oligarchy

Canadian Oligarchy: How the Super-Rich Rule "Socialized" Healthcare

By Miranda Schreiber


At the intersection of College St. and University St. in Toronto, six hospitals crowd together over five blocks. Although they are public institutions, most of their various departments are named by both speciality and private donor. In fact, nearly every center for care, research center, ‘wellness gallery,’ and atrium - even the nearby medical school - bears the name of its wealthy Canadian financier. Papered onto bus stops and the temporary barriers around construction sites are hospital fundraising campaigns, sometimes containing the stories of patients who feel particularly served by a given institution. Testaments to the power of private capital are everywhere.

In many ways this philanthropic basis of public healthcare is a virtually unquestioned aspect of the Canadian system, which is partially dependent on sporadic ‘gifts’ of millions of dollars from the highest echelons of the capitalist class. Major hospitals repeatedly characterize such events as generous, rather than reflective of the system that causes much of the sickness they spend their time treating. The Canadian situation is an example of the limits of public services under fundamentally capitalist conditions, the ways that the super-rich rule even ‘socialized’ systems.

Like many other kinds of capitalist infrastructure, the public healthcare system is useful to Canadians. However, it was designed to serve profit, not working people. An institution that has existed since the 1960s, it is easy to forget that it was not a gift from the government, a sign of an enlightened national character, but a concession from the capitalist class. Public healthcare did not simply appear due to a moment of moral clarity on parliament hill, it was demanded.

The history of Canadian medicine reveals this. Capitalist expansion onto Indigenous land led to the state-sanctioned destruction of food systems and smallpox epidemics; Indigenous nations were coerced into signing treaties in the midst of famine, allowing material resources to be expropriated by the settler state. [1] The Canadian government’s refusal to meet basic treaty obligations facilitated the spread of tuberculosis in substandard living conditions on reserves and in residential schools, internment camps where thousands of Indigenous children perished. [2] [3] Since its founding Canada’s existence as a capitalist colony has been contingent on the spread of disease. [4] This was simultaneous with the attempted destruction of Indigenous medicine and healthcare.

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After the first world war, the Canadian settler population became increasingly conscious of class warfare as their economic exploitation accelerated, frightening the capitalist class. “It seems strange now but at the time the possibility of a socialist or communist revolution was a viable threat to the ruling classes everywhere internationally,” says Tyler Shipley, author of Canada and the World. Revolutions in the USSR and Latin America revealed the possibility for working people to seize the means of production. As Alex Birrell explains on the podcast Unmaking Saskatchewan, the rapid spread of infectious disease among settlers led to grassroots organizing for the purposes of establishing public clinics in rural Saskatchewan for the treatment of diseases like tuberculosis. [5] In the 1930s during the depression, farmers who could not pay off medical debts unionized and formed the Farmer’s Labour Party, demanding social security and socialized medicine from the provincial government. [6] Even while farmers faced starvation due to drought, the medical establishment - specifically insurance companies and regulatory bodies representing urban doctors with wealthier patients - resisted public clinics from their inception, fearing a reduction in profits. [7] As Birrell explains on the podcast, “We had to drag the government around and force them to care, force them to act.” The first medicare bill was dramatically diluted by representatives of the medical establishment and commerce, so that “moderates won the battle over what medicare would look like….it was a victory built to be moved to the right.” A more comprehensive medicare plan was rejected in favor of one that placed more power in the hands of physician regulatory boards and industry.

Socialized healthcare in Canada came about at a time of capitalist crisis, as a concession, and so an aberration, of a fundamentally exploitative system that has required human deprivation from its beginning. As Shipley explains, the creation of Canadian healthcare, along with the rest of its social welfare system, stove off revolutionary activity and permitted the social reproduction of labor, offering enough care and security primarily to keep people looking for work. In the sixty years since medicare was passed, this Canadian social security net has been slowly stolen away, as the very forces that resisted public healthcare in the first place have reclaimed the infrastructure they reluctantly handed over to the working class. Over six decades, although more rapidly since the 1980s, the Canadian state has cut back government services and civil service employment while transferring power to private capital in the mass sale of public infrastructure and increases in tax breaks. [8] [9] Public health has been targeted at two ends: in the destruction of the resources that keep people healthy, and the sale of aspects of the healthcare system to private industry. Since 1985, housing and public sector pensions have been consistently clawed back, drug companies have been permitted to monopolize pharmaceutical drugs over generic brands, and thousands of civil service jobs have been eliminated while unemployment insurance has been cut. [10] [11] Grants to advocacy groups supporting the environment, Indigenous people, women, and children have been slashed, and occupational safety training programs have been defunded along with health and welfare grants.  At the same time, the wealthy have received massive tax breaks and government shares in transportation, universities, colleges, and communications have been sold off to private ownership.

The healthcare system is whatever remains after this attempt to maximize surplus profits, which has only hastened in the last several years. This is what explains the absurdly common event in Canadian healthcare in which a person who does not have a house is sent back out into freezing temperatures after receiving a free medical procedure. It clarifies the government decision to offer citizens care for ears but not for eyes, and a free patient-intake interview but not free medicine. There is no moral justification for this with the explanatory power of class analysis.

The story that healthcare makes Canada extraordinary is circulated in the media, in textbooks, and in political rhetoric. Another story we are often told is that people who can’t work but need healthcare are responsible for social misery. Patients are chided for ‘poor lifestyle choices’ and ‘wasting government resources’ by a healthcare system that effectively resents having to treat them. Predominant leaders in healthcare continue to collaborate with the philanthropists who are responsible for increasing homelessness and poverty. These multi-millionaires and billionaires have stolen from the public once through the theft of surplus value and the destruction of the public welfare state, and again in an evasion of just taxation. They donate to hospitals to expedite exploitation, not to end it; it’s just PR and a tax write-off. Representatives of commerce who are price-gouging groceries during a housing crisis like Galon Weston sit on hospital boards, claiming the system. [12] They name every medical building in their image.



Notes

[1] Clearing the Plains pg 24-29 (More in depth chapter 5, chapter 9)

[2] Clearing the Plains pg 27

[3] https://globalnews.ca/news/9432774/saddle-lake-cree-nation-residential-school-investigation-report/

[4] Clearing the Plains pg 24-29 (More in depth chapter 5, chapter 9)

[5] Unmaking Saskatchewan

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] https://www.sfu.ca/~mcohen/publications/Polecon/dismantl.pdf

[9] Stephen McBride and John Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order (Halifax: Fernwood, 1993), Table 2.4.

[10] Stephen McBride and John Shields, Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order (Halifax: Fernwood, 1993), Table 2.4.

[11] Federal Budgets 1985 to 1995; Canadian Council on Social Development, Canada's Social Programs are in Trouble, (Ottawa 1989);

[12] https://sunnybrook.ca/team/member.asp?m=948&page=4071

Thomas Hobbes, the Communist?

By Carlos Garrido

Republished from Midwestern Marx.

                                                             

The British materialist philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is one of the fathers of social contract theory and modern political philosophy. His magnus opusLeviathan[i] – is a text which á la Plato’s Republic covers a wide breadth of subjects from epistemology, science, religion, and moral and political philosophy. However, his text is most widely remembered for its monarchism-endorsing political philosophy and its speculative warring state of nature. Nonetheless, there is a contradiction at the heart of Hobbes’ work, between his notorious political thought and his moral philosophy, which is surprisingly egalitarian, collectivist, and progressive (esp. for the 17th century). Before we embark on the examination of this contradiction, let us refresh his position on the ideal political state and the state of nature.

In his political philosophy Hobbes espouses three forms of commonwealth, viz., monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy – each with their respective corrupted forms (tyranny, oligarchy, anarchy) (TH, 143). From these three options (whose minimum threshold is having some form of absolute sovereign power) he considers monarchy the most practical. In his ideal absolute monarchy, the sovereign, instituted by either force (“sovereignty by acquisition”) or choice (“sovereignty by institution”), uses fear – either the fear men have to return to a state of nature, or the fear men have of the sovereign himself – to rule over his subjects. This absolute monarch is paradoxically described as a “mortal god” and analogized to a leviathan – a biblical sea monster which Isaiah 27:1 urges God to slay (TH, 132). With very minor exceptions, Hobbes ideal political state is one in which the autonomy of the subjects is alienated onto the Monarch, making the later a singularity through which the multiplicity of suspended wills expresses itself.

Written during the English civil war, Hobbes’ Leviathan’s state of nature is a projection of the de facto chaotic state of England, where the warring factions of parliamentarian, absolute monarchist, and recently expropriated peasants – led by Gerrard Winstanley and the Diggers agrarian socialist movement – battled it out. In this context, Hobbes projects that in the state of nature (who he warns against interpreting as existing generally the same in all places), humanity is in a state of war, “every man, against every man” (TH, 92). This state of nature, we must clarify, is not limited to the condition pre-state primitive societies lived in. Beyond this, Hobbes describes conditions in a civil war (which he was in) and those in international relations between sovereigns as constitutive of a state of nature as well. For Hobbes, this state of nature in “continual fear” provides infertile grounds for industrial and human development, for the security of one’s life is the prime concern (TH, 94). In essence, within the state of nature “the life of man” is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Ibid.). 

Out of his political philosophy and speculation on the state of nature, the latter has remained the most influential in contemporary discourse. I remember the news reports during hurricane Katrina claiming that New Orleans was under a ‘Hobbesian state of nature,’ where rape, lootings, and killings dominated. This, of course, was false. Instead, as was shown in Rebecca Solnit’s A Paradise Built in Hell (among many other places), events like Katrina show that in times of adversity, when formal institutions seem to temporarily fall, people generally turn to collectively cooperating for the community. Nonetheless, the narrative that the “general inclination of all mankind” is “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death” remains essential in a system that can survive only insofar as it can “perpetually and restlessly” accumulate capital and reproduce the relations that facilitate this accumulation (TH, 73).

Hobbes’ political philosophy’s emphasis on an absolute sovereign is unacceptable for modern socialists. His anthropology, as constitutive of a portion of his theory on the state of nature, is also a perspective diametric to a Marxist position which shuns from these forms of speculative bourgeois essentialisms. Nonetheless, Hobbes’ laws of nature, the study of which he relegated as “moral philosophy,” retains interesting insights that lend themselves to striking moral criticisms of contemporary neoliberal capitalism (TH, 119).

Although before coming together into a commonwealth, humanity exists in the anxiety of the state of nature, Hobbes nonetheless posits that the laws of nature, centered around preserving life and keeping peace, are “immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, [and] iniquity… can never be made lawful” (TH, 119). Proceeding from the fundamental first law of keeping peace, let us examine a few of the nineteen laws Hobbes lays out for us. It is important to clarify that in our analysis we will be assuming that the modern political scenario is not constitutive of a state of nature, i.e., the grand majority of existing governments are not simply failed, sovereign-less states, most states do have an instituted sovereign power with roles similar to those needed to pass the threshold for Hobbes (even if some might be categorized within the three previously mentioned ‘corrupted forms’). Nonetheless, since for Hobbes, international relations, that is – relations between sovereigns – are constitutive of a state of nature, a loophole for excusing violations of the laws of nature in international relations is present. We will say more on this below.

To begin with – what is a lex naturalis (law of nature)? He says, “a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved” (TH, 97).

The first and most fundamental law of nature for Hobbes is that one must “seek peace, and follow it,” and if peace cannot be obtained, then one is allowed to defend themselves “by all means” (TH, 98). What greater violation of this law on earth than American imperialism? A system in which the supremacy of capital forces it to go abroad, as Marx said, “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt,”[ii] to continuously plunder foreign lands, is in a direct contradiction with peace. A nation which has been at war 226 out of its 244 years of life does not seem to be too fond of peace. And as to the times when violence, even when we seek peace, is inevitable, does not Hobbes’ proposition remind us of Fanon’s dictum to the colonized, who stuck in a “web of a three-dimensional violence”, are told they must “[end] the colonial regime by any means necessary?”[iii]

A Hobbesian might respond that within international dealings the laws of nature do not apply since international dealings are, for Hobbes, constitutive of a state of nature. Hence, the activities of American imperialism are fair game. It is important that we deal with this early, for similar international violations of the laws of nature are referenced below. This argument fails to distinguish two points: 1) international relations are always bound to national conditions – a sovereign does not take aliens to fight in wars of plunder, but his own citizenry, which, as in the case of the US, often return dead or physically and psychologically mutilated; 2) As Plato had already noted, states whose economic foundation is grounded on the “endless acquisition of money,” find it that they must “seize some of [their] neighbor’s land.”[iv] International relations reflect the national relations of class. To suppose, as Hobbes does, that international relations are in a state of nature is to presuppose a national economy based on accumulation, plunder, and expansion – and to ignore the possibility, effectively realized under socialism, of international relations based on cooperation and mutual development. Thus, the conditions of imperialism and global capital relations, instead of simply being brushed away through Hobbes’ categorization of them, further highlight the antinomies in Hobbes’ moral and political philosophy. For they demonstrate a condition where the commonwealth, that is, the general organization the laws of nature thrust humans into, is presupposed by Hobbes to be continuously flickering into a state of nature (the condition the laws of nature and commonwealth is supposed to negate) when dealing with the international realm of national politics. Nonetheless, let us continue our examination of his laws of nature.

In the fifth law of nature, the law of mutual accommodation, Hobbes states that just like an architect must toss aside material that takes “room from others” in the “building of an edifice”, so too “a man that by asperity of nature, will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of society, as cumbersome thereunto” (TH, 114). In a world where the eight richest people have the same wealth as the poorest half (almost 4 billion people), we live according to global relations which directly violate Hobbes’ fifth law of nature. For the Hobbesian unconvinced with the global nature of this violation (for reasons previously  mentioned), in the US, the country which spearheads the G7 in income inequality, the richest 1% of American households hold 15 times more wealth than the bottom 50% combined. This inequality exists at a time when hundreds of thousands are homeless, and when 42 million people, including 13 million kids, experience hunger in the country. From a Hobbesian moral philosophy, all those who are superfluously hoarding those things which others lack, must be immediately expropriated and expelled from society. Of course, a change in the society that allowed this in the first place is a precondition of the former.

The ninth law against pride gives an insight to how the inequality mentioned in five arose. Hobbes states, “the question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of mere nature; where, as has been shown before, all men are equal” (TH, 115). If men are equal, where did inequality come from? He says, “the inequality that now is, has been introduced by the laws civil” (Ibid.). In essence, men are born equal, it is their social formation which makes them unequal. Interesting enough, although Hobbes and Rousseau are seen to be in polar opposites, Rousseau also agrees that inequality is a development of our transition into society, specifically seen in the development of private property.[v]  Hobbes concludes that every man must “acknowledge another for his equal by nature” (TH, 116).

The tenth law is an extension of the ninths into the realm of the jus naturalis (rights of nature). Hobbes asserts that no man can desire a right for himself, “which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest” (Ibid.). He continues, “as it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certain rights of nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list: so it is necessary for man’s life, to retain some; as right to govern their own bodies, enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place; and all things else, without which a man cannot live, or not live well” (Ibid.). There are a few important things to note with this law. Firstly, the notion of rights applying to all was something that took more than three centuries after the writing of this text for the US to figure out. In some places, namely, in the settler colonial state of Israel, this law is still being violated. Secondly, the right to enjoy such things as clean air and water seems dim in a world where fossil capitalism is taking humanity and various other species on the planet to the brink of extinction. Lastly, Hobbes sustains as jus naturalis not just the right to all things one needs to live, but also to all things one needs to live well. In the US, the leading economic power in the history of the planet, having more than enough resources to do so, guarantees neither the latter nor the former to its people as a right. Shelter, food, water, and medical care, i.e., the basic necessities people need to survive, are not guaranteed to the American public. Beyond this, those specific things which each person requires in order to ‘live well,’ to virtuously develop themselves in community, are restricted for only those who can afford it. A system which is dependent for its reproduction on the commodification of people and nature is fundamentally unable to exist non-antagonistically to Hobbes’ tenth law.

Laws twelve and thirteen may also seem surprising to some. Here he states:

The twelfth, equal use of things common. And from this followeth another law, that such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the equality of the thing permit, without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right. For otherwise the distribution is unequal, and contrary to equity.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. Then, the law of nature, which prescribeth equity, requireth, that the entire right; or else, making the use alternate, the first possession, be determined by lot. For equal distribution, is of the law of nature; and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined.

These passages deserve the reply Marx gives the “intelligent” bourgeois of his time, who, while rejecting communism promote co-operative production and societies – he tells them, “what else, gentlemen, would it be but communism, ‘possible’ communism?”[vi] We must ask Hobbes here, ‘what is this, if not communism?’ From law twelve and thirteen we get three forms of property: 1) property that can be distributed equally to all deserving, 2) property that can be enjoyed in common, 3) property that can neither be enjoyed in common nor distributed equally but is assigned by lottery. Although it might not be what Marx deems the highest phase of communism, where relations are based “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need,”[vii] Hobbes nonetheless conjures the necessity for a form of lower phase communism out of his ‘laws of nature.’

As I hope to have shown, there is a persistent contradiction between Hobbes’ moral philosophy – dedicated as a science to knowing the lex naturalis – and his political philosophy, grounded more on his projected conception of human nature, than on the laws of nature which supposedly thrust humanity into a commonwealth. Hobbes’ moral philosophy can be described as a militant egalitarianism, which runs directly counter to his ideal conception of the state. If Hobbes’ moral philosophy were transferred in an honest manner into the political-economic realm, he would be alongside Gerrard Winstanley as a forefather of modern socialist thought. Unfortunately, the baby was dropped in the transfer, and what we received is a reactionary political philosophy.

As is often the case with the best of bourgeois thought, the faithful applicability of their moral philosophy would cause its transition into the political realm to escape beyond the boundaries of possibilities within bourgeois society, e.g., Smith, Rousseau, Kant, Mill. In Hobbes we have the most shocking of these cases. As a thinker whose defense of contractual relations has become sacrosanct for the religion of capitalism (used centrally to justify wage-slavery), and whose views on human nature provided a universal grounding for the capitalist ethos, we nonetheless find in his communistic moral philosophy fertile ground for an immanent critique of his own philosophy and of bourgeois society in general. However, we must remember moral criticism of a system is insufficient for its transformation. For a substantial transformation, i.e., for a revolution, a scientific understanding of the systemic mechanisms through which these morally reproachable things arise is necessary. It is here important to remember American Marxist and Socialist Labour Party leader Daniel DeLeon’s famous dictum, “the moral sentiment is to a movement as important as the sails are to a ship. Nevertheless, important though sails are, unless a ship is well laden, unless she is soundly, properly and scientifically constructed, the more sails you pile on and spread out, the surer she is to capsize.”[viii] 

 

Carlos L. Garrido is a philosophy graduate student and professor at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. His specialization is in Marxist philosophy and the history of American socialist thought (esp. early 19th century). He is an editorial board member and co-founder of Midwestern Marx  and the Journal of American Socialist Studies. 

Notes

[i] All quotations will be from this edition: Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. (Touchstone, 2008).

[ii] Marx, Karl. Capital Vol 1. (International Publishers, 1974), p. 760.

[iii] Fanon, Franz. “Why we use Violence.” In Alienation and Freedom. (Bloomsbury, 2018), p. 654.

[iv] Plato. “Republic.” In Complete Works. (Hackett Publishing Co, 1997)., p. 1012.

[v] See Rousseau’s 1755 Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.

