for military intervention in North Korea to stop a nuclear apocalypse," Express, December 2, 2017 ( https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/886615/North-Korea-nuclear-missile-war-vladimir-putin-military-action-kim-jong-un )

Abolition of Nuclear Weapons: The Struggle Continues

By Werner Lange

The United Nations and the antithesis of its noble ideals, nuclear weapons, were both born in the same fateful year of 1945. Now in 2017, after some seven decades of dialectical conflict, one of them is destined to be placed, in earnest, on an irrevocable course towards disappearance or debilitated diminution. The 45th President of the United States, another septuagenarian, is hell-bent on making sure it is not the nukes.

One month before his inauguration as President, Trump ominously proclaimed, in a tweeted message, "the US must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes". The very next day, December 23, the General Assembly of the United Nations overwhelming approved a resolution (L.41) to convene negotiations in 2017, starting in March, on a "legally binding agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination".

This historic breakthrough toward imposition of a universal permanent ban on nuclear weapons was greeted, again ominously, by another Trump tweet: "As to the UN, things will be different after Jan. 20th". Just how different remains to be seen, but it is fully conceivable and consistent with its misanthropic agenda that the Trump regime will use the full force of its usurped power to unrelentingly attempt to dismantle the United Nations entirely; or alternately, to implement the longstanding rightwing cry to get the UN out of the US and the US out of the UN. Unlike the abolition of nukes, the elimination or even evisceration of the UN would have catastrophic consequences for world peace and human rights.

The current existential conflict is not entirely unlike the one having faced humanity at the onset of the Cold War, and it is worthwhile for progressives to remind ourselves of the sacrifices and successes of the pioneers, particularly W.E.B. DuBois, in their heroic peace efforts during the dawn of the Nuclear Age as we hopefully move towards its twilight this year.

At a time when nukes numbered at the most in the dozens (instead of thousands) and nations possessing them were limited to only two (instead of nine and counting), a worldwide campaign was launched in early 1950 to outlaw nuclear weapons and identify any nation which first uses them as a war criminal. The text of the Stockholm Peace Appeal, put in the form of a petition, was unambiguous and uncompromising in its call for the abolition of these new weapons of unprecedented mass destruction:

"We demand the outlawing of atomic weapons as instruments of intimidation and mass murder of peoples. We demand strict international control to enforce this measure. We believe that any country which first uses atomic weapons against any other country whatsoever will be committing a crime against humanity and would be dealt with as a war criminal. We call on all men and women of good will throughout the world to sign this appeal".

Over 2.5 million Americans joined some 140 million persons worldwide in signing the first international appeal to abolish nuclear weapons. Organizing this historic peace effort in the USA was the short-lived Peace Information Center, led by an elderly African-American scholar, W.E.B. DuBois, the most prominent of the unsung heroes and pioneers of the American peace movement against the very existence, let alone proliferation, of nuclear weapons. Under his prophetic and indefatigable leadership, the PIC - though only permitted a 6-month existence in McCarthyite America - disseminated 485,000 copies of the Stockholm Peace Appeal along with thousands of "Peacegrams" sent to some 6000 Americans on its mailing lists.

Although over 125 prominent Americans, including 1946 Nobel Peace Prize recipient Emily Greene Balch, endorsed the Appeal, it was the enormous grassroots support throughout the country which undoubtedly concerned, even enraged, the Administration of the only world leader to ever authorize use of nuclear weapons for mass slaughter. Truman's Secretary of State publicly denigrated the Stockholm Peace Appeal as "a propaganda trick in the spurious 'peace offensive' of the Soviet Union"; the head of the US delegation to the UN called signers of the SPA, "traitors to their country"; the corporate media almost uniformly denounced this "anti-American" petition; circulators were often assaulted and occasionally jailed; and DuBois, along with his associates at the PIC, were ordered by the US government to register as foreign agents. Subsequent to a federal grand jury hearing at which only government evidence was presented, the elderly DuBois was indicted and arraigned in handcuffs at the Criminal Courtroom of Washington's Federal Courthouse.

A worldwide outpouring of righteous anger at his arrest coupled with expert legal defense prevented his death behind prison walls. His triumphal acquittal in late 1951 was the first time the US government failed to convict a citizen targeted by McCarthyism, marking the beginning of the end of this dark time in American history.

With the ascendancy of the Trump presidency, a forced descent into a similar darkness is now upon us. As before, there will be victims, institutional as well as individual, only in greater numbers and kinds. But there will also be victories, great ones, if we learn from the examples of patriotic peacemakers like DuBois who had the courage of their convictions to speak truth to power and suffer the consequences; or if we would but follow the directives of our national founders and do our duty, as enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, that "when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government and to provide new Guards for their future security". Then, and only then, will a light so shine in the darkness that the darkness of our times cannot overcome it, and the nightmare of a Trump presidency along with that of nuclear weapons ends, never to return.


Werner Lange was a Bernie Sanders delegate to 2016 DNC. He may be contacted at wlange912@gmail.com.

Dropping the Bomb: A Historiographical Review of the Most Destructive Decision in Human History

By Derek Ide

The historiography of the atomic bomb can be roughly categorized into three camps: traditionalists, revisionists, and middle-ground "consensus" historians. [1] Traditionalists, also referred to as orthodox[2] historians and post-revisionists, studying the atomic bomb generally accept the view posited by the Truman administration and articulated most clearly in Henry Stimson's 1947 Harper's Magazine article.[3] In short, this argument assumes that the use of the atomic bombs against Japan was justifiable on military grounds in order to prevent a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands. Often attached to such analysis is the notion that insofar as the atomic bombs ended the war prior to an invasion and saved hundreds of thousands or millions of lives, the use of the atomic bombs was also a morally sound decision. There tends to be a remarkable level of homogeneity amongst the traditionalist arguments. Whereas they may emphasize certain facts or aspects of the debate, they tend to present strikingly similar arguments, with a few exceptions.

The revisionists, in contrast, tend to be far more heterogeneous. Revisionist historians are unconvinced by the official narrative, and tend to emphasize the alternatives to the atomic bomb not pursued by the Truman administration. Furthermore, most revisionists accept, on some level, the "atomic diplomacy" thesis articulated first by Gar Alperovitz in 1965. To one degree or another revisionists argue that the Truman administration purposefully chose not to pursue alternatives to ending the war and that post-war diplomatic concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union were germane to, and in some historian's view dictated, the use of the atomic bombs.

The third camp, the consensus historians, are those who J. Samuel Walker refers to as having "reached a broad, though hardly unanimous, consensus on some key issues surrounding the use of the bomb."[4] These include the fact that Truman and his advisers were aware of alternatives that seemed likely to end the war, that invasion would likely not have been necessary, and that the atomic bomb did not save hundreds of thousands or millions of lives. What distinguishes them from the traditionalists is the argument that the atomic bombs were not a military necessity. On the other hand, their rejection or hesitancy to incorporate atomic diplomacy into their analysis differentiates them from the revisionists.

