Examining the Role of Anti-Communist Rhetoric in the Growth of Reactionary Cult Movements

By Oskar Kaut

Amidst America’s increasingly polarized political climate, there has been growing concern regarding the emergence of reactionary groups that display cult-like behaviors and tactics, posing vital questions about the impact these groups have on individuals as well as mainstream political discourse. Cults can be broadly defined as groups or movements that share a set of philosophical, spiritual, or political beliefs that are by and large considered to be extremist or deviant by mainstream society. On the other hand, the label “reactionary” is typically given to individuals or organizations that oppose social change and desire a return to “traditional” values and practices. Such beliefs have been on the steady rise for several years, and the conception and popularization of affiliated organizations and movements have followed (Rodrik 162). Many fringe reactionary groups such as the Proud Boys and Patriot Front have come under scrutiny for some of their practices, which are often highly secretive and can involve physical and psychological manipulation (Ashland 37). In recent years, there has been a concerning rise of far-right movements worldwide, providing an opportunity for reactionary groups to amplify their message and reach a much larger audience. Many of these groups display clear cult-like behaviors, as demonstrated by their deference to authority and distorted sense of reality. These groups often use anti-communist rhetoric to infiltrate mainstream political discourse, which serves as a gateway to legitimizing and normalizing the extremist ideology of far-right cults. Resultantly, it is crucial to recognize and address the presence of these cults within right-wing movements and the impact their rhetoric can have on broader society. 

A cult is a group or movement centered around a given (typically extremist) belief system that uses coercive tactics to maintain its hold over followers. Sociological research has shown that cults utilize tactics of social influence in order to manipulate their followers into submission (Corvaglia 9). Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerard divided the concept of social influence into two subcategories. Informational social influence refers to humans’ intrinsic desire to be “right”, whereas normative social influence refers to the desire to be liked by others. Both of these concepts can be aptly applied to cults. Cults use normative social influence (known colloquially as “peer pressure”) to recruit new members. In an increasingly isolated society, cults offer some individuals an opportunity to be a part of something that they see as larger than themselves. The propagation of this form of influence can lead to cult members partaking in practices that they would normally oppose in an attempt to gain favor with other members (Deutsch & Gerard 14). Similarly, in a world where misinformation is increasingly rampant and it can be difficult to know which sources to trust, cults make use of informational social influence to develop genuine conformity to their beliefs and practices. Cults attempt to create a hegemony of “accurate information” for their followers, thus justifying even private conformity in which individuals truly believe that the group is right or justified in their struggle (Corvaglia 18).  

Many reactionary organizations and movements embody the aforementioned cult characteristics. Stanley Milgram’s classical experiments in conformity shed light on the willingness of individuals to obey those whom they view as authority figures and perform actions that go against their own conscience (Slater 32-63). The experiments found that test subjects were willing to administer increasingly severe electric shocks to another person (who they believed to be a fellow test subject) even to the degree where they believed the shocks to be lethal. Reactionary cults (like other cults) often exert substantial social influence over their members and rely on a hierarchical structure of authority that leaves them vulnerable to pressures similar to those exhibited in Milgram’s experiments. Oftentimes–as can be seen in the cults of personality surrounding Gavin McInnes within the Proud Boys or Nazi-collaborator Stepan Bandera in Ukrainian nationalist organizations–members of far-right movements are subject to pressures to conform to the extreme beliefs and practices of groups under the direction of authoritative leaders (Rabotyazhev 525). In many ways, this demonstrates the presence of normative influence within reactionary groups and movements. Moreover, members of fringe right-wing movements are also frequently subject to constant messaging from the group’s ideological leaders and even cut off from external sources of information (Jurg & Tuters). This can be clearly seen as an application of informational social influence, in which far-right organizations appeal to their members’ intrinsic desire to be right by bombarding them with their subjective version of reality accompanied by statements such as “facts don’t care about your feelings”. The intent of this process is to present their extreme viewpoints as objective truths that cannot be challenged, thereby working to shift members’ worldviews over time. The existence of such cult-like behavior in reactionary groups and movements presents real issues for mainstream society as the prevalence of these cults continues to grow. 