[vi] Marx, Karl. “The Civil War in France.” In in The Marx-Engels Reader. (W.W. Norton & Co, 1978), p. 635.

[vii] Marx, Karl. “Critique of the Gotha Program.” In The Marx-Engels Reader. (W.W. Norton & Co, 1978), p. 531.

[viii] DeLeon, Daniel. Writings of Daniel DeLeon. (Red and Black Publishers, 2008), p. 13.

Five Characteristics of Neo-imperialism: Building on Lenin's Theory of Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century

By Cheng Enfu and Lu Baolin

Neoimperialism is the specific contemporary phase of historical development that features the economic globalization and financialization of monopoly capitalism. The characteristics of neoimperialism can be summed up on the basis of the following five key features. First is the new monopoly of production and circulation. The internationalization of production and circulation, together with the intensified concentration of capital, gives rise to giant multinational monopoly corporations whose wealth is nearly as great as that of whole countries. Second is the new monopoly of finance capital, which plays a decisive role in global economic life and generates a malformed development, namely, economic financialization. Third is the monopoly of the U.S. dollar and intellectual property, generating the unequal international division of labor and the polarization of the global economy and wealth distribution. Fourth is the new monopoly of the international oligarchic alliance. An international monopoly alliance of oligarchic capitalism, featuring one hegemonic ruler and several other great powers, has come into being and provides the economic foundation for the money politics, vulgar culture, and military threats that exploit and oppress on the basis of the monopoly. Fifth is the economic essence and general trend. The globalized contradictions of capitalism and various crises of the system often undergo an intensification that creates the new monopolistic and predatory, hegemonic and fraudulent, parasitic and decaying, transitional and moribund form of contemporary capitalism as late imperialism.

The historical evolution of capitalism has passed through several distinct stages. At the beginning of the twentieth century, capitalism reached the stage of private monopoly, which V. I. Lenin termed the imperialist stage. The era of imperialism brought with it the law of uneven economic and political development. In order to expand overseas and redistribute the territory of the world, the leading powers formed various alliances and launched a fierce struggle that led to two world wars. Eurasia suffered from continuous wars throughout the first half of the twentieth century. One after the other, national democratic revolutions and the communist movement developed continuously. After the Second World War, a number of economically underdeveloped countries adopted a socialist path of development, intensifying the confrontation between capitalism and socialism. Although The Communist Manifesto had long anticipated that capitalism would inevitably be replaced by socialism, this was only possible in a very few countries. The capitalist and imperialist system, despite suffering grave problems, survived. From the 1980s and early ’90s, capitalism carried out a strategic shift to neoliberal policies and evolved into its neoimperialist phase. This represents a new phase in the development of imperialism following the Cold War.

In his book Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin set out the definition and characteristics of imperialism as follows:

If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism.… We must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following five of its basic features: (1) the concentration of production and capital developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this “finance capital,” of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.1

In an article published in December 1917, Lenin further elaborated that: “Imperialism is a specific historical stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is monopoly capitalism; parasitic, or decaying capitalism; moribund capitalism.”2

Based on Lenin’s theory of imperialism, we shall analyze contemporary capitalism while bearing in mind the recent changes it has undergone. Neoimperialism, we shall argue, is the phase of late imperialism that has arisen in the contemporary world, against the background of economic globalization and financialization.3 The character and features of neoimperialism can be summarized, as stated, around five aspects.

The New Monopoly of Production and Circulation

Lenin stated that the most profound economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is deeply rooted in the basic law of capitalist competition, which holds that competition results in the concentration of production and capital, and that this concentration will inevitably lead to monopoly when it reaches a certain level. In the early years of the twentieth century, the capitalist world experienced two huge waves of corporate mergers as the concentration of capital and of production reinforced each other. Production came increasingly to be concentrated in a small number of large companies, with the process bringing about organization on the basis of industrial monopolies with cross-sector multiproduct management. Instead of free competition, monopoly alliances held sway. Beginning in the early 1970s, capitalism encountered a “stagflation” crisis that lasted for nearly ten years, followed by a period of secular stagnation, or a long-term decline in growth rates. Economic recession and competitive pressures in the domestic market drove monopoly capital to seek new growth opportunities overseas. With the support of a new generation of information and communications technologies, foreign direct investment and international industrial transfers have continually reached new heights, with the degree of internationalization of production and circulation dwarfing that of the past.

Monopoly capital is being redistributed globally from production to circulation. Through the decentralization and internationalization of production processes, a system has arisen in which global value chains and the operational networks for organizing and managing multinational corporations have been divided up. The multinational companies coordinate their global value chains through complex networks of supplier relationships and through various governance models. In such systems, the processes involved in the production and trading of intermediate products and services are divided up and distributed around the world. The input and output transactions are carried out in the global production and service networks of the subsidiaries, contract partners, and suppliers of the multinational companies. According to statistics, about 60 percent of global trade consists of the exchange of intermediate products and services, and 80 percent of it is achieved via multinational companies.4

Within the new monopoly structures, the second characteristic of neoimperialism is the internationalization of production and circulation. The further concentration of capital leads to the rise of giant monopoly multinational corporations whose wealth may be as great as that of whole countries. Multinational corporations are the true representatives of contemporary international monopolism. The characteristics of the giant monopoly corporations can be summarized as follows.

  1. The number of multinational corporations has grown globally, and the degree of socialization and internationalization of production and circulation has reached a higher level.

    Since the 1980s, multinational corporations have become the main driving force of international economic intercourse as the bearers of foreign direct investment. In the 1980s, foreign investment worldwide grew at an unprecedented rate, much faster than the growth during the same period of other major economic variables such as world output and trade. In the 1990s, the scale of international direct investment reached an unprecedented level. Multinationals established branches and affiliates around the world via foreign direct investment, the volume of which had expanded dramatically. Between 1980 and 2008, the number of global multinational companies increased from 15,000 to 82,000. The number of overseas subsidiaries grew even faster, from 35,000 to 810,000. In 2017, an average of over 60 percent of the assets and sales of the world’s one hundred top nonfinancial multinational companies were located or achieved abroad. Foreign employees accounted for approximately 60 percent of total staff.5

    Ever since the capitalist mode of production came into being, the concentration of production activities, expanding collaboration, and the evolution of the social division of labor have led to a continuous increase in the socialization of production. The decentralized labor processes are increasingly moving toward a joint labor process. The facts have proved that the sustained growth of outward foreign direct investment has strengthened the economic ties between all countries, as well as significantly increased the level of socialization and internationalization of the production and distribution systems, in which multinationals play a key role as the dominant force at the micro level. The internationalization of production and the globalization of trade have extensively redefined the way in which countries participate in the international division of labor, and this in turn has reshaped the production methods and profit models within those countries. Throughout the world, the majority of countries and regions are integrated into the network of international production and trade created by these giant corporations. Thousands of companies around the world form value creation nodes in the system of global production chains. Within the global economy, multinational firms have become the main channels for international investment and production, the core organizers of international economic activity, and the engine of global economic growth. The rapid development of multinational corporations shows that in the new imperialist phase constructed around the globalization of capital, the concentration of production and capital is reaching ever greater dimensions. Tens of thousands of multinational corporations now dominate everything.

  2. The scale of accumulation by multinational monopoly capital is increasing, forming a multinational corporate empire.

    Although the number of multinational capitalist corporations is not especially large, they all possess great strength. They not only comprise the main force in the development and use of new technologies, but also control the marketing networks and more and more natural and financial resources. On this basis, they have monopolized the proceeds of production and circulation and equipped themselves with an unparalleled competitive advantage. Between 1980 and 2013, benefiting from the expansion of markets and the decline in production factor costs, the profits of the world’s largest 28,000 companies increased from $2 trillion to $7.2 trillion, representing an increase from 7.6 percent to approximately 10 percent of gross world product.6 In addition, these multinational corporations not only form alliances with organs of state power, but also develop links with the global financial system, together forming financial monopoly organizations backed by state support. The globalization and financialization of monopoly capital further consolidate its wealth accumulation. In terms of sales revenue, the economic scale of some multinational corporations exceeds that of a number of developed countries. In 2009, for example, Toyota’s annual sales exceeded the gross domestic product (GDP) of Israel. In 2017, Walmart, rated by the Fortune 500 list as the world’s largest company, achieved total revenues of more than $500 billion, greater than the GDP of Belgium. If we combine the data for multinational corporations and the world’s total of almost two hundred countries, and draw up a list of their annual revenues and GDPs, it becomes clear that the countries represent fewer than 30 percent of the world’s one hundred largest economies, while the corporations account for more than 70 percent.

    If world development continues along these lines, there will be more and more multinational companies whose wealth is similar to that of whole countries. Although industrial globalization has made economic activity more fragmented, vast quantities of profits still flow to a few countries of the developed capitalist world. Investment, trade, exports, and technology transfer are principally managed via the giant multinational corporations or their overseas branches, and the parent companies of these multinational monopolies remain tightly concentrated in geographic terms. In 2017, corporations from the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom accounted for half of the top five hundred companies in the world. Some two-thirds of the top one hundred multinationals are from these countries.

  3. Multinational corporations monopolize the industries in their particular fields, controlling and running international production networks.

    The multinational giants have immense quantities of capital and formidable scientific and technological strengths, which ensure them a dominant position in global production, trade, investment, and finance, as well as in the creation of intellectual property. The economies of scale that result from the monopoly positions enjoyed by multinational corporations have expanded their competitive advantage. This is because “the larger the army of workers among whom the labour is subdivided, the more gigantic the scale on which machinery is introduced, the more in proportion does the cost of production decrease, the more fruitful is the labour.”7 The high degree of monopoly exercised by the multinational corporations means that the concentration of production and the concentration of control over markets reinforce each other, accelerating capital accumulation. Meanwhile, competition and credit, as two powerful levers for the concentration of capital, accelerate capital’s trend of coming under increasingly narrow control as it accumulates. Over the past thirty years, all of the world’s nations have promoted policy options aimed at boosting investment and relaxing the restrictions to which foreign direct investment is subject. Although the increasing scale of outward foreign direct investment by developed countries has to varying degrees accelerated capital formation and the development of human resources in underdeveloped countries, and increased their export competitiveness, it has also brought about large-scale privatization and cross-border mergers and acquisitions in these nations. This has accelerated the process through which small and medium enterprises are bankrupted or forced to merge with multinational corporations. Even relatively large enterprises are vulnerable.

    Around the world, many industries now have an oligopolistic market structure. For example, the global market for central processing units has been almost completely monopolized by the firms Intel and Advanced Micro Devices. As of 2015, the global market for seeds and pesticides was almost entirely controlled by six multinational companies—BASF, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, Monsanto, and Syngenta—that together controlled 75 percent of the global market for pesticides, 63 percent of the global market for seeds, and 75 percent of global private research in these areas. Syngenta, BASF, and Bayer alone controlled 51 percent of the global pesticide market, while DuPont, Monsanto, and Syngenta accounted for 55 percent of the seed market.8 According to statistics of the European Medical Devices Industry Group, the sales in 2010 of just twenty-five medical device companies accounted for more than 60 percent of the total sales of medical devices throughout the world. Ten multinationals controlled 47 percent of the global market for pharmaceuticals and related medical products. In China, soybeans are one of the vital food crops. All aspects of global soybean production, supply, and marketing chains are controlled by five multinational companies: Monsanto, Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus. Monsanto controls the raw materials for seed production, while the other four control planting, trading, and processing. These multinationals form various alliances through joint ventures, cooperation, and long-term contractual agreements.9 As more and more social wealth is seized by fewer and fewer private capitalist giants, monopoly capital deepens its control and exploitation of labor. This leads to capital accumulation on a world scale, aggravating global overcapacity and the polarization between rich and poor.

In the era of neoimperialism, information and communications technology is developing rapidly. The emergence of the Internet has greatly reduced the time and space required for social production and circulation, bringing about a surge of cross-border mergers, investment, and trade. Consequently, more and more noncapitalist regions have been incorporated into the process of accumulation dominated by monopoly capital, which has greatly strengthened and expanded the world capitalist system. The socialization and internationalization of production and circulation have undergone a great leap during the era of capitalist economic globalization in the twenty-first century. The pattern, described in The Communist Manifesto, according to which “a cosmopolitan character” has been given “to production and consumption in every country” has been greatly strengthened.10 The globalization of monopoly capital requires world economic and political systems to be on the same track in order to eliminate the institutional barriers between them. However, when a number of postrevolutionary countries abandoned their earlier political and economic systems and turned to capitalism, they were not rewarded with the affluence and stability preached by neoliberal economists. On the contrary, the neoimperialist phase is the setting for the rampages of hegemony and monopoly capital.

The New Monopoly of Finance Capital

In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin stated: “The concentration of production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry—such is the history of the rise of finance capital and such is the content of that concept.”11 Finance capital is a new type of capital formed by the merger of bank monopoly capital and industrial monopoly capital. The turning point in the change from general capitalist rule to that of finance capital appeared around the beginning of the twentieth century, when banks in the leading imperialist countries were transformed from ordinary intermediaries into powerful monopolists. But before the Second World War, due to recurrent wars, high information transmission costs, and technical and institutional barriers such as trade protection, the linkages between global investment, trade, finance, and the market were relatively weak. The degree of globalization of the economy remained low, hindering the outward expansion of monopoly capital. After the Second World War, economic globalization was accelerated by the new technological revolution. In the early 1970s, rising oil prices triggered a worldwide economic crisis and brought about the grotesque phenomenon, impossible for Keynesian economics to explain, in which inflation and economic stagnation coexisted. In order to find profitable investment opportunities and escape from the “stagflation” quagmire, monopoly capital transferred traditional industries overseas, thus maintaining its original competitive advantage. Meanwhile, it accelerated its decoupling from the traditional industries and sought to open up new financial territory. Capitalist globalization and financialization catalyzed and supported each other, accelerating the “virtualization” of monopoly capital and the hollowing out of the real economy. The Western economic recession of the 1970s thus acted not only as a catalyst for the internationalization of monopoly capital, but also as the starting point for the financialization of industrial capital. Since then, monopoly capital has accelerated its turn from monopoly exercised in a single country to international monopoly, from the monopoly of the industrial entity to the monopoly of the financial industry.

Within the context of the new monopoly of finance capital, the second key characteristic of neoimperialism is that financial monopoly capital plays a decisive role in global economic life, giving rise to economic financialization.

Minority of Financial Institutions Control Main Global Economic Arteries

To seek monopolistic power is the very nature of imperialism. “The big enterprises, and the banks in particular, not only completely absorb the small ones, but also ‘annex’ them, subordinate them, bring them into their ‘own’ group or ‘concern’ (to use the technical term) by acquiring ‘holdings’ in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by a system of credits, etc.,” Lenin explains. “We see the rapid expansion of a close network of channels which cover the whole country, centralising all capital and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national, capitalist, and then into a world capitalist economy.”12 At the neoimperialist phase, a small number of multinational corporations, most of them banks, have spread a very extensive and detailed operational network over the world via mergers, participation, and shareholding, and thus control not only countless small and medium enterprises but also the main global economic arteries. An empirical study by three Swiss scholars, Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston, showed that a relatively small number of multinational banks effectively dominate the whole global economy. Based on their analysis of 43,060 multinational corporations all over the world and the shareholding relationships between them, they found that the top 737 multinational corporations controlled 80 percent of total global output. After further study of the complicated network of these relationships, they came up with the even more amazing discovery that a core consisting of 147 multinational corporations controlled nearly 40 percent of the economic value. Of the 147 corporations, some three-quarters were financial intermediaries.13

The Globalization of Monopoly-Finance Capital

When imperialism evolved into neoimperialism, the financial oligarchies and their agents set the rules of trade and investment aside, and proceeded to launch currency, trade, resource, and information wars, plundering resources and wealth globally and at will. Within this system, neoliberal economists play the role of spokespeople for the financial oligarchs, advocating for financial liberalization and globalization in the interests of the monopolists and enticing developing countries to liberalize their capital account restrictions. If the countries concerned follow this advice, exercising financial supervision will become more difficult and their vulnerability to the hidden dangers of the financial system will increase. The effect will be to provide more opportunities for financial monopoly capital to plunder these countries’ wealth. In their operations on capital markets, the international financial investment giants tend to attack the fragile financial firewalls of developing countries and seize opportunities to plunder the assets these countries have accumulated over decades. This indicates that financial globalization and liberalization have certainly established a unified and open global financial system, but in the meantime have created mechanisms through which the global center appropriates the resources and surplus value of the less developed periphery. Concentrated in the hands of a minority of the international financial oligarchies and armed with actual monopoly power, finance capital has gained increasing volumes of monopoly profits through foreign investment, new business ventures, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. As finance capital continuously levies tribute from all over the world, the rule of the financial oligarchs is consolidated.

From Production to Speculative Finance

Financial monopoly capital, which has rid itself of the constraints associated with material form, is the highest and most abstract form of capital, and is extremely flexible and speculative. In the absence of regulation, financial monopoly capital is very likely to work against the goals set by a country for its industrial development. After the Second World War, under the guidance of state interventionism, commercial and investment banks were operated separately, the securities market was strictly supervised, and the expansion of finance capital and its speculative activity were heavily restricted. In the 1970s, as the influence of Keynesianism faded and neoliberal ideas began taking over, the financial industry began a process of deregulation and the basic forces controlling the operation of financial markets ceased to be those of governments and became the leading participants in the markets themselves. In the United States, the Jimmy Carter administration in 1980 enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, which abolished the deposit and loan interest rate controls, and by 1986 interest rate liberalization was complete. In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act ended all geographical restrictions on banking operations and allowed banks to conduct business across state lines, increasing the competition between financial institutions. In 1996, the National Securities Market Improvement Act was promulgated, markedly reducing supervision over the securities industry. The Financial Services Modernization Act followed in 1999, and the enforced separation of commercial banking from investment banking and insurance, a provision that had existed for nearly seventy years, was completely abolished. Advocates of financial liberalization initially claimed that if the government relaxed its supervision over financial institutions and financial markets, the efficiency with which financial resources were allocated would be further improved and the finance industry would be better able to boost economic growth. But finance capital has many unruly tendencies, and if restraints on it are lifted, it is quite capable of behaving like a runaway horse. Excessive financialization will inevitably lead to the virtualization of economic activities and to the emergence of huge bubbles of fictitious capital.

Over the past thirty years, finance capital has expanded in a process linked to the continuous deindustrialization of the economy. Because of the lack of opportunities for productive investment, financial transactions now have less and less to do with the real economy. Capital that is otherwise redundant is directed into speculative schemes, swelling the volume of fictitious assets in the virtual economy. In line with these developments, the cash flow of large enterprises has shifted extensively from fixed capital investment to financial investment, and corporate profits now come increasingly from financial activities. Between 1982 and 1990, almost a quarter of the sums previously invested in factory plant and equipment in the private real economy were shifted to the financial, insurance, and real estate sectors.14 Since the relaxation of financial restrictions in the 1980s and ’90s, supermarket chains have offered a wider and wider variety of financial products to the public, including credit and prepaid debit cards, savings and checking accounts, insurance plans, and even home mortgages.15 The shareholder value maximization principle popularized since the 1980s has forced CEOs to prioritize short-term goals. Rather than paying off debts or improving their company’s financial structure, CEOs in many cases use profits to buy back the company’s stocks, pushing up the stock price and thus increasing their own salaries. Of the companies listed on Standard & Poor’s 500 Index between 2003 and 2012, 449 invested a total of $2,400 billion to purchase their own shares. This sum corresponded to 54 percent of their total revenues, and another 37 percent of revenues were paid as dividends.16 In 2006, the expenditure by U.S. nonfinancial companies on repurchasing their own shares was equal to 43.9 percent of non-residential investment expenditure.17

The financial sector also dominates the distribution of surplus value within the nonfinancial sector. The sums paid as dividends and bonuses in the nonfinancial corporate sector account for a greater and greater proportion of total profits. Between the 1960s and the ’90s, the dividend payout ratio (the ratio of dividends to adjusted after-tax profits) of the U.S. corporate sector underwent a significant increase. While the average in the 1960s and ’70s was 42.4 and 42.3 percent, respectively, from 1980 to 1989 it never fell below 44 percent. Although total corporate profits fell by 17 percent, total dividends increased by 13 percent and the dividend payout ratio reached 57 percent.18 In the days before the U.S. financial crisis broke out in 2008, the proportion of net bonuses to net after-tax profits amounted to about 80 percent of companies’ final capital allocations.19 Further, the boom in the virtual economy has no relation whatever to the ability of the real economy to support such growth.