Given the nature of the three camps, the organizational framework I have utilized includes three sections. The first section will deal with the debate between traditionalists and revisionists. It will focus on questions of atomic diplomacy, the Potsdam Conference, unconditional surrender, Soviet entry into the war, projected casualty figures, and certain key figures in the Truman administration, the Soviet Union, and Japan. The second section will examine the points of disagreement within the revisionist camp. Although revisionists all challenge the orthodox position, they are significantly less homogenous than the latter. The third section of the essay will explore the consensus historians and their disagreements with both the traditionalists and the revisionists. Given the level of unanimity amongst the traditionalist historians, it is unnecessary to dedicate a section exploring differences between them because with rare exceptions, which will be noted when appropriate, there is remarkably little disagreement. The essay will conclude with a brief analysis of the authors, such as Robert Newman and Paul Boyer, who have extended their chronological framework significantly beyond the actual use of the atomic bombs.


The Traditionalists vs. the Revisionists

The five monographs within the traditionalist camp that will be analyzed here are Robert James Maddox'sWeapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision (2004)[5], Robert P. Newman'sTruman and the Hiroshima Cult (1995), Richard B. Frank's Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (1999), Paul D. Walker'sTruman's Dilemma: Invasion or the Bomb (2003), and Wilson D. Miscamble's The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (2011). On the other side of the debate are four revisionist historians, including Gar Alperovitz's The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (1995)[6], Martin J. Sherwin's A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies (2003),[7] Ronald Takaki's Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb (1995), and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (2005). The positions of the traditionalists and the revisionists regarding atomic diplomacy, the Potsdam Conference, Japanese surrender, the unconditional surrender policy, Soviet entry into the war, projected casualty figures, and key individuals[8] involved in the decision to use the bomb and Japanese surrender are fundamentally at odds.

The question of atomic diplomacy is what creates the fundamental divide between the two camps. Although there is great variation between revisionist and traditionalist positions on unconditional surrender, the role and race and racism, and other factors, most questions tend to be subsumed within and intricately bound up with atomic diplomacy. Since the revisionists first posited this thesis, it is appropriate to adumbrate their arguments. Objecting to the official narrative that "Truman simply had no choice except to use the atomic bomb," Alperovitz argues that Truman, significantly influenced by Byrnes, used the bomb as a form of "atomic diplomacy" to pursue post-war U.S. interests in both Europe and Asia. In essence, Alperovitz argues that the U.S. government "generally understood" that "Japan was defeated and preparing to surrender before the bomb was used." [9] According to Alperovitz there was a "quite general" notion amongst U.S. officials at Potsdam that the bomb would strengthen U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It was during this time that "a conscious decision not to encourage Soviet participation in the war" was undertaken. Attempts "to delay the Red Army's attack to the extent feasible" were meant to "limit Soviet political influence in Asia."[10] For Alperovitz atomic diplomacy is the crucial element in explaining the use of the bomb.

Martin Sherwin supplements Alperovitz's atomic diplomacy thesis by extending the importance of such diplomatic concerns backwards into the Roosevelt administration. Sherwin posits that the policies of the Roosevelt administration suggest "that the diplomatic value of the bomb began to shape his atomic energy policies as early as 1943."[11] Although Sherwin cites Roosevelt's elusive decision making process and sudden death as inhibitors to fully understanding his policy, he posits that Roosevelt "consistently opposed international control and acted in accordance with Churchill's monopolistic, anti-Soviet views."[12] Ronald Takaki, despite emphasizing the role of race and racism in the decision, also concedes that atomic diplomacy was indeed a factor. He notes the "incredible pressure" on Manhattan project scientists to complete the bombs prior to the Potsdam conference. Similarly, he explains how Truman purposefully postponed the conference to coincide with the bomb tests. Takaki maintains that two "schools of thought" dominated the thinking of U.S. officials, including the "quid-pro-quo" strategy, articulated by people like Henry Stimson,[13] and the "monopoly" strategy a la James Byrnes. [14] In Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's view, the Potsdam Proclamation was not a warning to Japan, but an attempt to justify the use of the bomb.

Hasegawa's argument aligns with Alperovitz's as well. He maintains that a "race" began at Potsdam between the United States and the Soviet Union when the Soviets set August 15 as their projected state of entry into the war. This "gave American policymakers a definite deadline to work for." [15] Thus, the timing of the Potsdam Proclamation was "integrally connected with the schedule for deployment of the atomic bombs."[16] The Truman administration desired to end the war via the atomic bombs in order to avoid Soviet entry and maintain hegemony in the Pacific in the post-war world. Therefore, the Truman-Byrnes commitment to unconditional surrender and the Potsdam declaration was simply a prelude to the use of the atomic bombs. Byrnes position was essentially: "if we insisted on unconditional surrender, we could justify dropping of the atomic bomb."[17] Concerned about the post-war political consequences of Soviet participation in the war, U.S. planners sought to bring about Japan's surrender before the Soviets could join. At best, Soviet participation in the war was an "insurance policy" in case the atomic tests failed.[18]

Thus, the revisionist position is quite clear. Officials in the United States were deeply concerned about post-war hegemony, particularly in the Pacific but in Europe as well, and saw the use of the atomic bomb against Japan as a way to contain the Soviet Union. Subsequently, any and all alternatives that could have ended the war, albeit not in time to prevent Soviet entry, were disregarded and not pursued. This conclusion is often premised on the fact that Japan was already defeated and near surrender. Alperovitz argues that "Japan was defeated and preparing to surrender before the atomic bomb was used. Though the question of timing was in dispute, it is also certain that this was general understood in the U.S. government at the time." [19] Hasegawa contends that the "Soviet entry into the war played a greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender" and, as such, the Japanese would have quickly surrender upon Soviet entry even without the use of the atomic bombs.

It is on these grounds that the traditionalists most vehemently challenge the revisionists. Robert James Maddox challenged what he saw as "blatant revisionist distortions" in order to construct his argument that the single-most decisive factor in forcing the Japanese to surrender and preventing a costly land invasion of Japan was the use of the atomic bombs. Whereas Alperovitz maintained that the casualty figures for a land invasion were inflated as post-war justifications by the Truman administration, Maddox suggests that the half-a-million figure "cited by Truman, and even higher ones, were circulated within the upper echelons of government."[20] For Maddox bombs were utilized out of military necessity because the Japanese would not have surrendered without the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, according to Maddox the "very idea of surrender was alien to the Japanese samurai tradition."[21] Furthermore, ULTRA intercepts suggest surrender prior to an invasion was not even a serious option, let alone inevitable. Richard Frank goes even further, arguing that the conclusions the revisionist reach regarding the MAGIC are erroneous because they ignore the fact that Japanese peace feelers were completely "want of official sanction." [22] Thus, the "thesis that Japan was actively seeking to surrender in 1945, and that American policy makers knew this primarily from code breaking," is rejected by the traditionalists.[23]

Robert Newman concurs with this analysis, adding that most "Hiroshima cultists,"[24] including Gar Alperovitz, P. M. S. Blackett, Paul Boyer, the Smithsonian exhibit authors, and others who "swallow this conclusion of the [United States Strategic Bombing Survey][25] whole" are incorrect because the study itself was extremely flawed. [26] Information in the survey was purposefully distorted to support conclusions already arrived at a priori by Paul Nitze, and the testimony of most high-ranking Japanese officials "overwhelmingly indicated that Japan was not about to surrender before the bomb."[27] Thus, the "Truman bashers"[28] are incorrect to argue that the bomb changed no minds. In fact, according to Newman it "created a situation in which the peace party and the emperor could prevail." [29] Wilson Miscamble also views himself as "exploding permanently the myth of a Japan ready to surrender," a "myth" perpetuated by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of 1946. [30]