Stagnation and shrinkage in the real economy coexist with excessive development of the virtual economy. The value created in the real economy depends on such purchasing power as has appeared through the expansion of asset bubbles and the rise of asset prices, the so-called wealth effect. As the gap between rich and poor continues to widen, the financial institutions are obliged, with government backing, to rely on a variety of financial innovations to support credit-fueled consumption by citizens who are not asset owners and to disperse the resulting financial risks. Meanwhile, the huge income and wealth effects generated by the appearance on the scene of derivative financial products and the growth of asset bubbles attract more investors to the virtual economy. Driven by monopoly profits, numerous derivative financial products are created. The innovations in the area of financial products also lengthen the debt chain and serve to pass on financial risks. An example is the securitization of subprime mortgage loans; layer upon layer of these were packaged together with the seeming purpose of raising the credit rating of the products involved, but actually in order to transfer high levels of risk to others. Increasingly, the trade in financial products is separated from production; it is even possible to say that it has nothing to do with production and is solely a gambling transaction.

The Monopoly of the U.S. Dollar and Intellectual Property

Again, in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin stated: “Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition held undivided sway, was the export of goods. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of capital.”20 After the Second World War, the deepening and refining of the international division of labor brought more developing countries and regions into the global economic network. Within the global production mechanism, every country and enterprise is seemingly able to exercise its own comparative advantages. Even the least developed countries can rely on cheap labor and such resource advantages as it might have to allow participation in the international division of labor and cooperation. However, the real motive of monopoly capital is to compete for favorable trading platforms and to plunder high monopoly profits. In particular, the U.S. dollar hegemony and the developed-country monopoly of intellectual property mean that international exchange is seriously unequal. Thus, the characteristics of the old imperialism, coexisting with the commodity output, define the general capital output. Meanwhile, the characteristics of neoimperialism that coexist with the commodity output and the general capital output are the output of the U.S. dollar and intellectual property.

The third characteristic of neoimperialism is defined by the hegemony of the U.S. dollar and the developed-world monopoly of intellectual property, which together generate the unequal international division of labor along with a polarized global economy and wealth distribution. In each of the four aspects that can be summed up as state-capital, capital-labor, capital-capital, and state-state, the dominant forces of giant monopoly capital and neoimperialism are further strengthened under the conditions of economic globalization and financial liberalization.

The Spatial Expansion of the Capital-Labor Relation: Global Value Chains and the Global Labor Arbitrage

Through mechanisms that include outsourcing, setting up subsidiaries, and establishing strategic alliances, multinationals integrate more and more countries and companies into the global production networks they dominate. The reason why capital accumulation can be achieved on this global scale is the existence of a large, low-cost global workforce. According to data from the International Labor Organization, the world’s total workforce grew from 1.9 to 3.1 billion between 1980 and 2007. Of these people, 73 percent were from developing countries, with China and India accounting for 40 percent.21 Multinational corporations are all organized entities, while the global workforce finds it exceedingly difficult to unite effectively and defend its rights. Because of the existence of the global reserve army of labor, capital can use the strategy of divide and conquer to discipline wage workers. Over decades, monopoly capital has shifted the production sectors of developed-world economies to the countries of the Global South, compelling workforces in different areas of the globe to compete with one another for basic living incomes. Through this process, multinationals are able to extort huge imperialist rents from the world’s workers.22 In addition, these giant corporations are well able to lobby and pressure the governments of developing countries to formulate policies that benefit the flow of capital and investment. Trying to secure GDP growth by inducing international capital to invest and set up factories, many developing country governments not only ignore the protection of social welfare and labor rights, but also guarantee various preferential measures such as tax concessions and credit support. The globalization of production has thus enabled the developed capitalist countries to exploit the less developed world in a more “civil” fashion under the slogan of fair trade. In order to launch their modernization, developing countries often have little choice but to accept the capital offered by the imperialists—along with the conditions and encumbrances that go with it.

Monopoly-Finance Capital and Multinational Corporate Dominance

The new structure of the international division of labor inherits the old unbalanced and unequal system. Although production and marketing are fragmented, the control centers of research and development, finance, and profit are still the multinational corporations. These corporate entities usually occupy the top of the vertical division of labor, owning the intellectual property rights associated with core components. The giant, globe-straddling corporations are in charge of formulating technology and product standards, as well as controlling the design, research, and development links. Meanwhile, their “partners” in developing countries are typically contracted to multinational corporations and are the recipients of such product standards. They usually engage in such labor-intensive activities as production, processing, and assembly, and are responsible for producing simple parts in mass quantities. Performing relatively unspecialized factory operations for multinationals, these enterprises earn only slender profits. The jobs in these enterprises generally feature low wages, high labor intensity, long working hours, and poor working environments. Although the value embodied in the products is primarily created by production workers in developing-world factories, most of the value additions are plundered by the multinationals via unequal exchange within the production networks. The proportion of overseas profits within the total profits of U.S. corporations increased from 5 percent in 1950 to 35 percent in 2008. The proportion of overseas-retained profits increased from 2 percent in 1950 to 113 percent in 2000. The proportion of overseas profits within the total profits of Japanese corporations increased from 23.4 percent in 1997 to 52.5 percent in 2008.23 In a slightly different accounting, the share of foreign profits of U.S. corporations as a percent of U.S. domestic corporate profits increased from 4 percent in 1950 to 29 percent in 2019.24 Multinational corporations are often able to use their monopoly of intellectual property to generate huge returns. Intellectual property includes product design, brand names, and symbols and images used in marketing. These are protected by rules and laws covering patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Figures from the UN Conference on Trade and Development show that royalties and licensing fees paid to multinational corporations increased from $31 billion in 1990 to $333 billion in 2017.25

With the advance of financial liberalization, finance capital no longer merely serves industrial capital, but has far overtaken it. The financial oligarchs and rentiers are now dominant. In the space of just twenty years from 1987, debt in the international credit market soared from just under $11 billion to $48 billion, with a rate of growth far exceeding that of the world economy as a whole.26

Neoimperialism and the Neoliberal State

Since the mid–1970s, economic stagflation has seen Keynesianism abandoned by governments, or employed much less. Neoliberal approaches such as modern monetarism, the rational expectations school, and supply-side theories are hits among economists, and dominate economic theory and policy in the neoimperialist countries. This is because these approaches accord with the expanding globalization and financialization of monopoly capital. Neoliberalism is a superstructure that has arisen on the basis of financial monopoly capital; essentially, it represents the basis for the ideology and policies required to maintain the rule of neoimperialism. In the 1980s, U.S. president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher were the world standard-bearers of neoliberalism. Advocating the ideas of modern monetarism and the positions of the private property and supply-side schools, they implemented privatization and market-oriented reforms, relaxed government supervision, and weakened the power of labor unions to defend working-class rights. After taking office, Reagan immediately approved the establishment of a special group of CEOs, with vice president George H. W. Bush as its director, to revoke or relax regulations. The changes advocated by the group related to job safety, labor protection, and the protection of consumer interests. The Reagan administration also joined forces with big capitalists to crack down on labor unions in the public and private sectors, dismissing union leaders and organizers and leaving the working class, already in a weak position, even worse off. The so-called Washington-Wall Street Complex argued that the interests of Wall Street and those of the United States were identical; what was good for Wall Street was good for the country. The U.S. government had in practice become a tool for the financial oligarchy to pursue its economic and political interests.27 Therefore, it was not the votes of citizens, or even the democratic system of the separation of powers, but the Wall Street financial oligarchy and the military-industrial complex that ultimately controlled the government. Wall Street influenced the political process and policy formation in the United States by providing campaign contributions and manipulating the media. Held captive by monopoly interest groups, the U.S. government had little power to promote the sound development of the economy and society and to improve people’s livelihood. The list of Wall Street executives with annual salaries of tens of millions of dollars features numerous matches with the people holding top U.S. government posts. For example, the seventieth U.S. secretary of the treasury, Robert Edward Rubin, had previously spent twenty-six years working for investment bankers Goldman Sachs. The seventy-fourth secretary of the treasury, Henry Paulson, had earlier served the Goldman Sachs Group as its chairman and CEO. Many senior officials of the Donald Trump administration also had histories as executives of monopoly enterprises. The existence of this “revolving door” mechanism means that even if the government were to introduce relevant financial regulatory policies, it would be hard fundamentally to shake the interests of the financial chaebols of Wall Street.

Whenever a financial crisis occurs, the government provides emergency assistance to the monopoly oligarchs of Wall Street. U.S. scholars have found that the Federal Reserve has used secret emergency loans to meet the needs of large Wall Street interest groups, in some instances providing strong support to bankers who are board members of regional Federal Reserve banks. In 2007, the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis broke out. Bear Stearns, one of Wall Street’s top five investment banks, was acquired by JPMorgan Chase. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America. Goldman Sachs, however, survived; the main reasons include a decision by the government to urgently grant Goldman Sachs the status of a holding company, allowing it to obtain massive life-saving funds from the Federal Reserve. In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission banned the shorting of financial stocks.28

U.S. Dollar Hegemony, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Plundering of Global Wealth

In July 1944, on the initiative of the U.S. and British governments, representatives of forty-four countries gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to discuss plans for the postwar monetary system. In the course of the Bretton Woods Conference, the documents Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial ConferenceArticles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, and Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—collectively known as the Bretton Woods Agreements—were passed. A key point of the Bretton Woods system was to construct an international monetary order centered on the U.S. dollar.29 Other currencies were pegged to the dollar, which was in turn pegged to gold. The U.S. dollar then began to play the role of world currency, replacing the British pound. The unique advantage that derives from the central place of the U.S. dollar in the international monetary system gives the U.S. a special position compared to the rest of the world’s countries. The U.S. dollar makes up 70 percent of global currency reserves, while accounting for 68 percent of international trade settlements, 80 percent of foreign exchange transactions, and 90 percent of international banking transactions. Because the U.S. dollar is the internationally recognized reserve currency and trade settlement currency, the United States is not only able to exchange it for real commodities, resources, and labor, and thus to cover its long-term trade deficit and fiscal deficit, but can also make cross-border investments and carry out cross-border mergers of overseas enterprises employing the U.S. dollars that it prints at almost no cost. The hegemony of the U.S. dollar provides an excellent illustration of the predatory nature of neoimperialism. The United States can also obtain international seigniorage by exporting U.S. dollars, and can reduce its foreign debt by depreciating the U.S. dollar or assets that are priced in U.S. dollars. The hegemony of the U.S. dollar has also caused the transfer of wealth from debtor countries to creditor countries. This means that poor countries subsidize the rich, which is completely unfair.

Since the mid–1990s, international monopolies have controlled 80 percent of the world’s patents, technology transfers, and most of the internationally recognized trademarks, something that has brought them large quantities of revenue. According to figures from Science and Engineering Indicators 2018 Digest, released by the National Science Council of America in January 2018, the total global cross-border licensing income from intellectual property in 2016 was $272 billion. The United States was the largest exporter of intellectual property, with income from this source comprising as much as 45 percent of the global total. The corresponding figure for the European Union was 24 percent, for Japan 14 percent, and for China less than 5 percent. In sharp contrast, the royalties on intellectual property paid by China to other countries increased from $1.9 billion in 2001 to $28.6 billion in 2017, and China’s deficit on cross-border intellectual property transactions reached more than $20 billion. During this period, the U.S. annual net income from licensing intellectual property to other countries was at least $80 billion.30

The New Monopoly of the International Oligarchic Alliance

Lenin stated in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism that “the epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, based on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the “struggle for spheres of influence.”31 Finance capital and its foreign policy, which is the struggle of the great powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of transitional forms of state dependence. Two main groups of countries—those owning colonies and colonies themselves—are typical of this epoch, as are the diverse forms of dependent countries that, politically, are formally independent, but in fact are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence.32 Nowadays, neoimperialism has formed new alliances and hegemonic relations in the economic, political, cultural, and military fields.

Within the context of the new monopoly of the international oligarchs, the fourth characteristic of neoimperialism is the formation of an international monopoly capitalist alliance between one hegemon and several other great powers. An economic foundation consisting of money politics, vulgar culture, and military threats has been formed for them to exploit and oppress via monopoly both at home and abroad.

The G7 as the Mainstay of the Imperial Capitalist Core

Neoimperialism’s current international monopoly economic alliance and the framework of global economic governance are both dominated by the United States. The G6 group was formed in 1975 by six leading industrial countries, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy, and became G7 when Canada joined the following year. G7 and its monopoly organizations are the coordination platforms, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization are the functional bodies. The global order of economic governance that was set up under the Bretton Woods system after the Second World War is essentially a high-level international capitalist monopoly alliance manipulated by the United States to serve its strategic economic and political interests. In the early 1970s, the U.S. dollar was decoupled from gold and the Bretton Woods currency system collapsed. One after another, summits of the G7 countries then shouldered responsibility for strengthening the Western consensus, contending against the socialist countries of the East, and boycotting the demands made by the less developed countries of the South for reforms to the international economic and political order.33 Since neoliberalism became the set of concepts dominating global economic governance, these multilateral institutions and platforms have become the driving force for the expansion of neoliberalism throughout the world. In line with the wishes of the international financial monopoly oligarchy and its allies, these bodies spare no effort to induce the developing countries to implement financial liberalization, the privatization of production factors, marketization without prior supervision, and free exchange in capital projects so as to facilitate inward and outward flows of international “hot money.” These institutions are constantly ready to control and plunder the economies of developing countries, extracting huge profits by encouraging speculation and creating financial bubbles. As Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in The Grand Chessboard, “the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can be said to represent ‘global’ interests, and their constituency may be construed as the world. In reality, however, they are heavily American dominated.”34

Since the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank have lured developing countries to implement neoliberal reforms. When these countries have fallen into crisis because of privatization and financial liberalization, the IMF and other institutions have forced them to accept the Washington Consensus by adding various unreasonable conditions to loans provided earlier. The effect is to further intensify the impacts of neoliberal reform. Between 1978 and 1992, more than seventy developing countries or former socialist countries implemented a total of 566 structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the World Bank.35 In the early 1980s, for example, the IMF used the Latin American debt crisis to force Latin American countries to accept neoliberal “reforms.” In order to curb inflation, the U.S. Federal Reserve in 1979 pushed short-term interest rates up from 10 percent to 15 percent, and finally to more than 20 percent. Because the existing debt of the developing countries was linked to U.S. interest rates, every 1 percent rise in U.S. interest rates would result in developing-world debtor countries paying an additional $40 to 50 billion per year in interest. In the second half of 1981, Latin America was borrowing at the rate of $1 billion a week, mostly in order to pay the interest on existing debt. During 1983, interest payments consumed almost half of Latin American export earnings.36 Under pressure to repay their loans, Latin American countries were forced to accept neoliberal reform plans initiated by the IMF. The main content of these plans consisted of privatizing state-owned enterprises; liberalizing trade finance; implementing economic austerity policies, with the effect of reducing living standards; cutting the taxes on monopoly enterprises; and reducing government spending on social infrastructure. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the IMF attached numerous conditions to assistance provided to South Korea, including that the allowance for foreign shareholdings be relaxed from 23 percent to 50 percent, and then to 55 percent by December 1998. Moreover, South Korea was required to allow foreign banks to set up branches freely.37

NATO and the International Monopoly-Capitalist Military and Political Alliance

Established in the early days of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international military alliance for the defense of monopoly capitalism. It is led by the United States and involves other imperialist countries. During the Cold War, NATO was the main tool used by the United States to actively contain and counter the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as to influence and control the Western European countries. At the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was dissolved and NATO became the military organization through which the United States sought to achieve its strategic goals on a global level. A capitalist military oligopoly, involving one hegemon and several other great powers, had come into being. Former U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher stated: “Only the United States can act as a leader.… For the United States to exercise leadership requires us to own a credible force threat as a backup for diplomacy.”38 The National Security Strategy for the New Century, published in the United States in December 1998, claimed unambiguously that the goal of the United States was to “lead the entire world” and that no challenge to its leadership, from any country or group of countries, would ever be allowed to come into being.39 On December 4, 2018, U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo declared in a speech to the Marshall Fund in Brussels: “The United States has not given up its global leadership. It reshaped the order after WWII based on sovereignty but not the multilateral system.… Under President Trump’s leadership, we will not give up international leadership or our allies in the international system.… Trump is recovering America’s traditional status as the world center and leadership.… The United States wants to lead the world, now and always.”40

To achieve leadership and domination over the world, the United States has made every effort to promote NATO’s eastward expansion, and has expanded its own sphere of influence to control Central and Eastern Europe and to compress Russia’s strategic space. Under the control of the United States, NATO has become an ideal military tool for U.S. global interests. In March 1999, a multinational NATO force led by the United States launched a large-scale air attack on Yugoslavia. It was the first time that NATO had launched a military strike against a sovereign country during the fifty years since its foundation. In April 1999, NATO held a summit meeting in Washington, formally adopting a strategic concept that can be summarized under two points. First, NATO was permitted to conduct collective military intervention outside its defense area in response to “crimes and conflicts involving common interests.” This effectively changed NATO from a “collective defense” military alliance into an offensive political and military organization with the so-called purpose of defending common interests and shared values. Second, NATO’s military actions did not require authorization from the UN Security Council.41

In addition to NATO, U.S. military alliances formed on the basis of bilateral treaties include pacts with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. There are U.S. military bases on the territory of all its military allies, and these comprise a major part of the neoimperialist military alliance. The United States and its allies make military threats and carry out provocations in many regions of the world, resulting in many “hot wars,” “warm wars,” “cool wars,” and “new cold wars,” intensifying the new arms race. The acts of “state terrorism” carried out by neoimperialism, and the double standard it applies to counter-terrorism, have caused other forms of terrorism to multiply.

Cultural Hegemony Dominated by Western “Universal Values”

In addition to its economic might and the hegemony exercised through its military alliances, neoimperialism is also characterized by cultural hegemony dominated by Western “universal values.” U.S. political scientist Joseph Nye emphasized that soft power was the ability to accomplish one’s desires through attraction rather than force or purchase. The soft power of a country is constituted mainly of three resources, namely, culture (which functions where it is attractive to the local population), political values (which function when they can actually be practiced both at home and abroad), and foreign policy (which functions when it is regarded as conforming to legality and as enhancing moral prestige).42 The Western developed countries, especially the United States, utilize their capital, technology, and market advantages to infiltrate less powerful countries and regions with their culture, and propose a series of “new interventionist” cultural theories designed to impose U.S. values. The United States subjugates the cultural markets and information spaces of other countries, especially developing countries, by exporting to them U.S. values and lifestyles, with the goal of making its culture the “mainstream culture” of the world.43

Cultural hegemony or cultural imperialism exports the “universal values” of the West and implements both peaceful evolution and “color revolutions” by controlling the field of international public opinion. The objective is to achieve Richard Nixon’s strategic goal of “victory without war.” The evolution of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe is a typical case. As is generally known, the penetration of values is usually slow, long-term, and subtle, and its communication channels are often hidden in academic exchanges, literary works, films, and television shows. For example, Hollywood is “the megaphone of American hegemonic policy.… Hollywood films are showing off the advantages of the United States to the rest of the world and trying to achieve their cultural conquest by this means.”44 Former senior CIA official Allen Dulles argued: “If we teach young people in the Soviet Union to sing our songs and dance with them, sooner or later we will teach them to think in the way we need them to.”45 Foundations and think tanks are also important driving forces for the spread of neoliberalism. For example, the U.S.-based Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Mont Pelerin Society, and Center for International Private Enterprise participate in the promotion of neoliberal values by funding seminars and academic organizations.

Lenin once stated: “Instead of an undivided monopoly of Great Britain, we see a few imperialist powers contending for the right to share in this monopoly, and this struggle is characteristic of the whole period of the early twentieth century.”46 Since the end of the Cold War, global capitalism has been characterized by the undivided monopoly of the United States. Other powers have no intention, and lack the strength, to compete. Some individual countries such as Japan have tried to challenge U.S. “monopoly rights” economically and technologically, but have ultimately failed. So it is with the European Union, which emerged later but eventually failed to shake U.S. hegemony. In the military field, the Gulf War and the subsequent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have further fueled U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic arrogance. With the help of its economic, military, and political alliances, and employing cultural soft power, the United States promotes its “universal values,” incites street protests and color revolutions in other countries, and forces developing countries to deregulate their financial systems by targeting them for the creation of debt and financial crises. When the global governance system dominated by the United States encounters challenges, it launches trade wars, science and technology wars, financial wars, and economic sanctions, and even goes so far as to threaten or actually launch military strikes. The U.S. dollar, military, and culture are the three pillars of U.S. imperialist hegemony, supporting “hard power,” “soft power,” “strong power” (economic sanctions), and “smart power.”47

In short, the international monopoly capitalist alliance made up of one hegemon and several great powers provides the economic foundation for the money politics, vulgar culture, and military threats that exploit and oppress through the exercise of monopoly both at home and abroad, and that amplify the power of the United States as the neoimperialist hegemon.

The Economic Essence, the General Trend, and the Four Forms of Ideological Fraud

Lenin characterized imperialism as a transitional and moribund capitalism. At the neoimperialist stage known as economic globalization, the basic contradiction of the contemporary capitalist economy is manifested in the contradiction between, on the one hand, the constant socialization and globalization of the economy with its production factors under private, collective, or state ownership, and, on the other, the disorder or anarchy of production within national economies and in the world economy.48 Neoimperialism rules out the adjustments that states and international communities need to make, instead promoting self-regulation by private monopoly capital and defending its interests. The effect, very often, is to intensify various contradictions within countries or on the world level. Economic, financial, fiscal, social, and ecological crises have all become epidemic diseases. Various of these crises are interwoven with social contradictions, or with the contradictions of capital accumulation. All of them together lend a new cast to the monopolistic and predatory, hegemonic and fraudulent, parasitic and decaying, transitional and moribund capitalism of the present epoch.

If we define neoimperialism with regard to its economic nature and general tendencies, we may conclude that its three characteristics are demonstrated in the respect that the globalized contradictions and various crises of the system frequently become intensified.

The economic essence of neoimperialism is that it is a monopolistic financial capitalism established on the basis of giant multinationals. The production monopoly and financial monopoly of the multinational corporations have their origins in the higher stage of production and capital concentration, giving rise to a phase in which monopoly is deeper and broader to such an extent that “nearly every industry is concentrated into fewer and fewer hands.”49 The automobile industry may be taken as an example. The production of the top five multinational automobile corporations accounts for almost half of global automobile production, and that of the top ten accounts for 70 percent.50 International monopolistic financial capital not only controls the world’s major industries, but also monopolizes almost all sources of raw materials, scientific and technological talent, and skilled physical labor in all fields, controlling the transportation hubs and various means of production. It dominates and controls capital, and controls various other global functions via banks and a variety of financial derivatives and shareholding systems.51 If we consider the total market value and total income and assets of corporations, the scale of the leading concentrations of economic power around the world is increasing, especially in the case of the top one hundred corporations. In 2015, the market value of the world’s top hundred companies was more than seven thousand times that of the bottom two thousand companies in a database of the world’s largest nonfinancial firms, compared to only thirty-one times in 1995.52 According to the data on the Fortune Global 500 for the year 2017, the revenues of 380 of the world’s top 500 companies (excluding Chinese firms) reached $22.83 trillion, equivalent to 29.3 percent of gross world product. Total profits reached $1.51 trillion, breaking the record, and the rate of profit increased by 18.85 percent year on year.53 The rise in the indicators of both profit share and profit rate illustrates the predatory nature of neoimperialism.

Given that economic globalization, financialization, and neoliberal policies are placing a triple squeeze on labor, profits are growing rapidly, while workers’ wages are increasing much more slowly.54 Between 1982 and 2006, the average annual growth of the real wages of production workers in nonfinancial corporations in the United States was just 1.1 percent, not only much lower than the 2.43 percent recorded from 1958 to 1966, but also lower than the 1.68 percent during the economic downturn from 1966 to 1982. The slowing of wage growth allowed the corporations’ profit share to rise by 4.6 percent during this period and accounted for 82 percent of the recovery in the rate of profit. The “labor squeeze” can be seen to have played a key role here.55 Moreover, since the U.S. economy began to recover in 2009 from the Great Financial Crisis, the average rate of profit, though lower than its peak in 1997, has still been significantly higher than its level during the late 1970s and early ’80s, when it was at a low point.56 The essence of neoimperialism is its need to control and plunder. Its drive to “predatory accumulation” is not only demonstrated by its exploitation of labor in the national setting, but also by its plunder of other countries. The forms this takes, and the methods employed, consist mainly of the following.

First, financial plunder. Neoimperialism extracts huge profits from its control over the prices of major international commodities. Employing financialization and other methods, it pressures the countries that produce raw materials, seeking to keep prices low. As part of its pressures and harassment, it may create financial bubbles and crises via large-scale inflows and outflows of capital, affecting the economic and political stability of the countries concerned. Or, it may seek to achieve a “victory without war” by imposing financial sanctions.57 Financial innovation and the lag in government regulation contributes to waves of nonproductive speculation. Financial oligarchs and multinational corporations at the top of the pyramid benefit from the price inflation of financial assets and are able to plunder huge quantities of social wealth.

Second is the privatization of public resources and state-owned assets. Since Thatcher-Reaganism came to dominate economic policy-making in numerous countries some forty years ago, the world has experienced a massive wave of large-scale privatization. The public assets of many less-developed countries have fallen into the hands of private monopoly capital and multinational corporate monopolies. The global level of inequality of wealth ownership has soared accordingly. The World Inequality Report 2018 reveals that, since the 1970s, private wealth in various countries has generally increased, while the ratio of private to national income in most “rich” countries has increased from 200–350 percent to 400–700 percent. In sharp contrast, public wealth has steadily declined. The net public wealth of the United States and the United Kingdom has fallen to a negative number in recent years, and that of Japan, Germany, and France is only slightly above zero. The limited value of public assets restricts the ability of governments to adjust the income gap.58

Third is the strengthening of the center-periphery pattern. The neoimperialist countries reinforce the center-periphery pattern through their dominant positions in trade, currency, finance, the military arena, and international organizations. Taking advantage of these positions, they continuously extort the resources and wealth of the peripheral countries to consolidate their monopoly or oligopoly status, and to ensure their own development and prosperity. The international transfer rate of surplus value has a positive effect on the general rate of profit in the hegemonic countries.59 It is only the neoimperialist countries that are able to use their economic, political, and military power to transform a portion of the surplus value created by underdeveloped countries into their own national wealth. Consequently, the accumulation of monopolistic capital by neoimperialism intensifies the polarization between rich and poor and damages people’s livelihoods in countries such as the United States and France (as proved by the international Occupy Wall Street movement, which involved eighty countries with its slogan of “we are the 99 percent”), while also reinforcing the accumulation of financial and environmental wealth in the countries of the “center” and of relative poverty and pollution in the countries of the “periphery.” In 2018, the combined GDP of the G7 “central” countries reached $317 trillion, accounting for 45.5 percent of gross world product.60 According to the Global Wealth Report 2013, prepared by Credit Suisse, the wealth of the 85 richest people in the world that year was equivalent to the total assets of the world’s poorest 3.5 billion people—that is, of half the global population.61

Economic Hegemony and Fraud

Imperialism as represented by the United States employs hegemony, bullying, and unilateralism, and adheres to double standards in diplomatic policy. At one point, Pompeo publicly admitted and expressed pride in his country’s fraudulent actions. “I was the CIA director,” he said. “We lied, we cheated, we stole. It was like we had entire training courses…it reminds you of the glory of the American experiment.”62 In the post-Cold War era, the United States dominates the world, free from any powerful checks and balances. It relies on its major advantages of military force, U.S. dollar hegemony, external propaganda, and science and technology to carry out bullying all over the world and to commit fraud both at home and abroad.63

In March 2018, the United States issued a document entitled Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which accuses China of “enforcing or compelling US enterprises to transfer technology” and “illegally invading US commercial computer networks to steal intellectual property rights and sensitive business information.” The purpose of this document was to create a pretext for launching a trade war; its accusations are nothing but rumors and do not correspond to the facts. What is the source of China’s technological progress? It flows from the efforts of gifted entrepreneurs who benefit from huge government investments in basic science. As former U.S. secretary of the treasury Lawrence Summers said, “it’s coming from an educational system that’s privileging excellence, concentrating on science and technology. That’s where their leadership is coming from, not from taking a stake in some U.S. company.”64 In provoking its economic and trade conflict with China, the United States has had an obvious intention: to blackmail and suppress China on an overall basis, starting with the trade war and gradually expanding into the areas of science and technology, finance, food, resources, and so on. U.S. authorities seek to weaken China’s strengths in trade, finance, industry, and technology, trying to ensure that China will not pose a challenge to the global hegemonic position of the United States.

With its slogan of “America First,” the Trump administration promoted U.S. hegemony and imposed economic sanctions on other economies. Its economic and trade policies were aimed principally at China, but were also directed at traditional allies such as the European Union, Japan, India, and South Korea. Time after time, Washington has practiced economic extortion and containment. It will never be forgotten that as early as the mid–1980s the United States forced Japan to sign the Plaza Accord and induced it to implement a low-interest monetary policy that brought large quantities of foreign capital into Japan. The result was that a surge of short-term demand for Japanese yen caused the country’s currency to appreciate sharply against the U.S. dollar. The influx of foreign capital and the monetary policy of low interest rates brought a soaring increase in Japanese asset prices. Despite the short-term prosperity, the eventual result involved big losses for Japan. The high asset prices meant that the foreign capital was soon cashed out and withdrawn, while the Japanese economy suffered huge setbacks and endured a “lost twenty years.”

Political Hegemony and Fraud

The United States has always labeled itself a representative of countries advocating democracy, freedom, and equality. Using political and diplomatic means, it spares no effort to impose its political system on other countries, especially the developing states it identifies as “dictatorships.” Former U.S. president George W. Bush identified Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” The United States exerts pressure on the rulers of such countries, applying double standards on questions of human rights. Using its propaganda, it demonizes these states as “undemocratic” and “autocratic,” while subsidizing nongovernmental organizations and media, as well as inciting dissidents and the opposition to mount “color revolutions” aimed at overthrowing the legitimate governments.

Acting at the behest of its military circles and monopoly energy groups, the United States has been a consistently destructive force in the Middle East and Latin America. Syria was listed by Washington among six “evil” countries, and the United States branded the Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad as illegal. U.S. senator John McCain, however, revealed the real purpose behind these moves. “The end of the Assad regime,” McCain stated, “would sever Hezbollah’s lifeline to Iran, eliminate a long-standing threat to Israel, bolster Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, and inflict a strategic defeat on the Iranian regime. It would be a geopolitical success of the first order.”65 In Latin America, the United States has continued its blockade against Cuba despite twenty resolutions carried overwhelmingly in the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, the United States is conducting an economic blockade against Venezuela, resulting in the country’s economic deterioration in recent years. Former U.S. vice president Mike Pence, setting aside Venezuela’s elections and popular support for the government, with no consideration of truth—even leaving out the U.S. economic siege war on Venezuela in violation of international law—pronounced: “The Maduro government’s vicious gangs have crippled the economy.… The true cost of the crimes of the Maduro regime cannot be assessed in numbers.… Two million people have fled the result of dictatorship and political repression that’s resulted in deprivation and created conditions near starvation. The United States will continue to help the Venezuelan people restore their freedom. The people will be free.”66

The United States is now applying to China the kind of Cold War policies that used to be employed against the Soviet Union. State department director of policy planning Kiron Skinner describes the fractious relations of the United States with China as “a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology.”67 The U.S. ruling class knows very well that the socialist system is superior to the capitalist system. Once large socialist countries such as the former Soviet Union and China become rich and strong through peaceful competition, it is inevitable that they are faced with confronting the hegemonic aims of the United States, which seeks nothing less than a unipolar world. Any attempts to promote broad reforms in the outdated imperial economic and political order are seen as a threat to U.S. hegemony. Consequently, the United States has adopted the dual strategy of “contact and containment,” engagement and aggression, which it seeks to pass off as “peaceful evolution.”

In reality, the so-called democratic politics in the United States are nothing but an illusion. First, the electoral process in the United States has increasingly amounted to a political fight between the two parties of the monopoly bourgeoisie. As the candidates of different factions of the monopoly bourgeoisie have campaigned for election, they have resorted to rumors, personal attacks, and slanders against their opponents, sidelining the real issue. Second, so-called democratic politics in the United States involve no more than a pro forma and procedural democracy. The pro forma voting system has been reduced to monetary politics, family politics, and oligarchic politics—that is, to an essentially undemocratic “despotism of monopoly capital,” or democracy for the few.

Cultural Hegemony and Fraud

Former U.S. National Security Advisor Brzezinski believes that “strengthening American culture as the ‘model’ of the world’s cultures is a strategy that must be implemented by the United States to maintain hegemony.”68 U.S. cultural hegemony is manifested principally through its control of media outlets and education, and through the propaganda function, both at home and abroad, of its literature and art, its liberal arts academia, and its values. The United States exports films, music, and literature all over the world. It controls almost 75 percent of the world’s television programs, and owns powerful film and television companies such as WarnerMedia, Universal Pictures, Paramount Pictures, and Columbia Pictures, which every year produce dozens of high-budget films involving investments of hundreds of millions of dollars. Research and reporting carried out by the U.S. mainstream media effectively dominate the shaping of world public opinion. The United States also controls the authoritative journals that mold discourse in the area of liberal arts academia, and it is the United States that determines the standards of elite education. The 2020 QS World University Rankings provide an example. The top places in these rankings are all taken by U.S. universities, and this situation provides a powerful tool for spreading deceptive Western “universal values,” Western constitutional views, and neoliberal economic concepts throughout the world. The basic views of the U.S. liberal arts establishment have taken a firm hold on the elites and masses at home and abroad.69 For example, the United States extols vulgar examples of literary and artistic kitsch as distinguished works of culture, deserving of Oscars or Nobel Prizes.

Neoclassical economics (and its counterpart in the form of neoliberalism) is responsible for a string of economic crises and for increased polarization between rich and poor. Nevertheless, it is depicted as a scientific theory that promotes development, increases popular welfare, and is worthy of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. In the United States, works that do not conform to the literary, artistic, and liberal arts canons of monopoly capital are difficult to disseminate via authoritative media, while writers and artists of real distinction are excluded, suppressed, or defrauded. The United States also holds an absolutely dominant position in the global field of cyberspace. Of the thirteen root Domain Name System servers, nine are under the direct control of U.S. corporations, universities, or government departments, while another is directly controlled by a U.S. nonprofit organization.70 Using these root Domain Name System servers, the United States can easily steal global intelligence, carry out network monitoring, and launch cyberattacks. The surveillance program PRISM, revealed by Edward Snowden, shows that the United States has complete control over the hardware and software of networks globally, and is well able to monitor the entire world and strike any other country. Lastly, the United States controls the intelligence alliance known as the Five Eyes (the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), through which it conducts large-scale monitoring activities and exercises cyber hegemony domestically and internationally.71

The cultural hegemony of the United States, its control over liberal arts academia, and the fraudulent use to which these advantages are put also appear in the stances taken by the United States on questions of ideology and values. These stances are always hostile to socialism and communism, and restrict the development of socialist countries. Previously, the United States devoted most of its efforts to smearing the Soviet Union, but the main target is now China. Early in May 1990, Nixon stated frankly: “While rebuilding the relationship with China, it is very important that we continue to pressure them to abandon socialism. Because we will use this relationship to make China’s policies milder. We must stick to this key point.”72 According to survey data from the U.S. Pew Research Center—an organization surely influenced by U.S. cultural hegemony and fraud—74 percent of Chinese college or university graduates love U.S. culture.73 It is a fact that most Chinese liberal arts scholars who have studied in the United States favor its basic institutional academic theories. To varying extents, they worship, flatter, and fear the United States. This seriously affects the confidence of Chinese citizens in Marxist culture, in socialist culture, and in China’s own rich traditional culture, and needs to be eliminated as soon as possible.

Military Hegemony and Fraud

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States has become increasingly presumptuous and has tended to resort to military force or threats in dealing with questions of international relations. In 1999, U.S.-led NATO forces bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, invoking the formula of “human rights above sovereignty.” In 2003, despite strong opposition from other countries, the United States invaded the sovereign state of Iraq. The Iraq War was not authorized by the UN Security Council, and Washington did not have any legal basis for its military intervention. The United States falsely claimed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons of mass destruction. After occupying Iraq, however, the United States found no evidence to prove that Iraq could produce chemical weapons of mass destruction. The real purpose of the United States in fabricating this lie was to control Iraq’s oil resources by military means.

The United States has consistently emphasized that its own interests should take first place and that its military advantages are not to be challenged. Although its economic strength has declined in relative terms, the United States is still expanding its arsenal and substantially increasing its defense spending. Since the Cold War, the United States has continued to create various military threats and pressures in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. To consolidate its hegemonic status, the United States has advocated and promoted NATO’s eastward expansion, with the goal of including all the Central and Eastern European countries in NATO’s sphere of influence and thus constricting Russia’s strategic space. In the Middle East, the United States aims to subvert the legitimate regimes of countries such as Syria and Iran by military means, and to support “color revolutions” in the region. In Asia in recent times, Washington has heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula and has also implemented its “Indo-Pacific strategy” aimed at containing China. The U.S. “Indian strategy” is serving to reveal the identity of its military allies and partners. Allies of the United States include Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and its claimed “partners” include Singapore, Taiwan (China), New Zealand, Mongolia; a number of South Asian countries such as India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal; and various Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The United States further proposes to strengthen its cooperation with Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia. In addition, it will work together with traditional allies such as Britain, France, and Canada to protect so-called Indo-Pacific freedom and openness.74

With the increase in China’s national strength, various U.S. scholars have been eager to invoke the Thucydides trap, claiming that it is difficult for Sino-U.S. relations to escape from this logic. But the truth, as China’s president Xi Jinping has pointed out, is that there is currently no Thucydides trap. Such a trap might, however, be created if the United States and its allies repeatedly make strategic miscalculations involving great powers.75 It may be asserted that it is the military hegemony and fraud of the United States that provides the root cause of the widespread instability, constant local wars, rise of war threats, and refugee crises around the world.