Richard Frank furthers this argument by explaining that Japan's "fundamental policy," based on the Ketsu-Go defense plan, was a national resistance program intended to bloody the invading enemy enough to force political negotiations and ipso facto avoid unconditional surrender. Frank relies heavily upon the document produced by the Big Six entitled "The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War," which argued Japan "must fight to the finish and choose extinction before surrender."[31] In essence, Japan was "effectively locked on course for a fight to the last man, woman, and child."[32] Furthermore, Frank continues this theme, arguing that the goal was to "severely bloody the invaders" to the point of achieving political goals. Ultra documents, according to Frank, did much to "unmask their carefully wrought plans."[33] The forces on Kyushu far exceeded the 350,000 number given to Truman. Indeed, by November 1 Japanese strength would be 680,000, much closer to the 1:1 ration of American to Japanese soldiers that U.S. leaders desperately wanted to avoid. Paul Walker takes this argument to its logical extreme. He argues that due the 35 percent casualty rate of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa battles, as well as the "fanaticism of the Japanese military and their updated code of Bushido," casualties would have ranged from around 250,000 in the invasion of Kyushu alone, to over one million with the invasion of both Kyushu and Honshu.[34] Miscamble maintains that "retrospective castigations" like William D. Leahy's memoirs in 1950, which denounced the atomic bomb as a "modern type of barbarism not worthy of Christian man," can be dismissed since "no military officials counseled the president against using the weapons prior to Hiroshima."[35] Maddox concurs, explaining that despite the retroactive denunciations of the atomic bomb by top-ranking military officials, no military officials seriously attempted to guide Truman away from using the bomb prior to its deployment. The fact that the bomb was utilized out of military necessity dismisses the "gravest charge against Truman," namely that the atomic bomb was deployed "primary as a diplomatic weapon to intimidate the Soviet Union."[36]

The question of Soviet entry into the war preoccupies an important space in the discourse as well. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa maintains that "Soviet entry into the war played a greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender."[37] Interestingly, Maddox claims the Soviets invaded Manchuria not to be "a good ally" but rather "to get in on the kill,"[38] an analysis Hasegawa would largely share. However, where the revisionists and the traditionalists differ, is that most traditionalists seriously downplay the role of Soviet entry into the war. In Frank's narrative, "Soviet intervention was a significant but not decisive reason for Japan's surrender… reinforcing but not fundamental."[39] Miscamble maintains that revisionist historians who emphasize Soviet entry in the war "distort history by overemphasizing" its importance.[40] According to Miscamble, Hasegawa's claim that Truman was disappointed at the Soviet entry into the war "are not substantiated by the historical evidence." [41] Paul Walker points out that when the emperor finally surrendered on August 15, 1945, the Russian invasion was not mentioned as a cause of surrender. Hasegawa counters this point by citing "another historic document" written by Sakomizu's [42] assistant and sanctioned by the emperor that was not issued until August 17. This rescript explained that if Japan continued fighting after the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war it would endanger "the very foundation of the empire's existence," [43] reinforcing Hasegawa's claim that Soviet intervention was key.

Perhaps the most creative defense of the use of the atomic bomb from the traditionalist camp is the moral one. One of the primary objectives of Wilson Miscamble is to "confront the question regarding the morality of the atomic bomb."[44] Miscamble suggests that for Byrnes and Truman "moral complexity or future diplomatic implications failed to complicate their straight forward thinking." If the atomic bomb "might save American lives" then it must be used, and this "remained, throughout, the essential motivation that guided the decision." [45] Whereas revisionists argue that Japan was defeated, he makes a stark distinction between defeat and surrender, explaining that the U.S. would have eventually won the war by "continued obliteration bombing of Japanese cities and infrastructure, a choking blockade, the terrible invasions... [and these] would have meant significantly greater Allied casualties and much higher Japanese civilian and military casualties."[46] Likewise, the abrupt end to the war also brought an end to Japanese brutality in other parts of Asia. Furthermore, "indiscriminate bombing had become the norm for the Anglo-American forces well before 1945," indicating that any "moral Rubicon" had already been crossed prior to Hiroshima.[47] Thus, the bomb was the "lesser of the evils available," and subsequently Miscamble pleas that in "future anniversaries of the dropping of the atomic bomb… one might hope for less moralizing condemnation of Truman's decision… Perhaps there might even be some empathy for the man who felt required to make the decision and who carried the burden of it."[48]

Robert Newman makes a slightly less sophisticated moral defense, proclaiming that neither "Hiroshima cultists nor professional moralists had even considered the possibility that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate retribution for the millions of deaths caused by Japan's fourteen-year rampage through China and the Pacific,"[49] an idea he apparently entertains. Newman suggests that the atomic bombs were moral actions taken in order to prevent greater evil. According to him the general arguments against Truman's choice to use the bomb come in four general varieties: first, atomic bombs are intrinsically evil and should not be used; second, their use violated the principle of noncombatant immunity; third, the bombs were used on invalid motives, including retribution, revenge, and reprisal; and fourth, no specific warning was given. To the first, Newman responds that "the case for immorality of today's overkill arsenals and war fighting doctrines is strong," but "to apply the same case retrospectively to 1945, however, is senseless."[50] To the second, Newman quotes Bamba Nobuya to suggest that the "Marxist interpretation of imperialistic war," namely that "the 'people' should have been innocent," is incorrect. The Japanese population did not just passively support imperialism, "on the contrary, most people competed to get front seats on the fascist bandwagon." [51] Thus, they were not noncombatants and to attack them was legitimate. To the third point Newman maintains that because the Japanese were involved in developing atomic weapons as well, even though U.S. leaders were not aware of this at the time, it retroactively justifies the decision. Since "upwards of 250,000 people… would have died each month the Japanese Empire struggled in its death throes beyond July 1945," and since the bomb had the ability to end the war early, it could not have been used for the wrong reasons.[52] To the last point, he responds that the shock value of the bomb was decisive in ending the war, and thus it would have been ineffective and prolonged the war to issue the warning.

Finally, the issue of culture and its relationship to policies of surrender are intricately bound up in the traditionalist narrative. For Paul Walker, a key element of the war was the "barbarism, savageness, and race hatred" of "an oriental enemy with a brutal heritage." [53] According to Walker, the Japanese in World War II "believed they were fighting in the proud traditions of their samurai ancestors."[54] This ideological reliance upon "a version of Bushido" meant that military schools taught "a perverted cult of death" which made "young Japanese men expendable numbers for the military's reckless and costly adventures." [55] Tracing Japanese history from the Forty Seven Ronin to the Meiji Restoration and beyond, Walker paints a picture of uniform brutality and aggression. This culminates in the period from 1894 to 1945, where "Japan was involved in almost constant warfare with her neighbors."[56] Since being a prisoner of war was "completely unacceptable, considered dishonorable or shameful, and contrary to the samurai code," the Japanese were essentially automatons that fought to the death. In contrast with U.S. imperialism, where "Filipinos had a positive image of America" and U.S. intervention in Vietnam "sorted itself out,"[57] Japanese imperialism was infinitely more brutal, according to Walker. This notion that the Japanese were imbued with fanaticism and the ideology of Bushido, which permeated their consciousness for centuries, is an important part of Walker's thesis because it attempts to reinforce the notion that the toll of casualties would be great in a U.S. invasion of Japan. Miscamble suggests a similar theme, explaining that the "the twisted neo-samurai … geared up with true banzai spirit to engage the whole population in a kind of national kamikaze campaign." [58] Maddox is slightly less crude, suggesting that that the "very idea of surrender was alien to the Japanese samurai tradition."[59]

Thus, within the traditionalist camp one finds a remarkable degree of unanimity. While some authors, such as Miscamble and Newman, focus on the moral argument, others, such as Maddox, implore the military aspect. Others still emphasize the "savage" culture of the "Oriental enemy" a la Paul Walker. Yet, all of the traditionalists tend to converge in their main analysis. There is little disagreement among them on any vital issues. In one way this greatly distinguishes them from the revisionist camp, which presents a quite heterogeneous and diverse array of analyses.