Neoimperialism Is a Parasitic and Decaying Late Imperialism

As Lenin stated,

Imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries.… Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather, of a stratum of rentiers, i.e., people who live by “clipping coupons,” who take no part in any enterprise whatever, whose profession is idleness. The export of capital, one of the most essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates the rentiers from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by exploiting the labour of several overseas countries and colonies.76

In the era of neoimperialism, the number of rentiers is increasing sharply, and the nature of the rentier countries is becoming more pronounced. The parasitism and decay of a small number of capitalist countries is further worsened, as can be seen specifically in the following aspects.

First, the United States employs its military, intellectual property, political, and cultural hegemony, as well as the U.S. dollar, to plunder the wealth of the world, especially that of developing countries. The United States is the world’s largest parasitic and decaying country. As evidence of this, we may take the trade between China and the United States. China sells to the United States goods produced by cheap labor, land, and environmental resources. The United States does not need to produce anything in order to buy these goods; it can simply print banknotes. With the money earned, China can then buy only virtual assets such as U.S. treasury bonds, and provide finance for U.S. consumer lending and outward expansion. The United States exports to China securities to which value cannot be added, while China exports to the United States mainly physical goods and labor services. The National Health Report released by the National Health Research Group of the Chinese Academy of Sciences shows that the United States is the country with the most hegemonic dividends in the world, due to the position of its currency, while China is the country with the largest loss of hegemonic dividends. For the year 2011, U.S. hegemonic dividends totaled $7396.09 billion, corresponding to 52.38 percent of the country’s GDP, and the average hegemonic dividends obtained per day came to $20.263 billion. Meanwhile, the sum lost by China totaled $3663.4 billion. In terms of labor time, about 60 percent of the working hours of the Chinese workforce were effectively given without recompense to serve international monopoly capital.77

Second, military spending has increased, which in turn increases the burden on working-class people. Neoimperialism leads and promotes military-related scientific and technological research, the development of advanced weapons, and the expansion of military production. As the People’s Daily observed in 2016, “the military-industrial complex supported by monopoly capital and the cultural hegemony formed on the basis of colonialism have prompted the western countries to intervene in other countries’ affairs at their will.”78 Neoimperialism has thus become the initiator of regional turmoil and instability, and the engine of war. Over the past thirty years, the United States has spent $14.2 trillion on waging thirteen wars.79 Meanwhile, lack of money hinders improvements to the living conditions of the U.S. people in areas such as medical insurance. Exorbitant military spending has become a heavy burden on the country and its people, while the parasitic monopolies in the arms industry have reaped immense profits. According to statistics of the British Institute for International Strategic Studies, official U.S. military expenditures in 2018 came to $643 billion, and in 2019 will reach $750 billion, more than the sum of the military spending of the world’s eight next largest military powers. Since the end of the first Cold War, the United States has launched or participated in six major conflicts: The Gulf War (1991), Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan War (2001), Iraq War (2003), Libya War (2011), and Syria War (2011).80 The addiction of monopoly capitalism to war is a manifestation of its parasitic and decaying nature. This barbaric characteristic of the system runs counter to civilization and threatens the shared future of the human community. It proves that neoimperialism is the primary root of war.

Third, wealth and incomes are concentrated in the hands of a specific class of owners of financial assets, as reflected in the 1 percent versus the 99 percent formulation. At the neoimperialist stage, the socialization, informatization, and internationalization of production have reached unprecedented levels, and the ability of human beings to create wealth is many times greater than in the old imperialist period. Nevertheless, the advance of productivity that is supposed to be a common gain for humankind has mainly benefited the financial oligarchy. “The bulk of the profits go to the ‘geniuses’ of financial manipulation,” one observer notes.81 In 2001, for example, the financial wealth (excluding property rights) held by the wealthiest 1 percent of the U.S. population was four times greater than that of the poorest 80 percent. The 1 percent held assets on the stock market of $1.9 trillion, roughly equivalent to the value of the stock held by the other 99 percent.82

Fourth, monopoly hinders technological innovation, slowing its advance. The greed and parasitism of financial monopoly capital make its attitude to technological innovation ambivalent. Monopoly capital relies on technological innovation to maintain its monopoly status, but the high profits that result from this status mean that monopoly capital shows a certain inertia in promoting innovation. Even if many advanced functions of mobile phones are successfully developed in the same year, the monopoly producers of mobile phones will divide up these functions to be introduced and promoted over several years. The purpose is to ensure that consumers will continuously purchase mobile phones with new functions, allowing the corporations to obtain high monopoly profits every year.

Fifth, the tendency for monopoly capital and its agents to cause decay in the mass movement is becoming more serious. Lenin observed that “in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism to split the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the working-class movement, revealed itself much earlier than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.”83 Neoimperialism divides the working class, striking at and weakening the labor unions using the excuse provided by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the tremendous changes in Eastern Europe. It also uses its monopoly profits to buy the support of individuals, and fosters opportunist and neoliberal forces within the workers’ movement and various other mass movements. The results of such ploys include the downturn in size and activity of labor unions and other progressive movements, the low ebb of the world socialist movement, and a more obvious and serious tendency for workers to worship the forces of neoimperialism or to be intimidated by them.

Neoimperialism Is a Transitional and Moribund Late Capitalism

Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism has revealed the transitional and moribund nature of monopoly capitalism for more than a century. However, except in a very small number of countries where socialism is being constructed, most capitalist societies have not perished. They have in fact achieved varying levels of development, and will continue to develop. This raises a very important question: How do we judge the transitional nature of contemporary capitalism, or its tendency to decline and perish? If we use the historical materialist method, the transitional nature of neoimperialism can be characterized on the basis of two points. First, like everything in the world, the neoimperialist system is constantly changing. It is a transient phenomenon in human history, and is not eternal. Second, there are reasons to believe that neoimperialism can eventually transition into socialism through various forms of revolutionary struggle.

In the era of neoimperialism, the developed capitalist countries have undergone many important technological and institutional reforms, which have provided the basis for a certain further development of capitalism and have delayed its demise. High and low growth rates continue to succeed each other, and the period of decay mentioned by Lenin has been greatly extended. This is because the capitalist countries have made many adjustments to their production relations and superstructure, including a degree of macroeconomic regulation, improvements to income distribution and social security, and so forth. In particular, there is no doubt that for the developed capitalist countries the advantages of economic globalization outweigh its disadvantages. Within the process of economic globalization, the powerful developed capitalist countries occupy an absolutely dominant position, through which they set out to maximize the benefits they receive. Their general drive to extend globalization in order to expand their markets does not, however, exclude the possibility of particular countries temporarily reversing the process in response to domestic crises, or as part of efforts to damage commercial competitors. “In the past two years,” a 2019 study notes, “the Trump administration has deepened its reverse globalization trend in the light of the domestic crisis. It adheres to the principle of ‘America first,’ and provokes international economic and trade disputes, trying to get rid of and pass on the domestic crisis.”84 The purpose of the United States in adopting a range of protectionist anti-globalization measures is to alleviate the domestic difficulties and crises it encounters within economic globalization, so as to advance its hegemonic interests.

Meanwhile, there is no essential conflict between the fact that neoimperialism and capitalism can look forward to existing and developing for some time to come, and the fact that a transition to a higher social formation is practically inevitable, provided that these societies do not degenerate into barbarism. The classic Marxist writers avoided setting out a specific timetable for the demise of capitalism and imperialism. Lenin’s scientific judgment is that “imperialism is a decaying but not completely decaying capitalism, a moribund but not dead capitalism.”85 He foresaw that moribund capitalism was very likely to drag out its existence for a prolonged period. Nor, on the basis of a comprehensive analysis, could it be denied that capitalism would see some kind of development even during its moribund stage. Discussing the decay of imperialism, Lenin stated: “It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not.… On the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only becoming more and more uneven in general, its unevenness also manifests itself, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (England).”86

John Bellamy Foster also stressed that, “to say that capitalism is a failed system is not, of course, to suggest that its breakdown and disintegration is imminent. It does, however, mean that it has passed from being a historically necessary and creative system at its inception to being a historically unnecessary and destructive one in the present century.”87

The basic contradictions of capitalism still exist and continue to develop. Likewise, the law of capitalist accumulation still exists and continues to develop. At the point when monopoly capitalism was coming into existence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the law of uneven economic and political development of imperialism made it possible for the revolution against capitalism to be victorious initially in one or several countries, before eventually spreading globally.

Decades after The Communist Manifesto proclaimed that capitalism would inevitably expire and Capital declared that the death knell of capitalist private ownership was about to ring, the October Revolution brought the downfall of the Tsarist Russian Empire. Then, the proletarian party led by Mao Zedong in China ended the semicolonial and semifeudal society ruled by the Kuomintang (Mao stated that China represented a feudal and comprador monopoly capitalism after the Second World War). The Soviet Communist Party led by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin consciously betrayed Marxism-Leninism, resulting in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist countries, with the exception of Belarus, regressing to capitalism. This demonstrates the twists, turns, and general difficulties experienced by the development of socialism and its economic system. But it cannot change the nature and general trend of the historical process.

China’s position on the main international fault lines is clear. In October 1984, Deng Xiaoping stated: “There are two major problems in the world that are very prominent. One is the issue of peace and the other is the North-South issue. There are many other issues, which are not of the same underlying importance or global and strategic significance as these two.” In March 1990, he reiterated: “As for the two major issues of peace and development, the peace issue has not been resolved, and the development issue has become more serious.”88 Deng emphasized that “peace and development” were the two major questions to be resolved.89

Based on the analysis of the character of neoimperialism, it can thus be concluded that neoimperialism represents a new phase of international monopoly into which capitalism develops after passing through the stages of free competitive capitalism, general private monopoly, and state monopoly. In addition, neoimperialism represents a new expansion of international monopoly capitalism, as well as a new system through which a minority of developed countries dominate the world and implement a new policy of economic, political, cultural, and military hegemony. If we examine the current situation on the basis of the international forces of justice and the development of the twists and turns of the international class struggle, the twenty-first century is a new era in which the world working class and the masses can carry out great revolutions and safeguard world peace; in which the socialist countries can carry out great feats of construction and promote ecological civilization; and in which progressive nations can work together to build a community with a shared future for humankind, a world in which neoimperialism and international capitalism gradually make way for global socialism.

Notes

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  2. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 23 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 105.

  3. John Bellamy Foster, “Late Imperialism,” Monthly Review 71, no. 3 (July–August 2019): 1–19.

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  11. Lenin, Selected Works, 201.

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  21. John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney, and R. Jamil Jonna, “The Global Reserve Army of Labor and the New Imperialism,” Monthly Review 63, no. 6 (November 2011): 3.

  22. Imperialist rent is the result of the differential in the prices of labor power of equal productivity. Samir Amin, “The Surplus in Monopoly Capitalism and the Imperialist Rent,” Monthly Review 64, no. 3 (July–August 2012): 83.

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  33. Lv Youzhi and Zha Junhong, “The Evolution and Influence of the G7 Group after the Cold War” [in Chinese], Chinese Journal of European Studies 6 (2002).

  34. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1998).

  35. Li Qiqing, “Neoliberalism Against Globalization” [in Chinese], Marxism & Reality 5 (2003).

  36. Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).

  37. He, Liu, and Liu, Asian Financial Crisis, 84, 91.

  38. Liu Zhenxia, “NATO’s New Strategy is the Embodiment of American Hegemony,” Social Sciences Journal of Universities in Shanxi 3 (1999).

  39. Liu, “NATO’s New Strategy is the Embodiment of American Hegemony.”

  40. Pompeo Threatened That the United States Is Establishing a New Global Order Against China and Russia,” Guancha, December 5, 2018.

  41. Liu, “NATO’s New Strategy is the Embodiment of American Hegemony.”

  42. Wang Yan, “Review of Research on the Index System of Cultural Soft Power” [in Chinese], Research on Marxist Culture 1 (2019).

  43. Hao Shucui, “Making the Socialist Culture with Chinese Characteristics Blossom in the Contemporary World Cultural Garden: An Interview with Professor Wang Weiguang, Member of the Standing Committee of CPPCC, Director of the Committee on Nationalities and Religion” [in Chinese], Research on Marxist Culture 1 (2018).

  44. Iranian Officials Slammed Hollywood Movies and Called them ‘Airfone,’” Huanqiu, February 3, 2012.

  45. Xiao Li, “Talks of the American Politicians and Strategists on the Export of Ideology and Values” [in Chinese], World Socialism Studies 2 (2016).

  46. Lenin, Selected Works, 248.

  47. Cheng Enfu and Li Linan, “Marxism and Its Localized Theories in China Are the Soul and Core of Soft Power” [in Chinese], Research on Marxist Culture 1 (2019).

  48. Cheng Enfu, “The New Era Will Accelerate the Process to Enrich People and Strengthen the Country,” Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism 1 (2018).

  49. John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesney, and R. Jamil Jonna, “Monopoly and Competition in Twenty-First Century Capitalism,” Monthly Review 62, no. 11 (2011): 1.

  50. Foster, McChesney, and Jonna, “Monopoly and Competition in Twenty-First Century Capitalism,” 11.

  51. Li Shenming, “Finance, Technology, Culture, and Military Hegemony Are New Features of Today’s Capital Empire” [in Chinese], Hongqi Wengao 20 (2012).

  52. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report 2017 (Geneva: United Nations, 2017).

  53. Global 500, 2018,” Fortune, accessed March 23, 2021.

  54. Li Chong’s research also shows that the rate of surplus value increased. According to his calculations, from 1982 to 2006 the variable capital of U.S. corporations increased from $1,505.616 billion to $6,047.461 billion, a rise of 301.66 percent. Meanwhile, surplus value increased from $674.706 billion to $3,615.262 billion, a rise of 435.83 percent. Li Chong, “Marx’s Law of the Falling Rate of Profit: Analysis and Verification” [in Chinese], Contemporary Economic Research 8 (2018).

  55. Lu Baolin, “Labor Squeeze and Profit Rate Recovery: A Discussion of the Neoliberal Accumulation System of Globalization and Financialization” [in Chinese], Teaching and Research 2 (2018).

  56. Guglielmo Carchedi and Michael Roberts, “The Long Roots of the Present Crisis: Keynesians, Austerians, and Marx’s Law,” World Review of Political Economy 4, no. 1 (2013): 86–115.

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  58. Facundo Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018 (Berkeley: World Inequality Lab, 2017), 15.

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  63. To cheat is to deceive people by using false words and deeds to conceal the truth. Fraud, which is even worse, involves deceptive acts committed by deceitful means. It refers to behavior intended to create confusion and misunderstanding.

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  76. Lenin, Selected Works, 241.

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  88. Deng Xiaoping, Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 [in Chinese] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993), 96, 353.

  89. Li Shenming, “An Analysis of the Age and Its Theme” [in Chinese], Hongqi

American Gracchi

By Nick Partyka

Foreword

When I originally conceived this essay in the fall of 2015 Donald Trump was merely one candidate for the Republican party nomination, and at the time perhaps not even the most outlandish. His surprising electoral college victory this fall prompted me to reconsider this essay, or rather some of its questions. In brief, my argument, or rather suggestion, is thus; If the Roosevelts are the American Gracchi, then, Whither an American Marius, or an American Sulla? At the close of the essay that follow I ask, What would a 21st century American Marius or Sulla look like? The election results, as well as the political and social atmosphere around the election have caused me to wonder, Might Donald Trump be an American Sulla?

As for a comparison between the men themselves, I think that would not come off. Donald Trump is a narcissistic short-fingered vulgarian whose scandal ridden, legally checkered career speaks for itself. What kind of analogy might we be able to make between Donald Trump and Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix? Well, we must first examine the political career of Sulla. Sulla was from a very blue-blooded Patrician family, but not a wealthy one. He made a late entrance into politics due to his penury, which he overcame thanks due to receiving a couple fortuitous inheritances. He then became a successful military commander serving prominently in important Roman wars. It is, for example, Sulla who actually tricks Jugurtha into surrendering. He also distinguishes himself in the Social wars, as well as the wars against Mythridates. Sulla is best remembered for leading his troops into Roman and establishing a dictatorship. A position he used to ruthlessly suppress his enemies, brutally slaughtering any who opposed him, as well as re-shape the Roman constitutional order in a way that restored the supremacy of the Senate, and thus, of the optimates.

The social and political consequences of the economic dynamics that had been playing out in Roman society since the Punic Wars had given birth, at a certain point, to a spectacularly new kind of politician in the Gracchi brothers. The populist tumult fostered by, and exploited by these revolutionary siblings was one of the main ingredients that eventually caused the fall of the Roman republic. The other big ingredient is the client army. The pioneer of the client army is a man taking a page from the Gracchi brothers' book. This man is Marius. Sulla is best understood in comparison to Marius; for indeed, through much of their lives these men were political opponents. Sulla was an optimate with a power base in the Senate, while Marius was a popularis with a power base in the Assembly, and among the people. Marius, much like Napoleon centuries later, was endeared to his soldiers because of his egalitarian policies. Rome had been faring poorly in the Numidian War for years, due to a stubborn persistence of inappropriate tactics and policies. On big problem was the populating of officers positions from among the nobility without regard for military skill or experience. One of Marius most popular reforms was to base promotions on merit. This had the dual effect of making for a more effective fighting unit, but also, and not insignificantly, made his soldiers extremely loyal since under him they could achieve more social mobility through a more meritocratic system of promotions.

Sulla, like most of his Patrician counterparts, did not like the way Marius was so popular with the people, nor do they like that he was enabling the use of the army for social mobility. The last thing conservative elites tend to like is to see members of the lower classes rising in the social hierarchy. Sulla's vision of reform then was one of restoring the senate to its traditional position of superiority. The main vehicle for achieving this end was the castrating of the office of Tribune, which Sulla was able to do in his capacity as dictator. His other main vehicle was proscription. Sulla adopted a practice of posting lists of people who he deemed enemies of Rome, and who then had twenty four hours to leave Rome or else be executed as a criminal. Most of these people killed themselves so that they could keep property in their families. Just to give a complete picture of Sulla, before adopting the practice of proscription he simply had his enemies arrested and summarily executed. He saw his work as to secure the superiority of the Senate over the Equites, and the Assembly by the most direct means. In fact, once he had done what he considered a sufficient job he retired as dictator and decamped to his country estate never again to interfere with politics in Rome.

Sulla is thus remembered as a brutal and reactionary figure. And, ultimately, a failure. This is because the constitution he put in place ended up lasting only a decade or so before being overthrown by former lieutenants of his. If anything, the bloody vigor that was required for Sulla to reform the Roman constitutional order as he did acted to accelerate the political decomposition that caused the ultimate collapse of the republic. Perhaps this then is the similarity between Trump and Sulla. Both represent violent outbursts of reactionary classes struggling to retain their grip on power as the society they preside over drifts out of their control. Indeed, in the end, the Roman Senatorial class was only able to retain its social power by sacrificing its political power under the Principiate and the Empire. In making himself primus inter pares Ceasar Augustus abolishes the republic in practice while retaining many of its forms and trappings. Might not Donald Trump's election signal such a turning point in American history?