The Revisionist Camp

The traditionalists and revisionists part ways on the fundamental divide of atomic diplomacy. Within the traditionalist camp arguments are largely convergent, whereas within the revisionists camp the nuances are far more pronounced. All tend to agree that some level of atomic diplomacy was in play. Most, however, disagree on a variety of other issues. Gar Alperovitz and Martin Sherwin heavily emphasize the role of atomic diplomacy. In contrast, Takaki suggests race and racism as primary variables. Hasegawa maintains that an "international" perspective is vital, and criticizes past revisionists for heavily focusing on leaders in Washington. As Gar Alperovitz is the first and quintessential revisionist, much of the internal discussion amongst revisionists is characterized by correcting, expanding, or challenging certain assumptions Alperovitz has made.

The first distinction of analysis can be seen in the characterization of the Roosevelt and the Truman administration. Alperovitz imbues individual political actors, particularly Harry Truman and his adviser James Byrnes, with immense agency over the use of the bomb. He warns against "analyses which assert that a combination of factors-political, military, racial, and financial-produced the decision."[60] He also makes the case against "momentum theories," which may have "an odd feeling of seeming plausibility about them," but which go against the evidence that top U.S. military officials were against the bombing.[61] Throughout his work it is stressed that individual political actors were absolutely fundamental in the decision, and that no sort of "momentum theory" is capable of capturing the dynamics of the top-level discussions that led to the final decision. Alperovitz emphasizes the importance of the Truman-Byrnes relationship, implicitly suggesting that the outcome may have been different with Roosevelt in office.

Martin Sherwin articulates a somewhat distinct argument that draws a strong line of continuity between the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. For Sherwin, an "analysis of the policies [Roosevelt] chose…suggests that the diplomatic value of the bomb began to shape his atomic energy policies as early as 1943."[62] Although Sherwin cites Roosevelt's elusive decision making process and sudden death as inhibitors to fully understanding his policy, he posits that Roosevelt "consistently opposed international control and acted in accordance with Churchill's monopolistic, anti-Soviet views."[63] He concludes that Roosevelt's commitment to amicable postwar relations with the Soviets has "often been exaggerated," and that "his prescriptions for the diplomatic role of the atomic bomb… reveal a carefully guarded skepticism regarding the Grand Alliance's prospects for surviving the war intact."[64] Thus, Sherwin argues that Truman did not "inherit the question" of whether to employ the bomb as a means of atomic diplomacy, but he "inherited the answer" since by 1943 the diplomatic value of the bomb had already begun to shape atomic energy policies. The decision to use the bomb, and its diplomatic implications, were prescribed by Roosevelt. Truman's decisions were more or less technical, revolving around how specifically to use the bomb. Where Alperovitz has attempted to present a break or disconnect between what he perceives as Roosevelt's uncertain and wavering atomic policies, Sherwin presents a forceful analysis suggesting strong continuity between the two administrations.

A second point of contention amongst revisionists is the role of race and racism in the decision to use the bomb. Here Alperovitz argues that while "it is certainly possible" that racism amongst U.S. officials played a role in the decision to drop the bomb, "it is all but impossible to find specific evidence that racism was an important factor."[65] In contrast, while Takaki adopts Alperovitz's notion of atomic diplomacy, he drastically parts with him on the issue of race. Takaki's primary focus is understanding the decision within the trajectory of US racism. [66] In this regard, it seems his argument is best encapsulated when he declares, borrowing from John Dower, that "in this 'war without mercy,' Truman made the deadly mushroom cloud of 'Manhattan' appear over Japan in order to destroy an enemy he regarded as 'a beast'."[67] Takaki explicates upon the "racialization of the Pacific War," positioning it within the historic context of racism and US expansionism. After briefly addressing Japanese notions of racial superiority, Takaki attempts to place Truman's decision to use the atomic bombs within the "sociological imagination" of anti-Japanese racism in US society. In doing so, he links the war in the Pacific to earlier periods of conquest. His analysis focuses on the complex processes by which the US idea of democracy was intricately bound up with westward expansion and slavery, all institutions saturated with racialized notions of superiority. Citing the Chinese Exclusion Act, "Yellow Peril" hysteria, the American Federation of Labor anti-Japanese agitation, and the Asiatic Exclusion League, Takaki draws a long line of continuity culminating in the internment of Japanese Americans and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For Takaki, notions of racial superiority and anti-Asian racism were key variables in the "sociological imagination" which facilitated the bombing of hundreds of thousands of civilians. It is in this context of a society deeply permeated with both institutional and individual racism that Truman's actions must be analyzed. Takaki analyzes Truman's biography, emphasizing the implicit notions of racial superiority deeply embedded in him and his family of ex-slave owners. Takaki outlines Truman's broadly anti-Asian sentiments, such as in 1911 when he explained that he "does hate Chinese and Japs" and that the "yellow men [ought to be] in Asia." [68] By 1945, Truman referred to the "Japs" as "savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic." Thus, the "sociological imagination" was a highly racialized one that helped rationalize the slaughter of innocent Japanese civilians in the minds of men like Truman.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa also takes Alperovitz to task on more than one occasion. Throughout Racing the Enemy he points out that he views his work as a corrective to the mistakes of revisionist historians. As he explains, the "sharp division between revisionist and orthodox historians in the Unites States" has failed to address the crucial international dimension because "the main point of contention is over American perceptions of Soviet intentions" that "depict Soviet actions as a sideshow and assign to Moscow a secondary role at best."[69] Furthermore, although Hasegawa is certainly not an orthodox historian, he is mildly critical of the revisionists who have preceded him: "Although much of what revisionist historians argue is faulty and based on tendentious use of sources, they nonetheless deserve credit for raising an important moral issue that challenges the standard American narrative of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[70] Thus, Hasegawa strengthens the revisionist narrative by correcting some of the errors and increasing the attention to the international dynamic at work.

Alperovitz in large part bases his argument on the conclusions of the 1946 United States Strategic Bombing Survey which argued that Japan "would likely have surrender in 1945 without atomic bombing, without a Soviet declaration of war, and without an American invasion." [71] In contrast with Alperovitz and most other revisionist historians who uncritically accept the United States Strategic Bombing Survey's conclusion, Hasegawa maintains that "defeat and surrender are not synonymous," and Paul Nitze's "conclusion was repeatedly contradicted by the evidence in the Survey itself."[72] He largely accepts the critique of the USSBS findings put forward by Barton Bernstein. Instead, he argues that "even without the atomic bombs, the war most likely would have ended shortly after Soviet entry into the war-before November 1."[73] Strangely, Hasegawa tends to overemphasize his departure from Alperovitz on this point, or he must have simply overlooked Alperovitz contention that, even had the atomic bomb not been used, it is "almost a certainty that the Japanese would have capitulated upon the entry of Russia into the war."[74]

On a number of other points Hasegawa and Alperovitz certainly do disagree, however. Whereas Alperovitz characterizes the Sino-Soviet negotiations between Stalin and the Nationalists as a U.S. ploy to prolong Russian entry in the war, Hasegawa responds that in the Sino-Soviet negotiations, the "interests of Truman, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek all converged: the successful conclusion of a Sino-Soviet treaty could make everyone happy." [75] Hasegawa does not view the difficult negotiating by the Chinese as a concocted plot by the U.S. to keep the Soviets out of the war. "Revisionist historians are wrong," Hasegawa explains, "in asserting that Harriman's actions were meant to pressure Soong to resist Stalin's demand in order to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan."[76] Likewise, throughout his work Hasegawa repeatedly attempts to re-characterize Byrnes are someone not nearly as bent on geopolitical conflict with the Soviet Union as other revisionist historians have made him out to be. For instance, in response to the Soviet Kurils Operation as part of August Storm, Hasegawa argues that Byrnes, "though often regarded by revisionist historians as an ardent advocate for a tough stance against the Soviet Union… favored a conciliatory position on this issue."[77] Thus, the internecine differences amongst the revisionists exist. They are not nearly as pronounced or as heated as the differences between the traditionalists and the revisionists, but significantly more obvious than any real disagreement amongst traditionalist scholars.


Consensus Historians vs. The Traditionalists and the Revisionists

Between the traditionalist and revisionist historians lay a murky "middle ground" that encompasses a group of scholars who posit quite different arguments regarding the atomic bomb but tend to share in common a notion that alternatives existed. These "consensus" historians, as J. Samuel Walker refers to them, [78] in some way suggest that Truman and his advisers were aware of alternatives that seemed likely to end the war. The "consensus" historians reject the traditionalist argument that the atomic bombs were a military necessity and at the same time greatly distance themselves from the atomic diplomacy thesis. Samuel Walker'sPrompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of the Atomic Bombs Against Japan (1997), Dennis Wainstock'sThe Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1996), and Sean L. Malloy's Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan (2008) form the core of this "consensus" or middle ground camp.

Dennis Wainstock argues that the policy of unconditional surrender was a "policy of revenge, and it hurt America's national self-interest." [79] He continues, suggesting that had the United States given Japan conditional surrender terms, including retention of the emperor, Japan would have surrendered significantly earlier than it did. This means that neither the atomic bombs nor Soviet intervention would have been required. By prolonging the war in Europe and East Asia the policy of unconditional surrender expanded Soviet power in both areas, thereby harming U.S. interests. The dropping of the atomic bomb only "hastened the surrender of an already defeated enemy." [80] Wainstock does not neatly align with either the traditionalist or revisionist camp. First, he aligns his critique of unconditional surrender within "U.S. national interests." His emphasis is that unconditional surrender unnecessarily prolonged the war, and Truman's commitment to it subsequently harmed U.S. interests since the prolonged war eventually allowed the Soviet Union to enter the arena and exercise increased influence in East Asia. This "policy of revenge [unconditional surrender]… hurt America's national self-interest" because it "prolonged the war… and helped to expand Soviet power."[81]

It is in this way that Wainstock differs sharply from all of the traditionalists who, in one way or another defend the policy of unconditional surrender. Whereas Paul Walker, Richard Frank, and Wilson Miscamble tend to be generally supportive of the unconditional surrender policy, James Maddox, in a rather reserved way, argues that "there is no way of telling whether the doctrine prolonged the war in any way." [82] Robert Newman is Wainstock's primary adversary in this regard, however. Newman argues two main points: first, Truman "had no good reason" to believe that permitting retention of the emperor would have led to early capitulation and, second, the "Potsdam Declaration defined surrender in a fashion acceptable to the Japanese peace forces."[83] To "those who insist that unconditional surrender was a purely punitive stance," he proclaims that the "leaders of the Japanese peace party… saw in the Potsdam terms an acceptable alternative to the destruction Japan would otherwise sustain."[84] The reason that Truman eventually accepted the condition that the emperor be retained was, according to Newman, because "peace was too tantalizing to resist." [85] In the end, however, Newman is sure that retaining the emperor, "what Hiroshima cultists insist was a viable alternative for Truman to end the war early… was really no alternative at all."[86] Furthermore, the conditions outlined at Potsdam were not unconditional surrender, and the Japanese knew it. Thus, for Newman the entire thesis constructed by Wainstock rests on dubious grounds.

Regarding his differences with the revisionists, Wainstock concedes that "perhaps Truman's decision to drop the bombs was an attempt to both impress the Soviets… and to end the war before the Soviets entered and seize the Far Eastern territories."[87] Even if this were true, however, it was totally counterproductive since in the end it prolonged the war and allowed Soviet entry, something that could have been prevented by altering the policy. This brief commentary is all the space that Wainstock provides for the atomic diplomacy thesis. In other words, despite accepting that atomic diplomacy may have played some minor role, Wainstock contends that a blind policy of unconditional surrender was of prime importance in the decision. This is where his greatest disagreement comes to the fore with the revisionists, and in particular Hasegawa. Hasegawa contends that even if Truman had "accepted a provision in the Potsdam declaration allowing the Japanese to retain a constitutional monarchy," it would "not have immediately led to Japan's surrender."[88] It is doubtful, Hasegawa maintains, "that Japan would have capitulated before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the Soviet Union entered the war."[89] Thus, whereas the policy of unconditional surrender is the fundamental variable for Wainstock, it is significantly less so for Hasegawa. Wainstock significantly minimizes the significance of atomic diplomacy and inflates the importance of the unconditional surrender policy.

Sean Malloy, like Takaki, attempts to analyze the decision to use the atomic bomb through the "lens of biography." [90] Malloy attempts to approach "the use of the bomb through a conceptual framework he calls the "context of use," positioning the use of the bomb as a "compound product of a series of choices" rather than "the result of single decision." [91] Malloy makes the argument that Stimson, as secretary of war, unintentionally "presided over a set of policies that accelerated the budding nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union,"[92] despite his "deep concern with limiting the effects of war on civilians and fostering trust between nations as the foundation of the peace that followed." [93] In essence, realpolitik dominated Stimson's approach to the atomic bomb and undermined his moral commitments.

One example of this is Stimson's oversight of the 1945 Stassfurt operation intended to secure Anglo-American hegemony over uranium supplies. By the time of Strassfurt, when the U.S. moved in to seize the largest known stock of uranium in Europe, they "did as so as part of a one-sided nuclear arms race" in which, "by 1945, the Soviet Union was already America's primary nuclear rival."[94] Thus, while Stimson is the tragic hero with a fatal flaw, James Byrnes is his foil, presented as the bad apple in the administration who desires conflict with the Soviet Union. Malloy's key argument, then, is that "by his own actions during World War II, the secretary of war had helped to set in motion exactly the kind of destructive international competition in armaments that he had spent much of his long public career attempting to avoid." [95] The almost capricious nature of his rapidly changing positions, and the tenuous justifications which frequently accompanied them, indicates that Stimson's moral convictions were more often than not drown out for the sake of political expediency. Malloy's conception of the atomic bomb as a "tragedy" is the principle departure from the traditionalists who tend to glorify the use of the bomb and celebrate it for ending the war and saving lives.