One might, as many do, see Trump's victory as an outburst of an aging, angry, white America feeling itself being left behind; feeling itself losing grip on its monopoly of social, cultural, and political power; losing its grip on its ability to understand the forces at play that shape the course of modern life. Even in Trump's very campaign slogan one hears echoes of the intentions of Sulla; "Make the Senate Great Again". This then is the similarity, a society wracked by inequality and violence, & marred by poverty and deprivation in which traditional elites, against the tide of history, attempt to put the old order on newer, more solid footing, hoping vainly that it will withstand the forces of change. In the end, Sulla's programme was doomed to fail, and the scale of the violence needed to do it was a major clue. In just the first few days after Trumps' election we saw hundreds of incidents of hate-based intimidation, harassment, and attacks. Might this also be a futile struggle against historical, and economic forces that is doomed to be a mostly Pyrrhic victory? Can we see in the success and popularity of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump alignments of political forces akin to those that marshaled behind Marius and Sulla respectively? If the Roosevelts are the American Gracchi, and Sanders and Trump are the Marius and Sulla, then Whither our American Ceasar? Is our American republic on a similarly downward trajectory as the Roman republic? Do we live in the age of a moribund republic?

I don't know the answers to these questions. I ask them because of the thought they provoke or inspire in the reader. This is, or at least ought to be, a sobering moment for citizens of all political ideologies given the immense unpopularity of both candidates. Given the many and repeated, and unabashed, instances of the President-elect saying or doing something grossly offensive or insensitive, mocking or dismissive, demeaning or bigoted against every group in America save white people during his entire campaign it is critical to reflect on the health of our republic. It is essential for all to reflect on what the results of this election mean for our country, and its future, and, perhaps most ominously, with the divisions laid bare in this election, whether or not it has one.

N.Partyka

11.2016




Introduction

The crisis of 133 B.C. certainly seemed highly significant to those involved in it and those observing it. However, it was to take on much larger significance as time went on. For this crisis signaled the rising momentum of social, political, and economic forces that would undermine the Roman republic within a century. For only thirty years after the crisis of 133 B.C. (and even fewer years after the crisis of 121 B.C.) would be born the man who rode highest on the tide of these forces, and who would ultimately kill the republic, Gaius Julius Caesar. Thus, the crisis of 133 B.C. has come to be seen as the opening salvo in the process that results in the fall of the Roman republic, and the rise of the Roman Empire.

The great crisis of the 20th century, the Great Depression, also seemed a momentous event to those caught up in it. Might it not also come to take on a higher historical significance in decades not too distant from our own? Might not future generations of Americans come to see the first third of the 20th century A.D. as similar to the last thirty years of the 2nd century B.C.? Might perhaps a future American Marius look back and see in the Roosevelts, Teddy & Franklin, the American Gracchi?

When we look at the political careers of the Gracchi and the Roosevelts in parallel we will notice some striking similarities. Similarities that I think illuminate important aspects of the contemporary political landscape. Often, it is only with the clarity of hindsight, afforded by examination of history, that larger features of contemporary political reality can be put in a spotlight. Though analogies can, and should, only be pushed so far, the commonalities we will see ought to be somewhat unsettling, that is, if one is concerned for the fate of democracy and democratic citizenship in America.

I must note here the perilous nature of comparisons between modern America and Ancient Rome. Such comparisons are made often, and usually quite poorly. Most often such comparisons come down to a very broad analogy between the political, economic, and military hegemony each possessed in its era of dominance. We must, with Marx, emphasize the important differences between capitalist and pre-capitalist economic formations. Though a model of class struggle may be applicable to the ancient world, as G.E.M de St. Croix adroitly demonstrates, the Roman Empire is not capitalist. Though it may contain capitalistic elements, as indeed Marx was clear that some features of capitalist economies pre-date capitalism, one must not confuse the oligarchy of the wealthiest Romans with a bourgeoisie.

This note of caution registered, I must point out that what is at issue here is not a comparison between modern American and Ancient Rome as empires, or as the international hegemon, or even the nature of that hegemony. What I want to focus our attention on here is a comparison between economic and social dynamics, and the political forces they create or unleash. We'll see that in different eras, dissimilar as they undoubtedly are, interesting similarities emerge that might incline us to see ourselves, and our modern conflicts, in the history of Ancient Rome. It is upon noting these similarities that we come to the unsettling questions about the future of democracy in America. If the Roosevelts are the American Gracchi, then is an American Marius, or more ominously an American Sulla, in our future? Indeed, just like Marius and Sulla, many former US Presidents have parlayed military success in war-time into political careers; perhaps most notably, Washington, Jackson, Taylor, Grant, and Eisenhower. And, in the heart of the Great Depression many Americans wondered aloud whether or not an American Mussolini, a man who modeled himself on Roman strong-men of the past, could lift the nation out of depression. Is the American republic declining? Do the similarities of the economic and political forces at play, and underlying, the crises of 133-121 B.C. & 1929-1945 A.D., signal that our republic is as sickened as the Roman republic? Is there a cure for what ails our republic?

I must pause here to make an important note. Though I have spoken of the "Roman republic", and of "American democracy", one must recognize that these terms are highly problematic. Ancient Rome was indeed a republic of free citizens, but, of course, citizenship was very heavily restricted. Modern America is a democracy, which co-exists with high levels of economic inequality, racial and gender injustice, widespread socio-political exclusion and alienation. I will continue to employ this terminology throughout, but always cognizant of the limited scope of their meaning within the economic and political contexts of their respective epochs.


Lex Sempronia Agraria

Yes, 133 B.C. was an eventful year for the Roman republic. But the crisis that was ignited that year, and which smoldered until flaring up again in 123-121 B.C., and then again from 50-44 B.C., did not just spring into existence. Rather, the crisis that erupted was the result of years, decades, of slowly accumulating forces and pressures. It will do us well then to take some stock of the situation the Romans faced in the years before, and leading up to, 133 B.C.. If we are to understand the political career of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, then we must know something of the texture of the economic and political scene into which he inserted himself.[1]

The source of the economic and social problems that created such political tumult was, in a word, the latifundia. These very large, slave-worked estates owned by the wealthy Patrician elite of Rome. The growth of these displaced many small farmers, Plebians, who typically would re-locate to the city of Rome itself. Outside of the resident plebian population of Rome and the freedmen, they were the major contributing source of the classical Plebs Urbana. As part of the severance package from military service, troops were usually given land to farm as small farmers. The Roman ideal was that a Roman man would produce enough in the way of agricultural products on his small-farm to meet his families' consumption needs, and hopefully a surplus to sell.

However, many former soldiers turned out to be terrible farmers; others found out they hated farming; others were pushed off their land against their will by more powerful neighbors; others lost their farms while away on extended military service in the Punic wars or the subsequent Roman wars of conquest. In any event, more and more good Roman land in the Italian peninsula was being consolidated in the hands of fewer and fewer land-owners. This was all in spite of the Lex Lincinia Sextia, passed circa 367 B.C., which limited Roman citizens to the possession of not more than five hundred jugerum (one jugerum is approximately ½ acre). Aside from the illegal dispossession and displacement of small-holders, the latifundia grew larger and larger as a result of the illegal appropriation of public lands, the ager publicus, by wealthy aristocrats.

Thus, in the years up to 133 B.C. what one sees in Roman society is the growth of the large, slave-worked plantations, which causes increasing unemployment among a class of persons who are Roman citizens and veteran soldiers, and who flock in increasing numbers to Rome itself, swelling the ranks of the "urban mob". These are the folks who come more and more to make up the ranks of the Plebian Assembly, the Concilium Plebis. This group became increasingly restive as their economic plight worsened. The spoils of military hegemony brought a flood of slaves into Rome, while Patricians used their social and legal privileges to illegally acquire very large, very profitable estates. As has been common throughout history, the tumult and disorder engendered by a century of warfare from the First Punic war in 264 B.C., through the end of the Third Punic war and the Roman conquest of Greece in 146 B.C., provided the opportunity for many wealthy Romans, Patricians and Plebians, to become even wealthier. In the wake of these wars, which saw Rome rise to preeminence in the Mediterranean world, it looked to many Roman citizens not among the Roman Patrico-Plebian oligarchy that the benefits of the conquests were going mainly to the elites, not to those who did the fighting and the dying.

This then is the environment into which Tiberius Gracchus emerges when he is elected Tribune of the Plebs in 133 B.C. But who is this Tiberius? First, he is of an old and distinguished Patrician family. His mother, Cornelia, was the daughter of the great Scipio Aemilianus, victorious general of the Third Punic war who destroyed Carthage. Thus, to be elected Tribune was deeply shocking to many, especially other Patricians. Remember that to be elected Tribune one must be a Plebian, and so Tiberius had to legally renounce his Patrician status in order to stand for the position at all. Had he been older he could have run for Consul, a more traditional position for someone of his background, but he apparently decided he could not wait to begin his political career, so urgent were the problems facing Roman society.

Second, he is a Popularis, that is, one of the Populares. This is to say that Tiberius' political base was among the Plebians in the Assembly, and not among the optimates in the Senate. This was a fairly new development in Roman political life. Cynical observes will dismiss Tiberius as a political "adventurer", a power-seeker. The upper-class bias found in much of the writing of and on classical history reaffirms this perception of the elder Gracchi. And yet, in fragments of the speech with which he introduced his bill paint a different picture. In describing the plight of dispossessed Roman citizens he says,

"Hearthless and homeless, they must take their wives and families and tramps the roads like beggars…They fight and fall to serve no other end but to multiply the possessions and comforts of the rich. They are called masters of the world but they possess not a clod of earth that is truly their own". [2]

As Tribune in 133 B.C. Tiberius undertook political action to address what he saw at the crisis in Roman society. In seeking solutions to this crisis he enacted measures that directly challenged the power of the established Senatorial elite. As a Popularis, he acted to bring more legal and political rights, economic benefits, and social privileges to Roman citizens, as well as working to extend citizenship rights to more of Rome's Italian allies. He also acted to directly attack the basis of aristocratic power, land ownership. In the ancient world, when land was the main means of production, as well as the basis of economic independence, and with it social prestige. Tiberius was able, through much resistance, to pass his Lex Sempronia Agraria. This was a land-reform measure designed to break-up the illegal latifundia and redistribute land to dispossessed Roman citizens. Knowing that the aristocrats in the Senate would be hostile to his proposals Tiberius, much as a Popularis would, took the unorthodox action of appealing his case to the Plebian Assembly, which was much more receptive to his ideas. As a result of Lex Hortencia, passed circa 287 B.C., legislation passed by the Plebian Assembly was binding on Patricians too; which it had not been up to that point.

Then, late in the year, Tiberius caused a constitutional crisis with his appropriation of the legacy of Attalus III of Pergamum. Attalus, King of Pergamum, died without an heir and bequeathed his entire estate to the Roman people. Traditionally, this kind of matter was handled by the Senate. It was one thing to redistribute land, which even many elites grew to accept, but in order to give the re-settled farmers a chance they would need capital to stock the farms with the necessaries of farming. In order to pay for this, Tiberius decided to appropriate the Attalus' legacy. He got the Plebian Assembly to vote to do so, and as a result of Lex Hortencia, there was nothing the Senate could do. This was, even for a person like Tiberius Gracchus, a stretch of constitutional authority, and indeed for many it was an outright breach. Tiberius had already acted haughtily in - probably illegally- dismissing a fellow Tribune, a man named Octavius, in order to remove the last obstacle to the passage of his land-reform bill.

In order to see why Tiberius' appropriation of Attalus' legacy caused a constitutional crisis we must take a look at the institution of the Roman Senate. In the period directly after the kings, the Roman senate, which had been merely an advisory body, seized control of the reigns of the Roman state. The Patrician and the Plebians had together expelled the odious Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, or Tarquin the Proud, the last king of Rome, and circa 509 B.C. founded what we now call the Roman republic. The slogan around which this new regime coalesced was "SPQR", which translated into English means in essence, "the Senate and the Roman people are one". On one level it announces the fact that Patrician and Plebian unity drove out the hated kings, and that their combined strength under-pinned the new regime, whose legitimacy was predicated on preventing kings from ever returning. On another level it very clearly announce that the Patricians, the Senatorial class, were a group separate from and superior to the "people of Rome", i.e. the Plebians and freedmen. It also very clearly announces the order of precedence in the new regime. The Senate and the Roman people are one, but the Senate comes first. Thus, the Senate, or the Senatorial class, came to dominate all or most of the major positions in government, especially the consulship. Until the time of Tiberius Gracchus the political primacy of the Senate was little in doubt.

So, when news of Attalus' bequest reached Rome in late 133 B.C., the Senate took its time discussing what to do at its own leisurely pace. It never occurred to them that someone would do what Tiberius Gracchus was about to do. They were just as shocked as they were earlier when Tiberius renounced his Patrician status to become Tribune, something it never occurred to anyone, Patrician or Plebian, that anyone would even think of doing. So, while the Senate dithered, Tiberius acted. But his action directly challenged the Senate's traditional prerogatives, threatening to take away some, perhaps in the long term all, of their power. By the time of Tiberius Gracchus the example of democratic Athens was well known. Pericles, Ephialtes, and others had successfully broadened to scope of the power of the Assembly at the direct expense of that of the Athenian version of the Senate, the Areopagus, stripping it all functions save adjudicating murder trials by 462 B.C..

By these actions, and others, Tiberius Gracchus made plenty of enemies for himself, enemies with important positions in the Roman state. Once Tiberius was no longer Tribune, his enemies could, and in all likelihood would, exact some revenge on Tiberius; the direct and obvious implication being that they might murder him. As Tribune, Tiberius' person was constitutionally sacrosanct. All Plebians swore an oath to protect the tribune from any physical attacks. So, when his term of office expired he would be vulnerable to his enemies, many of whom would likely be able to legally use state powers to pursue their ends. Thus, Tiberius forced further constitutional crisis on the Senate by running for re-election, the legality of which was by no means settled and obvious. Roman law at this time prohibited certain senior magistrates from being immediately re-elected to their post. Tiberius' argument was that since the office of Tribune was an office of the Roman people, i.e. the plebs, not of the Roman state, i.e. the patricians, and thus this prohibition did not apply to him. Despite vigorous resistance to his re-election campaign from the optimates it looked likely that Tiberius would be re-elected Tribune.

On election-day, Tiberius was allegedly seen pointing to his head. This news was carried to the Senate, which was meeting close by, where it was universally agreed that Tiberius was attempting to make himself king. For, again, per Lex Hortencia, any bill the Plebian Assembly passed, was law. So, if they voted Tiberius king, then he would be king. And if "SPQR" meant anything, it very much meant, "no more kings". Now Tiberius' supporters have claimed that his pointing to his head was a pre-arranged signal to some of his closest allies that he felt his life in danger, and they should rally to him. In any event, the Senate was so enraged, and perhaps after under-estimating Tiberius more than once already, they decided to act swiftly to prevent the sentina urbis (the bilge or dregs of the city) from destroying their republic. The Senators broke up their furniture to make bludgeons, and stormed off as a group, around 300 persons armed with rocks and clubs, towards where Tiberius and his supporters were. They felt they had little choice as the sitting Consul refused to lead the Senatorial army against a sitting Tribune. When the dust cleared, Tiberius and hundreds of his followers, those who had not successfully fled the scene, had been clubbed to death in the street by the Senate.

The bitter irony is that, as provocative as Tiberius' actions may have seemed to the optimates, the best men, the terms of his Lex Sempronia Agraria were fairly generous towards them. In fact, Tiberius inserted a compensation clause in his bill. He was going to have the state pay some of the illegal holders of public land to give it up. Senatorial elites, who monopolized land ownership, especially land in and around Rome itself, were going to be paid for land they had stolen in the first place. Not too bad a deal. And in hindsight, taking it might have been preferable to the century of internecine civil strife and violence that followed from not taking it.


Theodore Rex

Theodore Roosevelt was the first United States President to be born in a city, to go by his initials, first to leave the country during his term of office, he was the youngest President, he was the first to win the Nobel Peace prize, first American to win any Nobel Prize, first President to own and automobile, first to do down in a submarine, first to use transatlantic cable to send diplomatic messages, first to grasp the potential of publicity and the burgeoning mass media, and first to dine with an African-American in the White House, among many other firsts. He was an author, naturalist, historian, conservationist, hunter, imperialist, and progressive, among other things. Clearly, these were revolutionary times, and clearly Theodore Roosevelt represented a new force in American politics. The world was changing, that is, being changed, ever more radically and seemingly at an increasing pace, by the economic and political forces of capitalism and liberalism. The early part of the 20th century saw the emergence of a unified national market in America, mostly through the agency of the consolidation of firms. The world most of us today consider "modern" was quickly coming into being, with all the attendant social dislocation and duress for those on the bottom o the social hierarchy.[3]

Teddy, like Tiberius Gracchus, had a Patrician upbringing, enjoying the benefits of upper-class privileges. They both entered politics in a time of high corruption, high economic prosperity, as well as constitutional transformation and crisis. Both also had a popular political orientation. Teddy Roosevelt championed many progressive causes during his tenure as President, resulting in many important benefits for working-class Americans. Teddy fought corrupt political machines, tired to get a "Square Deal" for the American people, who he saw as too often being taken advantage of by predatory capitalists. Lastly, like Tiberius Gracchus, Teddy's main political nemesis can be summed up in a single word, trusts. This was the height of the age of the Robber Barons, and of the monopolistic consolidation of America's largest industries. Much like the times of Tiberius Gracchus, the era of T.R. was one of economic prosperity, but mainly for the wealthy. There was a widespread sentiment that the benefits of industrial capitalist society were accruing principally to one class, namely, the capitalists. The predations and manipulations of the giant trusts, reported often in the increasingly frenzied world of competition between newspapers, were perhaps the most glaring symbols to many of this fact. That this problem of trusts and their growing power was recognized can be seen in the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890.

After the close of the Civil War, American capitalism came increasingly into maturity.[4] It was in this period that some of the most famous as well as infamous names of American business history tread the scene. This was the era when the likes of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan, Fisk, Gould, Vanderbilt, and later Ford, dominated the business world, and constructed their corporate empires. As American capitalism continued to mature, this process of maturation quickly became characterized by the large-scale consolidation of firms in many of the nations' largest, and most important, industries; e.g. railroads, steel, banking, and oil. By the turn of the twentieth century this process was far along in its work, and yet still not finished. The consolidation of individual wealth at the apex of the income scale, and of the ownership of firms via ownership of stock, in the hands of the so-called "captains of industry" gave these men near total control of the American economy from top to bottom. These new large-scale monopolistic firms were able to determine, almost at will, workers' wage hours, and benefits; they determined the prices consumers -especially urban ones- paid for almost everything they bought; they set the rates the farmers had to pay to ship their produce to market, thus determining in large part the earnings of farmers.

Theodore Roosevelt was without a doubt America's most popular President since Abraham Lincoln. Not only did the development of mass media, and a national market for such media, make whomever was going to be a President in this era more accessible to journalists, and thus to the American people, but Teddy in particular connected with the American people in deeper way. Perhaps it was his blend of east and west, or his combination of patrician background and working-class energy, that endeared him so much to the populace. His legacy in the American imagination testifies to the lasting impact he made on the American social and political psyche. The sheer volume of his personal correspondence over his life also testifies to the interest, and indeed fascination, he inspired in many. His landslide victory in the 1904 election also shows how taken Americans, from all across the nation, were with Roosevelt.