Malloy's differences with the revisionist camp are rather nuanced, but significant. Once again, his conception of the bombs as a "tragedy," rather than a calculated diplomatic initiative, separates him from the revisionists. Second, he makes the argument that the secretary of war "was in a unique position to shape many of the decisions about the use of the bomb."[96] This is in direct contradistinction to other historians, such as Alperovitz, who emphasize the agency of actors such as James Byrnes at Stimson's expense. Second, Malloy attempts to put forward a sort of "momentum theory" that Alperovitz considers "seemingly plausible" but in reality historically bankrupt. During the various decisions that led to the atomic bombing, the morals and convictions of officials were often sublimated for political expediency. For Malloy, this was particularly true of Stimson. In this way, a sort of "momentum theory" is employed by Malloy to mitigate the pernicious intent of certain actors and explain away the "failures" of their decisions. Thus, the atomic bombs were not intentionally used as diplomatic tools by most of the Truman administration, but policy "failures" as individuals were swept up in events. Further modifying the arguments of Alperovitz and Hasegawa, Malloy argues that "American domestic politics" were a primary reason that Truman "failed at Potsdam" to use the "two potentially useful, if imperfect, diplomatic levers… in an effort to end the war." [97] Furthermore, whereas Hasegawa presents Soviet entry as vital, Mallow suggests that "neither the public threat of Soviet entry nor the lure of allowing the Japanese to retain the emperor after the war were diplomatic panaceas." [98] Thus, Malloy's differences with the revisionists are perceptible.

A slightly different approach is apparent in J. Samuel Walker's book. He sets out to answer two interrelated questions: was the bomb "necessary at all" and, "if so, what exactly did it accomplish?"[99] By the conclusion of the book, Walker asserts that the answer to the first question "seems to be yes and no. Yes, it was necessary to end the war as quickly as possible. No, it was not necessary to prevent an invasion of Japan."[100] Addressing the second question, he maintains that the bomb "shortened the war and saved the lives of a relatively small but far from inconsequential number of Americans."[101] By situating his thesis within these parameters, S. Walker avoids having to take a position regarding the morality of the atomic bombings and instead focuses on rather narrow notions of "military necessity." He presents a variegated list of reasons Truman dropped the bomb: "(1) the commitment to ending the war successfully at the earliest possible moment; (2) the need to justify the effort and expense of building the atomic bombs; (3) the hope of achieving diplomatic gains in the growing rivalry with the Soviet Union; (4) the lack of incentives not to use atomic weapons; and (5) hatred of the Japanese and a desire for vengeance."[102]

Walker's differences with the traditionalists are quite clear: Walker suggests three rectifications to the popular narrative, a narrative the traditionalists largely accept: first, "there were other options available for ending the war… without the bomb and without an invasion"; second, due to Japan's enervated capacity for war, Truman and his advisers did not regard invasion as inevitable; last, even if invasion was necessary to end the war, military planners "projected the number of American lives lost at far fewer than the hundreds of thousands that Truman and his advisers claimed after the war."[103] Furthermore, Walker relies on the USSBS, a point of divergence between himself and both the traditionalists and Hasegawa, to conclude "the war would probably have ended before an American invasion of Kyushu became necessary." [104] Walker essentially dismisses the entire traditionalist approach, with the caveat that Truman was indeed concerned with saving as many American lives as possible.

It is important to note that he is rather critical of the revisionist approach as well. First and foremost, Walker specifically outlines what Alperovitz disparages as an analysis asserting "that a combination of factors-political, military, racial, financial-produced the decision." Alperovitz's criticism of such an approach is that it "is easy to assemble fragments of evidence" that suggest such an analysis, but jumping from these "fragments to an explanatory conclusion about decision-making at the very top of the U.S. government is suspect."[105] Thus, Walker's "five fundamental considerations" are a significant departure from Alperovitz. More significantly, Walker actually considers the entire atomic diplomacy thesis as a sideshow. For instance, he maintains that "Truman did not drop the bomb primarily to intimidate the Soviets." It was at best an ancillary consideration, a "bonus."[106]

Thus, the "consensus" historians, largely agree that potential alternatives existed, that invasion may not have been necessary, and that the atomic bombs were probably not responsible for saving hundreds of thousands of lives. In other words, they were not a military necessity. At the same time, the atomic bombs were not deployed primarily as diplomatic mechanisms. Even if they eventually came to fulfill this role, it was either the unintentional result of "momentum" or a tertiary variable barely perceptible vis-à-vis other considerations.


Conclusion: The Myth, the Cult, Nuclearism, and Nuclear Consciousness

In the post-war era, the debate and discussion over the bomb has been of tremendous importance. Both the traditionalist and revisionist camps have plotted the trajectory of the discourse surrounding Hiroshima and Nagasaki in different ways. Gar Alperovitz has suggested that officials promulgated propaganda in a top-down manner in order to manufacture an "American myth" surrounding the use of the atomic bombs. Robert J. Lifton's preface to Martin Sherwin's A World Destroyed laments the emergence of "nuclearism," the ideology that the atomic bomb is a "deity" capable of both "destroying the world" and "capable of ruling and protecting the world, even of keeping the world going."[107] In contrast, Robert Newman denounces Alperovitz and other revisionists as "Hiroshima cultists," "Truman bashers," and a host of other pejoratives for creating a "cult" that worships at the altar of Hiroshima. Lastly, Paul Boyer, in his book By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (1994), suggests that a sort of "nuclear consciousness" has infused itself in the perceptions and ideology of Americans in the post-war era.[108] In fact, "nuclear reality" so deeply pervades our "consciousness that it is hard to imagine what existence would have been like without it." [109] In these various ways authors have interpreted the post-war world after the atomic bomb.

In the second part of his book, Alperovitz explores the creation of the mythology surrounding the ostensibly "inevitable" use of the bomb. He maintains that three decisions, including the rejection to provide enough time for Japan to surrender, the choice to not offer the Japanese emperor assurances, and the explicit decision not to test a Russian entry into the war, "set the terms of reference for the bomb's subsequent seemingly 'inevitable' use… [and] so tightly framed the remaining issues as to make it all but impossible thereafter to oppose the bombings." [110] This "framing of the bomb," alongside the top-down campaign of disinformation immediately after the war, were key factors that facilitated the permeation of American consciousness with the "inevitability" narrative.

Stimson, Truman, Byrnes, and Groves were key figures in this top-down propaganda campaign. Despite what Alperovitz argues was an ancillary role in the actual decision to drop the bomb, Stimson did play a vital role in propagating the official discourse, citing Stimson's 1947 Harper's article which was presented as "a mere recital of the facts." Stimson posited a rigid dichotomy later picked up by traditionalist historians: either a costly invasion or use of the bomb was required to end the war. As Alperovitz explains, the article was an "extraordinary success," with the New York Times, the Washington PostReader's Digest, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and an indeterminate number of other media outlets "decidedly uncritical and, indeed, often effusive in praise."[111] Truman's argument that "the dropping of the bombs stopped the war" and "saved millions of lives" was the main line of thought he propagated continuously after the war. He maintains that the "over a million" figure "became the essential source for a myth which has been repeated with only occasional challenge for much of the last half century" despite modern scholarship demonstrating "the estimate to be without any serious foundation in the documents of that period." [112] Byrnes systematically distorted and revised the past by shrouding himself in secrecy and meticulously managing his personal writings. Groves' role as "an expert public relations artist and news 'spin' master" also comes to light when he devised a strategy whereby U.S. officials would "saturate" the "huge market hungry for information with officially approved material from the only authoritative source available."[113] In Japan itself a Civil Censorship Division of the Occupation had some 8,700 staffers engaged in examining thousands of newspapers, magazines, textbooks, motion pictures, and even private mail to ensure they did not stray too far from the official discourse.[114] The most pernicious form of censorship was also the most ubiquitous; namely, government classification. Thus, as Alperovitz argues, "the 'normal' functioning of government… is even more effective than the occasional excesses which make the headlines."[115] In these ways the historical narrative from beginning to end was "managed" by U.S. officials.

Part of Martin Sherwin's work is intended to combat the legacy of nuclearism. In a world where humans have "infused [the atomic bomb] with a constellation of awe and mystery. That constellation has included tendencies to embrace the bomb, to become fiercely dependent upon it, indeed, to render it something close to a deity."[116] The "willful embrace of the cruelest weapon ever created is the essence" of nuclearism.[117] Suggesting a line of continuity with Paul Boyer, A World Destroyed suggests that an "idealistic aura of peacemaking was inseparable from the bomb's lure of ultimate technology and ultimate power-all of which became part of the transcendent technology of nuclearism."[118] Hence, "the bizarre emphasis on the bomb's ostensible function of 'saving lives' rather than destroying them, of rendering the world peaceful rather than bringing to it a specter of annihilation." [119] This "bizarre emphasis" has been the plaything of traditionalist scholars for decades.

In sharp contrast with Alperovitz and Sherwin, Robert P. Newman's thesis in Truman and the Hiroshima Cult is the paradigmatic post-revisionist account of the atomic bomb and its aftermath. In it he argues that a "cult," with attendant cultists, has arisen around Truman and the Hiroshima decision. These "Hiroshima cultists" argue, in a variety of forms, that Japan was on the verge of surrender, that the "unconditional surrender" formula unnecessarily prolonged the war, and that Truman's decision to drop the bomb was driven either by racism towards the Japanese or diplomatic concerns vis-à-vis the Soviets, or some combination thereof. Newman vehemently rejects what he refers to as the "Japanese-as-victim cult," suggesting that any and all of the above suggestions are fundamentally incorrect. Newman proclaims that neither "Hiroshima cultists nor professional moralists had even considered the possibility that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate retribution for the millions of deaths caused by Japan's fourteen-year rampage through China and the Pacific."[120]

Newman traces the development and growth of what he maliciously and interchangeably refers to as the "Japan-as-Victim myth" or "Hiroshima cult." He begins by explaining how in the immediate aftermath of the war "the whole world viewed Japan as villainous." [121] After 1948, however, things began to change, in both Japan and the United States. In 1949 John Hersey's Hiroshima was published, which Newman credits with having the opposite but equally powerful impact that Anne Frank's diary had on Germany. Where Anne Frank's diary forced Germany to come to terms with its atrocities, Hiroshima shielded Japan from having to do so, and helped begin the "Japan-as-Victim" myth. Furthermore, in 1951 P. M. S. Blackett published Fear, War, and the Bomb, which argued that the bomb was not the last act of the Second World War but the first act of the Cold War. Finally, in 1954 when the U.S. tested the new H-bomb and the crew of a tuna trawler were affected by radioactive fallout, the "five most important Japanese newspapers took a common position: this was the third atomic bombing." [122]

Despite all this, however, in 1964 a public opinion poll suggested that 49 percent of the Japanese public viewed the United States as their "favorite foreign country." By 1973, after the U.S. atrocities in Vietnam and use of Japan to accomplish them, this "popularity" had dropped to 18 percent. [123] By the late sixties people were questioning earlier U.S. military endeavors, notably the dropping of the atomic bombs, as a reflection of the changing political tide and anti-Vietnam war sentiment. By 1989, the "majority opinion even among Japanese scholars" was accepting of both the Blackett thesis and racism as primary factors in the dropping of the atomic bomb. In the United States, the gradual buildup of anti-nuclear activism, starting with The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in the late 1940s to the "Scientists' Declaration on Nuclear Power" in 1975, had a major impact on retroactive views of the bombings. Thus, "accurate charges" of postwar "overkill… seemed to legitimate chargers of overkill levied at the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs."[124] Furthermore, many "who became disillusioned with the American terror bombing in Vietnam became converts to the Hiroshima guilt trip."[125] Newman also cites Ian Buruma's The Wages of Guilt, which explores the myriad of factors for why a "Japan-as-Victim" cult developed but no comparably "cult" developed around Germany. The key factor as Newman sees it, however, was Vietnam. Without it, "the Japanese-as-victims cult in the United States would still be puny."[126] Newman's work is a vicious attack on the legacy of revisionists like Gar Alperovitz and Martin Sherwin.

Paul Boyer's study, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, addresses the "unsettling new cultural factor" of the atomic bomb that had been introduced in immediate post-war period from 1945 to 1950. [127] His contention is that the bomb "had transformed not only military strategy and international relations, but the fundamental ground of culture and consciousness" in the United States.[128] These five formative years shaped how Americans first "confronted the bomb, struggled against it, and absorbed it into the fabric of the culture." [129] In short, Boyer maintains that the 1945 to 1946 period was a time of "obsessive post-Hiroshima awareness of the horror of the atomic bomb," while in the period from 1947 to 1950 and after there was a "diminished cultural attention and uneasy acquiescence" as the "dread destroyer of 1945 had become the shield of the Republic by 1950."[130] In essence, Sherwin's "transcendent technology of nuclearism" permeated what Boyer calls America's "nuclear consciousness." This "nuclear consciousness" was infused into the very core of American ideology in the post-war era and so deeply pervades American "consciousness that it is hard to imagine what existence would have been like without it."[131] Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Boyer argues, "stand as signposts marking both a gash in the living flesh of our historical consciousness and a turning point in our ethical history." [132]

From 1945 to 1946 an "intense discourse" had surrounded the atomic bomb, where after 1947 this "diminished to scattered murmurs and faint echoes" and by 1950 "America's nuclear culture… would appear as a gray and largely deserted landscape."[133] Around this time the Atomic Energy Commission began a full throttle propaganda campaign to associate atomic energy with health, happiness, and prosperity. This campaign drew in scientists, educators, radio personalities, health workers, and others, directly reaching some four million Americans and indirectly affecting many more. A "policy of deep secrecy about atomic-bomb research and stockpiling," alongside the "pervasive official practice… of playing down the bomb's dangers" continued to condition the American public.[134] In this context, and with the ensuing Cold War schism that dominated international relations, the "civil defense" paradigm displaced the "international control" slogan dominant during 1945-6. This multifaceted propaganda campaign was so successful that by 1950 Americans had overwhelmingly, if not unanimously, embraced the atomic bomb. The mid-1950s saw a resurgence of debate over the atomic bomb and then a re-decline after 1963. He argues that the illusion of diminished risk, the loss of immediacy, the promise of a world transformed by atomic energy, the complexity and comfort of deterrence theory, and the importance of the Vietnam War led to the decline of atomic prominence. Interestingly, whereas Newman positions the Vietnam as the central feature in establishing the "Hiroshima cult," Boyer contends that the Vietnam War actually lessened discussion and debate over the atomic bomb.