And yet, Roosevelt was an avowed patrician. He was a seventh generation New Yorker whose family originally immigrated to New Amsterdam in the middle of the 17th century and prospered. Over generations Theodore's forebears made a fortune, which they successfully passed on to their descendants. This money was made by practices, or in industries, which would be dis-tasteful to modern sensibilities, to say the least. In particular, the trade in sugar was the source of much profit for the early Roosevelts. The almost unfathomable human suffering entailed in the production of sugar on European sugar plantations in the Caribbean is well-documented.[5] Teddy was educated at Harvard, where he had a servant to attend to him, and was elected to one of its most prestigious clubs. He was quite conscious of his elite status, refusing to allow journalists to photograph him playing tennis as he thought it a rich man's pastime, or at least, thought voters would see it that way.

And, just like Tiberius Gracchus, this deeply patrician individual took up a popular political orientation, and challenged the political and economic power of established elites. Now, Roosevelt did not have to legally renounce his social status as Tiberius did, but he nonetheless faced vigorous resistance from elites whose power he was threatening. In the New York State Assembly, as Governor of New York, and as President of the United States, T.R. fought often for reforms which would benefit working-class people, often in the face of opposition from bosses in his own party. During his time in the New York State Assembly, that Roosevelt could be so aloof from the bosses that controlled the party political machines testifies again to his patrician status, as he did not need the pecuniary favors and inducements party bosses used to maintain discipline and loyalty. After his tenure in the Assembly, Teddy served as a civil service commissioner appointed by Benjamin Harrison, where he fought the spoils systems. So scrupulously did he do his work that Grover Cleveland asked him to stay on at his post, despite Roosevelt being a Republican. In 1895 he was appointed one of three commissioners charged with reforming the NYPD. In 1897 party bosses facilitated his appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy so as to prevent him from returning to politics in Albany.

As President, Roosevelt continued to champion progressive causes, and win important victories for those not of elite backgrounds, and with elite means. This was the essence of the "Square Deal" he campaigned on in 1904, favoring neither the rich nor the poor, neither capital nor labor. He thought that the government should certainly not redistribute wealth or property, but it also should not align itself with the elite and aid them in preying on the poor. It is in this spirit one can see his efforts towards legislation like the expansion of the national parks system and the creation of the United States Forrest Service, the Pure Food & Drug Act, the Antiquities Act, the Meat Inspection Act, and the Hepburn Act. Also in this spirit one must see T.R.'s trust-busting actions. During his term in office the old Rough Rider initiated at least forty anti-trust actions, the most notable of which being his break-up of J.P. Morgan's Northern Securities Trust, which effectively controlled the nation's railroads, and Rockefeller's Standard Oil trust, which effectively controlled the refining of oil. Lastly, and very importantly, Roosevelt was the first President to formally recognize organized labor, by including the voice of organized labor in labor disputes; something which appalled the more patrician elements in American society.

Of course, Roosevelt's progressivism had limits. He was not anti-business, he was not in principle against the large corporations. Roosevelt thought that large-scale firms, like the trusts, might be useful, but needed to be regulated so that they did not take advantage of consumers. He was a friend to business, and to transnational capital insofar as he successfully completed the Panama Canal, the importance of which to modern capitalist globalized world-economy cannot be overstated. Roosevelt's actions in the case of the Brownsville riots demonstrate the limits of his racial progressivism. He may have invited Booker T. Washington to dine with him in the White House, but he discharged all the black soldiers accused despite a Texas grand jury not returning indictments against any for lack of evidence. T.R. was also an unabashed imperialist; fighting in Cuba during the Spanish-American war, supporting the subsequent U.S. occupation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, as well as supporting the annexation of Hawaii, and announcing the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

Also, similarly to the elder Gracchi brother, Theodore Roosevelt would resort to the threat of constitutional crisis to achieve his ends. One must note that unlike Tiberius, Teddy only threatened constitutional crisis, never quite pushing beyond the bounds of constitutional legality and forcing a full-blown political crisis. And, like Tiberius, Teddy was accused of expanding executive authority at the expense of more constitutionally appropriate bodies. The title of Edmund Morris' biography, Theodore Rex, testifies in part to this perception of Teddy as a usurper of Congress' powers, as someone acting more like a classical Greek Tyrannos, as opposed to a Basileus. One salient example is found in the Coal Strike of 1902. Heading into the winter coal miners' went out on strike for better wages and hours, and recognition of their union. The mine owners refused to meet with the miners, or even listen to their demands. A national crisis of immense proportion was clearly in the offing if no resolution could be found.

Expanding the role of government, Teddy decided to intervene in the dispute. Intervening at all in a labor dispute in this era meant doing so in support of the workers, as the lassiez-faire policy which had dominated was an implicit, if not sometimes very explicit, choice to side with owners. Thus, intervention at all in this case meant the de facto recognition of organized labor's political legitimacy. In the face of the owners' continued recalcitrance T.R. threatened to turn an economic and political crisis, into a full-blown constitutional crisis. If the mine owners would not accede to Teddy's request to submit the dispute to federal mediation, Teddy claimed he would take over the mines and use the army to run them. Roosevelt did not have the explicit constitutional power to do this, even if he could have in practice carried out this threat, which he probably could have. The issue with this move was the appropriation of private property for public purposes without due process, or without just compensation, as required by the constitution. Whether or not Roosevelt could have gotten away with this move if it had made it to the Supreme court, which it almost certainly would have had Teddy followed through on his threat, is unclear and beside the point.

In the face of Roosevelt's threat, the mine-owners caved in and accepted federal mediation. The resulting settlement averted a national crisis, and saw the workers win a 10% pay increase and a nine-hour day. In the end, the threat of a constitutional crisis was enough for Teddy to achieve what he wanted despite the organized resistance of an economically, and thus also politically, powerful clique. Two years later, after Roosevelt's re-election, he once again threatened a constitutional crisis, but not intentionally. His resounding victory in 1904, and his continuing national popularity, gave many observers a good reason to think he could handily win another election in 1908. The issue in this case being that of the political precedent of Presidential term limits, which was an informal constitutional practice until codified into law after the death of Franklin Roosevelt. T.R. could have argued that since he merely finished out the term of the assassinated William McKinley, his first term was not really his, and thus he could run for President in 1908 perfectly legally. Whether this argument would have stood up with the Supreme Court, or with American voters, we will never know. Rather than force such a constitutional crisis, Roosevelt committed political suicide by announcing on election-night that he would not seek another term as President.

During his 1912 run for President under the Bull Moose banner there was an attempt on Teddy's life;. However, unlike that against Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C., it was not was not organized, lacked elite support, and thus was not successful; indeed, the attempted assassination was carried out by a man, John Flammang Schrank, who claimed to be inspired by the ghost of William McKinley. The potential mental instability of the would-be assassin notwithstanding, he was angered by what he saw as Roosevelt's tyrannical hunger for power, as evidenced in his bid for an unconstitutional third term. Despite having certainly made enemies among the wealthy and propertied elite of America, however, as much as he stretched the law or the limits of his powers, he didn't push the existing order into full-blown crisis. Like most other early 20th century 'progressives', Teddy was for gradual reform as a way of preventing a larger, potentially disastrous, social revolution. Though he fought against the abuses of the capitalist system, its replacement was nowhere on his agenda. Like Tiberius Gracchus with his land reform, Theodore Roosevelt sought not to radically alter an economic and social system, but to alter it so as to make it generate a more broadly-based prosperity. This was the aim of T.R.'s anti-trust actions, as well as the progressive items on his domestic policy agenda.


Facing the Forum

In 123 B.C., ten years after the assassination of his brother Tiberius, Gaius Sempronius Gracchus embarked on a political career by following closely in his brother's footsteps. Gaius renounced his Patrician status, by a legal process called transitio ad plebem, in order to be elected Tribune. As Tribune, just like his brother, Gaius was a Popularis, continuing Tiberius' un-finished programme of land re-distribution. Also like Tiberius, Gaius' actions as Tribune made for him many enemies among the optimates of the Senate, whose distaste for Tiberius would have ill-disposed them to Gaius from the beginning. And lastly, just like his brother, when Gaius pushed the Senate too far, threatened their power and privilege too much, they accused him of trying to become king, Rex, and they assassinated him.

Picking up the political legacy established by Tiberius, Gaius was a reform-minded politician who advocated for the needs of 'the Roman people', the same people referenced in the slogan "SPQR". Gaius supported increasing the rights of Plebian Roman citizens, as well as granting citizenship rights to more of the Italian allies. He continued to work of the land commission established by his brother. That Gaius could make political hay with the same economic and political issues as Tiberius had, shows that the fundamental problems in Roman society had not be addressed in the decade between the Tribunates of the Gracchi brothers. Indeed,

"The ten years which separate the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus from his brother form a sort of twilight interval, such as sometimes separates two important periods of history, full of half-articulate cries, broken lights, and shadows of great events to come. Much is begun, nothing is ended, and the course of events seems to hang in suspense, as if in waiting for some master-hand to give the decisive impulse". [6]

Gaius popular political orientation can be seen in his effort to found a colony on or near the site of the former Carthage, a colony he was to call Junonia, after the goddess Juno. While Tiberius mostly confined himself to the issue of the monopolization of land, and his programme of land redistribution, Gaius was far more wide-ranging in his attempts at reform. He introduced significant reform measures into the judiciary, the military, and the economy. He tried to limit the power of the Senatorial class by transferring some of their judicial powers to the Equites, or Knights, trying to drive a wedge between these classes. In the military, Gaius passed laws requiring the state to clothe and equip soldiers, reduce their term of service, and he forbade the conscription of boys under the age of seventeen. He also introduced price-controls for wheat, in effort to limit and regularize the price of bread, the main staple of the diet of the Plebs Urbana. Indeed, as if the Senate would not be hostile to Gaius already on account of their disgust with his brother, as well as the reforms he himself proposed, Gaius introduced what seems to us on its face a minor reform. This was a reform whereby, against long-established custom, speeches would now be delivered while facing leftward instead of rightward. By having speeches delivered while facing the Forum, the meeting place of the Plebian Assembly, instead of the curia, the Senate's meeting house, Gaius was delivering a none too subtle message to the Senate about where he thought power in the Roman state resided.

That the Senate felt threatened by Gaius after his first term as Tribune can be seen clearly in their recruitment of a political stooge to do their bidding in the Plebian Assembly, one Marcus Livius Drusus. It can also be immediately perceived in their use of propaganda - a new development at this time- against Gaius Gracchus by the optimate class, while he was away supervising his colony at Junonia. In the first case, the Senate used Drusus to out-do, or one-up any legislation proposed by Gaius Gracchus. If, for example, Gaius proposed to get increased rights for the Italian allies, the Drusus would propose a bill with even more generous rights and privileges, e.g. immunity from 'scourging', i.e. flogging, by a Roman military commander, or ability to appeal the sentence of a Roman magistrate. If Gaius wanted to settle 1,000 people in colonies, then Drusus would propose settling 3,000 people in colonies, et cetera.[7] Drusus even passes a law cancelling rents.

In the second case, the Senate's hostility to Gaius can be seen in the malicious rumors playing on Romans' superstitions that were spread far and wide in effort to cast Gaius' colony, as well as his person, as cursed. Gaius' enemies wanted to try to turn the people away from Gaius, to make him less popular, and therefore less powerful, by making him out to be impious, by insinuating that the many ill omens surrounding Junonia were clear signs of the dis-favor of the Gods. One might see this aggressive push against Gaius by the Senate as their having learned something of a lesson in under-estimating Tiberius' audacity and ambition, and being conscious about not making the same mistake with Gaius. They feared, and perhaps not so unreasonably, that Gaius might be planning to use his new North African colony to stage and then launch an invasion of Rome, in revenge for the Senate's murder of his brother; for which only a few nominal executions of relatively minor Senators took place.

Gaius, like his brother Tiberius, pushed the Senatorial elite too far, and forced a violent reaction from them. Arch-Patrician Scipio Aemilianus intervened in the early part of Gaius career to undermine the Gracchan land commission by transferring the commissions' powers to the Consul, effectively ending land re-distribution. Senatorial hostility and use of propaganda rendered the long-term success of the Gracchan colony at Junonia doubtful at best; indeed, the colony only survived for 30 years. Questions about the feasibility of practicability of Drusus' proposals notwithstanding, for it is unclear where he would or could have acquired the land necessary to settle such a large number of colonists, the people took the bait, and Gaius found that his power had been diminished. Upon his return to Rome, Gaius mis-read the political climate and took the provocative action of moving his residence to the Aventine hill in Rome, the well-known long-time strong-hold of the Populare faction. After he failed to win a third Tribunate, largely through the machination of his political enemies, many of whom held important political posts, the stage was set for a confrontation.

After his return to Rome in 121 B.C., and the deterioration of his political position, Gaius became increasingly wary about his personal safety and hired a bodyguard. The Senate would have seen both Gaius' moving to the Aventine and his hiring a body-guard as highly provocative actions. To the Senate, they were certainly not the kind of honorable actions befitting an up-standing and law-abiding Patrician Roman citizen. They looked like the action of a dangerous radical, who, like his brother before him, threatened to cause disruption to the pattern of business as usual for the Senatorial aristocracy. For Gaius, cognizant of his brother's fate, these were reasonable measures of self-protection. Unfortunately for Gaius, his bodyguard got into a drunken fight with a slave, who happened to be a servant of the sitting Consul, as a result of which the slave was killed. The Senatorial elites lost no time in spinning this incident into a conspiracy to kill the Consul which had only barely missed its target. This obviously could only further exacerbate the hysterical paranoia among the Senate directed against Gaius Gracchus, and deepened the elite's sentiment that this was a dangerous individual.

With a number of his political enemies elected to prominent political positions, including one Lucius Opimius elected Consul, in addition to Livius Drusus as Tribune, the time had come for the elites to try to un-do the mischief wrought by Gaius Gracchus. On the day set for the repeal of much of his reforms, this Opimius sent an attendant to perform a sacrifice. Let us not forget that religion and politics were far less divorced than they are now. On his way back this servant, Quintus Antyllius, carrying the entrails of the sacrifice tried to push his way through a crowd. Most accounts agree that it was Quintus Antyllius' efforts to get through the crowd, composed of supporters of both Gaius Gracchus' faction and Opimius' faction that sparked a row between the groups resulting in Quintus' death. On Plutarch's account, it was Quintus' rudeness in pushing through the crowd that caused the Gracchan supporters to attack him. According to Appian, Gaius' supporters mis-understood his dis-approving countenance when approached by Quintus as a sign to act.

The death of Quintus Antyllius gave Opimius and his optimate faction all the pre-text they needed to mobilize against Gaius Gracchus. Here was a man who, like his brother before him, had renounced his Patrician status to obtain a political career pandering to the Plebians and freedmen. He had rocked the boat by continuing his brother's land reform project, but then moved much beyond that issue to make sweeping changes to the Roman constitution in many areas. He had founded a colony on cursed land and persisted in building it despite many ill omens - a potential staging point for an invasion aiming at an anti-Senatorial coup de etat. Gaius had shown his contempt for the Senate in giving speech facing left, and moving to the Aventine hill. He had acted openly, through his political reforms, to acquire power for himself at the expense of the Senate. He had allegedly plotted to kill the Consul with his bodyguard, was rumored to be involved in the death of Scipio Aemilianus, had appeared to sanction the impious action of his followers in killing Quintus Antyllius. In the eyes of the Senatorial aristocracy, Gaius Gracchus was clearly a very dangerous man, from a now suspect family.

The Senate mobilized the next day behind the Consul Opimius, to pass a declaration of martial law, called a senatus consultum ultimum, and to seize Gaius Gracchus and put him on trial; the eventual outcome of which no one, least of all Gaius, would have been in doubt about. After a few unsuccessful attempts at making peace, unsuccessful largely because the Senatorial faction refused anything but unconditional surrender, Opimius led a well-armed group to confront Gaius and his supporters, who had barricaded themselves on the Aventine hill. After a brief skirmish most of Gaius' supporters fled or were killed. The encounter was so brief largely because Gaius' supporters were mostly Plebians, and they were very likely to be less well armed, and especially less well-armored, than their opponents. We are told that Gaius' supporters were armed mainly with the spoils of the Gallic campaign of the former consul, and Gracchi supporter, Marcus Fulvius Flaccus. Having not taken part in the fighting, and having refused to arm himself with anything but a small dagger, Gaius fled the scene. After being hotly pursued as he tried to make a desperate escape across the Tiber River, and with no options remaining, Gaius instructed his slave to kill him rather than be taken alive by his enemies; suicide being a more honorable death in the eyes of an upper-class Roman like Gaius Gracchus.

A final note about the Gracchi is important. Like many popular politicians there are questions about whether the Gracchi were real reformers, or whether they were simply using the power of the Plebian Assembly to advance their own political careers and objectives. Are the Gracchi simply power-seekers, or were they more akin to social revolutionaries? Most likely, they are somewhere in between. The Gracchi provide another first in this regard. They form one of the earliest links in a long chain of aristocratic elements taking the lead in the fights of slaves, serfs, and proletarians over the ages for a society based on the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Individuals in this lineage have always faced such charges. For example, Fidel Castro and his revolutionary cohort in Cuba faced such charges in the 20th century.


A New Deal and a Second Bill of Rights

We could easily imagine, and not unreasonably so, that Gaius Gracchus looked up to and was inspired by his elder brother Tiberius and his political career. We know for certain, thanks to documentary evidence, that Franklin Roosevelt looked up to and was inspired by his fifth cousin Theodore and his political career. And, just as the younger Gracchi took up the spirit of his brother's political ideals, so too did the younger Roosevelt adopt the spirit of his cousin's progressive political ideals. Where T.R. offered Americans overwhelmed by the size, scope, and pace of modern industrial society and the enormous corporate entities that controlled and profited from it a "Square Deal", F.D.R. offered Americans crushed under the weight of the most colossal episode of market failure yet recorded, the Great Depression, a "New Deal". The metaphorical deal had to be new with F.D.R. since the political and economic environment had changed so dramatically in the interval between his cousin's Presidency and his own. In offering such a deal, Franklin became the most popular President since his cousin; even winning the largest electoral victory in American history up to that point in 1936, taking forty six out of forty eight states.

Like his cousin Theodore, Franklin Roosevelt had a distinguished Patrician pedigree. He was raised on his family's aristocratic country estate, Springwood, in Hyde Park New York. Franklin received the kind of education one expects for the scion of a Patrician family. He was first educated by private tutors at home, then attended the prestigious Groton School, and after that, Harvard. His ancestors on his mother's side, the Delano family, were a very wealthy Huguenot family that had been in, and prospered in, America even longer than the Roosevelts. Even his childhood pastimes, much like T.R., bear the marks of upper-class privilege. The young Franklin collected stamps, coins, and books; did photography; hunted and collected bird specimens. And yet, also like his cousin Teddy, Franklin adopted a distinctly popular political orientation, challenging the power of elites, and threatening constitutional crises in order to push through legislation he thought necessary. The many public works and employment programs enacted, and experimented with, during the New Deal era demonstrate this concern for the plight of working Americans. F.D.R.'s lasting political legacy, adored by some and loathed by others, testifies to the significance of his impact on American society. It was under his watch that Congress passed, for example, the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the Glass-Steagall Act, the Wealth Tax Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the National Industrial Recovery Act. He also created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board.

Franklin Roosevelt, idolizing his cousin T.R. as he did, followed closely in his political footsteps, just as the younger Gracchi brother had. Franklin was elected to the New York State Assembly in 1910, where tried to emulate his cousin's anti-establishment politics, fighting the Tammany Hall machine bosses that still dominated New York politics. He followed Teddy again when he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy by Woodrow Wilson in 1913. Then in 1920 he was tapped by the Democratic Party to be the nominee for Vice President. As his political career was gathering much momentum, despite the Democrats losing the 1920 election, F.D.R. was to leave the scene, much as T.R. had done after the death of his mother and wife. Where Teddy headed west to be a cattle rancher, Franklin was to be afflicted with polio. In this way, Franklin once again imitated his cousin and hero by enduring a period of, metaphorical, political exile. F.D.R emerged again later to win the Governorship of New York in 1928. It was in part his term as Governor, and part the effects of the Great Depression, that positioned Franklin Roosevelt to be the Democratic Party's nominee for President in 1932.

In 1929, the Great Crash, as it came to be known, changed the political and economic landscape of America in ways no one was prepared for. In the aftermath of the Crash there was however near universal agreement about who had caused it, and who was to blame. Wall-Street, the banks, and speculators were all the target of a raging torrent of public obloquy. The scope of this tsunami of condemnation is in its own way a measure of the scope of the crash itself, and the social an economic dislocation that followed in its wake. In 1929 unemployment in the US was about 3%; by the later part of 1932 it was 25%. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined precipitously. It was $87.4 billion in 1929, but by 1933 it had fallen to $39.7 billion. Workers' earning fell from $50.8 billion in 1929, to 29.3 billion in 1933. In 1929 there were 25,000 banks in the US, but by 1933 there were less than 15,000. Between 1929 and 1932 farmers lost about 2/3rds of their income. Most strikingly 3/4th of the people eligible for assistance were unable to obtain any. [8] Homelessness, starvation were widespread, suicide rates rose dramatically. These figures provide some idea of the scale of the crisis produced by the Crash of 1929 and its aftermath.

As if the economic crisis was not enough, Roosevelt also had to confront the growing threat posed by fascism. This threat posed more than one problem for Roosevelt. Not only did the militarism of Italy, Germany, and Japan threaten peace and security, but their example threatened further political instability in America. At a time when the American economy was in dire straits, as were many of the leading European industrial economies, the economies of fascist Germany and Italy, and of the communist Soviet Union, were performing much better. These examples, combined with the economic and political tumult brought on by the effects of the Depression, made fascism and communism, seem like very real alternatives for America. The idea of dictatorship, or of dictatorial powers, was not universally, or unambiguously negative in the eyes of many Americans. Before the out-break of the war, Italy and Germany were not reviled enemies, but potent competitors with a radical new model of political-economic organization, one that was turning in a better performance than the economies of the leading democracies in a time of globalized economic depression. A reporter is said to have commented to F.D.R. about the New Deal that because of it he'd go down in American history as the best President or the worst President. F.D.R. is said to have replied something to the effect of, "no, if I fail, I'll be the last President". This statement provides some insight into how real the threat of fascism and communism felt, even in the highest reaches of American government.

As President, Franklin Roosevelt inherited a chaotic, and indeed dire, social and economic situation. In response, he undertook decisive, and in the eyes of critics radical, action in order to lift the economy out of the depression. In so doing he saw himself as trying to save American capitalism from itself, and thereby save American democracy. Though in the end it was war production that brought the American economy back to life, and to prosperity, Roosevelts' pre-war efforts to combat the Great Depression are not one bit less heroic. Though he enjoyed unprecedented popular support, he also faced much resistance to his proposals from established elites. Like his cousin, Franklin was accused to over-reaching executive authority, of radically altering the constitutionally ordained relationship between the state and the economy, and between the state and its citizens. Many in the American aristocracy felt that the "New Deal" Franklin Roosevelt was offering the American people was far too generous, and involved far too much government intervention, to the point that he was accused of being a communist, or a dictator. This is especially true in regards to the National Labor Relations Act, which created the National Labor Relations Board, and the Social Security Act. The first provided a federal guarantee of workers' right to organize and to bargain collectively, the second provided important benefits for the retired and the unemployed. This conviction that Roosevelt was a despotic tyrant was only confirmed when he stood for and won a third, and then later a fourth, term as President, in contravention of one of America's most revered informal political traditions.

Under the influence of new thinking in economics, especially in macro-economics, in particular the work of John Maynard Keynes, Roosevelt and his advisors designed a myriad of programs and initiatives designed to prime the economic pump by putting money in the hands of workers. Where T.R.'s "Square Deal" aimed only to prevent business from unfairly trampling the consumer, Franklin's "New Deal" aimed beyond just assuring fairness, and towards more directly improving workers' level of material welfare. The alphabet soup of New Deal agencies and administrations testifies to the extent of the efforts undertaken by the Roosevelt administration to fight-off the Great Depression. Thus we have, for example, the T.V.A., the P.W.A. the W.P.A., the C.C.C., the F.E.R.A., the C.W.A., the F.S.A., and the R.E.A., among many others. Some programs or policies were more successful than others, and F.D.R. showed a great deal of pragmatism in moving from one to another, and when one failed, he simply tried something else. His radical expansion of government, in terms of its size, the scope of its powers, and the fields of its action, earned Roosevelt and his "New Deal" the undying enmity of many American capitalists. They saw his expansion of the scope and scale of government intervention in society as unconstitutional, as un-American, and even as a communist take-over. His New Deal employment programs were seen as re-distribution of wealth and his push for increased regulation as an abrogation of private property.

In order to enact his reform programme F.D.R. had to threaten a constitutional crisis, his well-known "court-packing" plan, that is, formally, the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937. The Supreme Court had been working to undermine his attempts to enact the kind of legislation needed to being economic recovery, relying heavily on its decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital. In response, Roosevelt threatened to add several new justices to the court, one for every current justice over 70 years of age. The implication was very clear. If the court did not stop undermining Roosevelt, he would pack the court with judges who would vote the way he wanted, and thus over-ruling the recalcitrant conservative jurists. If seems very clear that Roosevelt could have followed through on his threat, and had such legislation passed through the Congress if he needed to. The issue in this case is less Roosevelts' ability to do what he threatened, or even the legality of this tactic. The issue has more to do with the spirit of democracy and of the constitution. The threat Roosevelt made certainly appears inconsistent with the spirit of democratic governance, and respect for its mechanisms. His ends may have justified his means in this case, as the threat of fascism was indeed very real at the time, but his threat certainly would seem to violate the spirit of fair play in a democratic polity. We will never know now what might have happened if Roosevelt had carried out his threat. The Supreme Court would no doubt have weighed in, and thus the stage would have been set for a confrontation between the executive and legislative branches and the judicial branch.

Out of this experience, both his own and the nation's, with the Depression and then the war, came Roosevelt's commitment to the idea of a second Bill of Rights. This would have been Roosevelt's most significant reform to the U.S. constitution, the introduction of social and economic rights into the American constitutional order. Had he lived longer he might have seen more of his idea brought to life. As it is, several aspects of his proposal for a second Bill of Rights have become part of the American constitutional order in the form of what Cass Sunstein calls "constitutive commitments". For example, social security is not a constitutional right, and yet any politician, from any either current party, would be hard pressed to get elected calling for such a policy, or, if elected, to get such a policy passed through the Congress. Discrimination on the basis of sex, for instance, is not explicitly forbidden in the Constitution. However, the constitution has been so interpreted that such a prohibition is today considered consistent with, necessary for, or even implied by, the rights enumerated in it. Indeed, as Sunstein argues, if not for the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 the American constitutional order would contain social and economic rights. Nixon, as President, was able to appoint several justices to the Supreme Court, and as a result, to stop the Warren Court's momentum toward recognition of the kind of social and economic rights outlined in Roosevelt's Second Bill of Rights.

Part of Roosevelt's vision with the second Bill of Rights was to guarantee the exercise of democratic citizenship. The age-old republican principle that economic dependence make for political subjugation, was clearly at work in F.D.R.'s thinking.[9] "Necessitous men are not free men", Roosevelt once said, thus, providing for all citizens to have access to the most basic necessaries of life is the essential pre-requisite for the exercise of democratic citizenship.[10] In order for a democracy to truly flourish, citizens must be liberated from what F.D.R. called "fear" and "want".[11] Persons who do not enjoy the freedom from fear or freedom from want could never fully realize the ideal of democratic citizenship. Such a Bill of Rights, the inclusion of social and economic rights in the constitutional order, would very obviously be anathema to American oligarchs, who would deride such an inclusion as socialist re-distribution of wealth, as the subsidization of the idleness of the lazy by the industriousness of the productive. That many American aristocrats, and optimate politicians, still decry the New Deal as the death of the American republic, shows just how radical were Roosevelt's actions, and how radical they were perceived as being by contemporaries. We know, for example, how shocked and traumatized the Athenians were during the Second Peloponnesian War, because in the surviving literary sources, it is constantly referred to as the worst thing to have ever happened to anyone. [12] The continuing enmity against Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal from some elite quarters likewise demonstrates the depth of feeling of people at the time. The same could be said about Southern elites in regard to Abraham Lincoln and his actions during the war and for imposing the Reconstruction regime.


Legacies

In thinking about the political legacies of both the Grachhi and the Roosevelts, one, I think, very striking similarity that jumps to mind is that all of them left their political work unfinished. All envisioned, and attempted to enact -with varying success- significant changes in the constitutions of their societies. All reacted strongly against large concentrations of wealth and power -both economic and political- that left the vast majority destitute and all but formally disenfranchised. In the case of the Gracchi since the problem was caused by the latifundia their reforms was focused first on land redistribution, and only later on about issues like extension of citizenship rights.

In the time of the Roosevelts, the problem was the trusts, the large corporations, and the immense concentrations of financial and productive assets they controlled; and also with the social, political, and economic power that control bestowed. Thus, the Roosevelts' reforms were focused in the first phase on trust-busting and consumer protections, and then in the second phase on unemployment relief, social security, and labor rights. While Theodore Roosevelt was the first President to give organized labor a voice at the bargaining table. Franklin Roosevelt formally codified labor rights into law as President. Yet, despite the success both pairs of politicians undoubtedly did have, they all left - or were forced off- the scene before their work could be completed.

We know Tiberius' work was left undone, given that he was violently assassinated, and his land commission effectively neutered after his death. Moreover, that his brother Gaius could make a political career, ten years later, on many of the same issues, shows very clearly that the same problems existed, and that Tiberius' reforms were not sufficient to address the full scale of the problem. Much of the reason for this was that Tiberius' reforms were systematically undermined by the optimate faction after his assassination. Though it would have been politically dangerous for the elites to immediately abolish Tiberius' land commission, they did the next best thing, they defunded the project. The Senate was able to deprive Tiberius of sufficient funds to effectively administer the project while he was alive, and then to tighten the purse strings even further after his murder. Later on, in 129 B.C., most of the powers of the commission were transferred to the Consul. The dithering allowed by this maneuver enabled the Senatorial elites to in-practice halt the work of the land commission.

That Gaius was forced, in the end, to choose between suicide and a violent assassination, shows that he was also forced off the scene while his reforming project was not fully consolidated, let alone finished with its work. Again, moreover, that Gaius Julius Caesar later on also made a political career with many of the same political issues as the younger Gracchi, shows once again that the underlying dynamics causing the problem had not been remedied. Perhaps, if the Gracchi had been successful their reform project, there never would have been a Caesar. Nonetheless, it was not until 118 B.C. that Tiberius' land commission was formally dissolved. Then in 111 B.C. even the rents that owners of public land were supposed to pay were abolished, effectively completing the privatization of the ager publicus. Thus, the legislation of both the Gracchi was in the main repealed formally, or informally undermined. All Gracchan reforms were ultimately cancelled under the ultra-conservative constitution imposed by Sulla and his proscriptions, and enforced by his client-army.[13]

Teddy Roosevelt himself thought he left his work unfinished, and that he quit the scene too soon. He regretted almost immediately his decision on election-night in 1904 to not seek another term. In exchange, his party did allow him to pick his successor. T.R. had much confidence in William Howard Taft when the latter took office. Taft would however prove a disappointment to Teddy. This was one reason, among others, that Theodore Roosevelt decided to run for President again in 1912, his now famous "Bull Moose" campaign. T.R. may be remembered as a trust-busting President, and indeed he was quite active; at least relative to other Presidential administrations, both before and after. However, T.R. was not an anti-business politician, not even an anti- corporate politician. He was a progressive, and fought business leaders, and the "captains of industry", but he was not anti-capitalist. He may have busted some trusts, may have slowed the development of some others for a time. But, that the Crash of 1929 happened shows very clearly that the reforming work of T.R. was not finished; even if it was capable of adequately addressing the problems in the American economy that ultimately caused the Crash.

That right-wing politicians today continue to gripe about the New Deal, and the "welfare state" it created, demonstrates without a doubt that F.D.R.'s work was left unfinished. Towards the end of his Presidency he advocated for a second Bill of Rights, which would include social and economic rights. Though this proposal formed one the major bases of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and as a result an important part of dozens of national constitutions around the world, only small parts were adopted in the United States. His experience with the Great Depression had convinced Franklin Roosevelt that these social and economic rights were essential. They were needed to alleviate the massive human suffering caused by Depression induced unemployment and deprivation. They were also necessary to guarantee a secure foundation upon which citizens could depend, and thus achieve the kind of liberty needed to exercise democratic citizenship. This, very obviously, has not developed; quite the opposite in fact. But that the legacy of the New Deal and the proposal for a second Bill of Rights are still controversial shows that the transformative work F.D.R. begun had also not yet been fully consolidated, and was not yet fully finished.


Conclusion

The crisis of 1929-1945 was a watershed event, not only in American history, but in world history. It was responsible for unleashing perhaps the largest wave of suffering the human world has ever seen; I am including in this wave the Cold War of the subsequent period, and its attendant proxy wars and "disappeared" dissidents; I am also including in this wave the undeclared war of "underdevelopment" that kills through malnutrition and treatable diseases. This crisis occasioned some of the largest movements and exchanges of populations, both voluntary and involuntary, and their attendant cultural mixing. These were extraordinary times, unprecedented times, to the people living through them.

In 1932 A.D. Franklin Delano Roosevelt began a project of radical constitutional change, expanding the powers of the federal government and the executive branch, in response to an extreme crisis. This is much the same as what Tiberius Gracchus did in 133 B.C. in response to the economic crisis of the Roman republic after the Punic Wars. Both were derided as dictators during their careers. Both had their work attacked by factions of the aristocratic elites of their societies. In the long-run, both had big parts of their work undone by political opponents. Like the Grachhi then, could the Roosevelts' political careers be the signal of a new phase in the development of the American republic? Are we heading, like the Romans of the Gracchi's era, towards the destruction of the republic?

If we can venture one broad conclusion, it is that plutocracy and extreme concentrations of wealth foment crisis. And, it is out of moments of crisis that revolutions emerge. Often times, revolutions which are not successful are followed by reaction. Reaction, especially in the ancient world, could be extremely cruel, as the aftermath of the repression of the Gracchan revolution demonstrates. Worries about vast accumulations of wealth undermining democracy also underlay the 'progressive' political agendas of both Roosevelts. And, just like the Gracchi, attacking these concentrations brought unceasing scorn upon both Teddy and Franklin Roosevelt from the elites, but adoration from the masses.

Ancient historians like Plutarch, Livy, Dio Cassius, Cicero, Appian, Tacitus, and Polybius all have distinct upper-class biases. And all roundly condemn the Gracchi as political 'adventurers', as radicals using unconstitutional methods, and as largely responsible for getting themselves murdered. Modern historians, who typically share an upper-class bias, differ more in opinion, but there remain many who decry the Roosevelts as closet-socialists who radically changed the American constitutional order for the worse, in effect undermining the American republic. Conversely, just as the Roman people had erected statutes of the Gracchi brothers throughout Rome, so too during the Depression did people -often with few material possessions and living in ramshackle housing- hang up pictures of F.D.R.. Moreover, Franklin Roosevelt's role as victorious wartime leader - in a war that made his nation a super-power - blunted much of the vitriol some had had toward Roosevelt because of his New Deal policies before the war.

This bring us back to our original question, or questions: Are the Roosevelts the American Grachhi?; If they are, What does this mean for the American republic?; Should we be looking out for an American Marius, or an American Sulla? What would either of these even look like in the 21st century? It was less than a century after the death of Gaius Gracchus that Caesar was himself assassinated, and we are now drawing up closely towards a century since the New Deal era. Perhaps the ancient world and the modern world are too different to draw meaningful parallels? I don't necessarily have the answers to these questions. My main goal was simply to pose the first question about the American Gracchi. I leave the rest of the questions be conjectured about by the reader.



Notes

[1] For excellent resources on Roman history for this period see; Havell. H.L.. Republican Rome. 1914. Oracle Publishing, 1996. Also see; Scullard, H.H.. From the Gracchi to Nero. 1959. 5th edition. Routledge, 1982. Also see; Parenti, Michael. The Assassination of Julius Caesar. The New Press, 2003. Also see; Titchener, Frances. "To Rule Mankind and Make the World Obey". Portable Professor Series. Barnes & Noble Audio; 2004.

[2] Quoted in; Parenti (2003), 61.

[3] For excellent resources on the life and political career of Theodore Roosevelt see; Morris, Edmund. Theodore Rex. Random House, 2002. Also see; The Roosevelts: An Intimate History. Dir. Ken Burns. PBS, 2014. Also see; Brands, H.W.. T.R.: The Last Romantic. Basic Books, 1998.

[4] For an excellent history of this period, up to 1900, see Brands, H.W.. American Colossus. Anchor Books, 2011.

[5] See; Abbott, Elizabeth. Sugar: A Bittersweet History. The Overlook Press, 2011.

[6] Havell (1914), 367.

[7] Colonies were a great tool for the Romans to relieve social pressure accumulating among the Plebs Urbana at Rome. Being re-settled in a colony gave the colonist a second chance, which many wanted, even at the cost of re-settlement far from Rome, the idea of which would have abhorred a true Roman. This was thus an easy way for politicians to win acclaim and popularity with the people.

[8] These stats come from Sunstein, Cass. The Second Bill of Rights. Basic Books, (2004): 36-38.

[9] I mean "republican" in the classical political sense here. The republican tradition has a long history in political philosophy. Excellent modern work in this tradition has been done by Philip Petit. See Republicanism. Oxford University Press, 1997.

[10] Sunstein (2004), 90.

[11] These are two of F.D.R.'s "four freedoms". See Sunstein (2004), 80.

[12] See; Hanson, Victor Davis. The Other Greeks. 1995. University of California Press,1999. Also see; Hanson, V.D.. Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece. University of California Press, 1998.

[13] Proscription is a process whereby Roman citizens were declared 'outlaws', 'traitors', or 'criminals' by the state, i.e. the Senate. Once a citizen was declared a criminal they effectively had a bounty put out on their head. If one was a victim of proscription, one would have twenty hour hours to either flee or face trial; the outcome of this trial would not be much in doubt. In response to proscription many Roman citizens chose suicide. This was because if they either fled or were convicted in court their property would be forfeited to the state. Thus, in order to keep property in the family, many proscribed individuals chose suicide to exile or execution.