Although Boyer aligns neatly with revisionist historians, he does refocus the chronological lens. Where other historians have drawn a line of continuity between the development of the bomb and its use, or between the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, Boyer furthers that line of continuity by exploring the state's role in managing post-Hiroshima public discourse. In this way Boyer's work partially overlaps and agrees with but significantly transcends Alperovitz "architecture of an American myth." By focusing on the state's institution of a broad, far-reaching propaganda campaign that helped shape popular opinion, Boyer repositions the role of the state not just as user of the atomic bomb, but also as manager of the dominant discourse after its use. In this way, Boyer provides a unique historiographical contribution by arguing that atomic policies "transformed not only military strategy and international relations, but the fundamental ground of culture and consciousness" in the United States.

Thus, not only is the discourse surrounding the actual use of the atomic bomb split into competing camps, the post-war discourse itself is a topic of debate. In this regard, Paul Boyer's work is the most thorough, sophisticated, and systematic cultural analysis of the post-war discourse. For those of us interested in challenging not only the excesses of war, but the inter-imperial rivalries that ultimately lead to the use of the bomb, understanding the nuances of the historiographical debate is vital. More importantly, in the wake of the 1995 Smithsonian controversy and the ever-expanding list of countries with access to nuclear armaments, those of us on the left must continue to wage war on the post-war discourse justifying and rationalizing the atomic bomb.



Bibliography

Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995.

Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin Books, 1999.

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.

Maddox, Robert James. Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004.

Malloy, Sean L. Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Miscamble, Wilson D. The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Newman, Robert P. Truman and the Hiroshima Cult. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995.

Walker, J. Samuel. Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of the Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

Walker, Paul D. Truman's Dilemma: Invasion or the Bomb. Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 2003.

Stimson, Henry L. "The Decisions to Use the Atomic Bomb." Harper's Magazine (1947).

Sherwin, Martin J. A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Takaki, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.

Wainstock, Dennis. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. New York: Enigma Books, 2011.


Citations


[1] I borrow the term "consensus" from J. Samuel Walker.

[2] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa utilizes "orthodox" to describe this position.

[3] Henry L. Stimson, "The Decisions to Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's Magazine (1947). See full article: http://classrooms.tacoma.k12.wa.us/stadium/mberggren-2/us-history/download/Stimson%2B-%2BHarper%2BFeb%2B1947%2B-%2BDecision%2Bto%2BUse%2Bthe%2BAtomic%2BBomb.pdf?id=230795

[4] J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of the Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 105.

[5] Originally published in 1995.

[6] A reiteration and strengthening of his 1965 work Atomic Diplomacy.

[7] Originally published in 1973.

[8] Truman, Stimson, Byrnes, Stalin, Hirohito, and the Big Six in Japan are examples where disagreement is most pronounced.

[9] Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 19.

[10] Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 225.

[11] Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 6.

[12] Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 7.

[13] This argument maintained that the US should share atomic technology with the Soviet Union in exchange for political cooperation.

[14] This position stated that the US should maintain a monopoly over atomic technology as long as possible and advance its diplomatic aims through harsh bargaining from its position of atomic power.

[15] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 140.

[16] Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 154.

[17] Ibid., 135.

[18] Ibid., 139.

[19] Alperovitz, 19.

[20] Robert James Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), xv.

[21] Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 146.

[22] Ibid., 113.

[23] Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 104.

[24] This is Newman's term for revisionist historians.

[25] The USSBS maintained that in all likelihood Japan would surrender prior to November 1, 1945 without the atomic bombing or the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war. It further states that had Japan not surrendered by November 1, it would definitely have surrendered prior to the end of 1945.

[26] Robert P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 36.

[27] Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 47.

[28] This is one of Newman's other terms for revisionists.

[29] Ibid., 49.

[30] Wilson D Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 91.

[31] Frank, 95.

[32] Ibid., 96.

[33] Ibid., 197.

[34] Paul D. Walker, Truman's Dilemma: Invasion or the Bomb (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 2003), 171.

[35] Miscamble, 115. Original emphasis.

[36] Maddox, 153.

[37] Hasegawa, 5.

[38] Maddox, 131.

[39] Frank, 348.

[40] Miscamble, 89.

[41] Ibid., 91.

[42] Sakomizu was chief secretary to the cabinet of Japan during World War II.

[43] Hasegawa, 250.

[44] Miscamble, 3.

[45] Ibid., 44.

[46] Ibid., 113.

[47] Ibid., 119.

[48] Ibid., 124.

[49] Newman, xiii. Emphasis added.

[50] Ibid., 120.

[51] Ibid., 130.

[52] Ibid., 138. Emphasis original.

[53] Paul Walker, 15.

[54] Ibid., 17.

[55] Ibid., 18-19.

[56] Ibid., 27.

[57] Ibid., 43-44.

[58] Miscamble, 120-1.

[59] Maddox, xv.

[60] Alperovitz, 656.

[61] Ibid., 657.

[62] Sherwin, 6.

[63] Ibid., 7.

[64] Ibid., 8.

[65] Alperovitz, 655.

[66] Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 8.

[67] Takaki, Hiroshima, 100.

[68] Ibid., 94.

[69] Hasegawa, 2.

[70] Hasegawa, 300.

[71] Alperovitz, 4

[72] Hasegawa, 295.

[73] Ibid., 296.

[74] Alperovitz, 85.

[75] Hasegawa., 129.

[76] Ibid., 188

[77] Ibid., 275

[78] Samuel Walker cites Barton Bernstein as one of the pioneering "consensus" historians of Hiroshima.

[79] Dennis Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (New York: Enigma Books, 2011), 178.

[80] Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb, 178.

[81] Ibid., 178.

[82] Maddox, 8.

[83] Newman, 57.

[84] Ibid., 71.

[85] Ibid., 73.

[86] Ibid., 77.

[87] Wainstock, 171

[88] Hasegawa, 290

[89] Ibid., 291

[90] Sean L. Malloy, Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to Use the Bomb Against Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 7.

[91] Malloy, Atomic Tragedy, 8.

[92] Ibid., 81.

[93] Ibid., 11.

[94] Ibid., 67.

[95] Ibid., 70.

[96] Ibid., 9.

[97] Ibid., 129. Here he is referring to retention of the emperor (modifying unconditional surrender) and the public threat of Soviet entry into the war.

[98] Malloy, 129

[99] Samuel Walker, 6.

[100] Ibid., 109.

[101] Ibid., 109.

[102] Ibid., 92.

[103] Ibid., 5-6.

[104] Ibid., 89.

[105] Alperovitz, 656.

[106] Walker, 95.

[107] Sherwin, xi.

[108] Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), xix.

[109] Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light, xx.

[110] Alperovitz, 631.

[111] Ibid., 455.

[112] Ibid., 466.

[113] Ibid., 598.

[114] Ibid., 610.

[115] Ibid., 613.

[116] Sherwin, xi.

[117] Ibid., xi.

[118] Ibid., xii.

[119] Ibid., xi.

[120] Newman, xiii.

[121] Ibid., 153.

[122] Ibid., 161.

[123] Ibid., 164.

[124] Ibid., 177.

[125] Ibid., 183.

[126] Ibid., 184.

[127] Boyer, xxi.

[128] Ibid., xxi.

[129] Ibid., xx.

[130] Ibid., 352 and 349.

[131] Boyer, xx

[132] Ibid., 182.

[133] Ibid., 291.

[134] Ibid., 303.