In recent years, the presence of reactionary groups has risen sharply both in the United States and globally (Rodrik 162). The attention given to these cults has also increased in the wake of sustained political polarization and social unrest. Large rallies such as the 2017 Charlottesville “Unite the Right” march and the January 6th, 2021 attack on the United States capitol demonstrate the power that these fringe movements now hold as well as their capacity for violence and contribution to the erosion of democratic norms and social stability. The prevalence of right-wing cults can also be seen through the drastically increased proliferation of disinformation and conspiracy theories. Now more than perhaps ever in modern history, mainstream American politics are characterized by a general rejection of the notion of objective reality (Bleakley 1). One of the main causes of this rejection can be attributed to the prominence of echo chambers among political extremists on social media, in which aligning beliefs are reinforced and dissenting viewpoints are actively suppressed (Bleakley 12). This phenomenon hints at a bleak reality: the influence of reactionary cults and movements is not limited to their own movements. Rather, their extremist views and tactics can be observed slipping into mainstream political discourse. 

The growth of reactionary cults within far-right politics has drastically influenced mainstream political discourse. These cults both directly participate in mainstream political campaigns and employ a number of more indirect methods to influence political dialogue. As previously mentioned, the rise of fringe, right-wing cults has coincided with a sharp increase in the prevalence of disinformation and harmful conspiracy theories (Bleakley 2). Reactionary groups have used their growing platforms to disseminate propaganda promoting their fringe ideology and undermining that of their political opponents. Much of this is centered around tactics of fear-mongering in an attempt to create a feeling of urgency for action. Additionally, fringe-right cults are able to methodically slip into mainstream political discourse through media coverage of contentious issues as well as through the actions of individual politicians. Over the past several years, a large number of far-right politicians have adopted language that echoes the beliefs held by reactionary cults in attempts to appeal to certain voters. For example, both Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene and Rep. Lauren Boebert are former followers of the QAnon cult and continue to espouse much of the same rhetoric supported by the group today, even as they hold some of the highest elected offices in the country. Powerful politicians and media figures’ adoption of framing similar to that propagated by reactionary cults has led to a dramatic shift in the “Overton Window”—the frame of what beliefs are considered socially acceptable within mainstream society. 

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The Overton Window is a concept designed to describe the range of ideas that are considered largely acceptable within conventional society at a given time. Joseph Overton (for whom the term is named) conceptualized that ideas outside the window (i.e., politically unacceptable) may later fit within the realm of acceptable ideas because the “window” can “either move or be transformed in size” (Oleksandr 52). It is through this process that reactionary cults are able to slip their ideas into conventional political discussions. Even over relatively short periods of time, one can observe how views that were previously unthinkable become widely adopted within the mainstream. Similar to the concept of the Overton Window is that of deviance, which refers to the idea of departing from generally accepted standards present in society. According to Hewitt, “Deviance…represents a real or imagined threat to social order, and the deviant is accorded a special and discredited position in relation to it,” (214). Thus, views outside of the Overton Window at a given point in time typically also fall under the umbrella of deviant views. The concepts of the Overton Window and deviance (and the relationship therewithin) are crucial to understanding the strategic importance of falling within the views accepted by mainstream society for far-right organizations. As Zuckerman puts it, “Stray outside the sphere of legitimate debate into the sphere of deviance, and your position becomes invisible to mainstream media dialog,” (16). Essentially, in order to reach a larger audience, reactionary cults have to struggle to fit within the established norms of society at any given point in time. Because of the tactical need to infiltrate mainstream political discourse, many right-wing, reactionary cults seek to normalize their own viewpoints by falsely equivocating their views with those held on the left. 

Reactionary groups often use anti-communist rhetoric to slip into mainstream political discourse by framing their opposition to communism as a defense of democracy, individual liberties, and freedom. One of the simplest means by which fascists can achieve their ultimate goal of consolidating power is by utilizing anti-communism as a tool to create a common enemy. By depicting socialism as a threat to national security, reactionaries can silence opposition, suppress meaningful dissent, and legitimize their authoritarian system. Another means by which reactionary groups seek to utilize anti-communist rhetoric is to equivocate fascism (and oftentimes Nazism) and communism. This is of course, on its face, absurd: while communism promotes the seizure of the means of production by the workers (Marx & Engels 38), Nazism is characterized by its emphasis on racial purity and antisemitism. The false equivalence of communism and Nazism is often propagated by far-right cults and media figures alike as a means to both discredit left-wing ideas and shift the Overton Window in favor of their own ideology. Making the comparison between communism and Nazism serves to downplay the severity of the crimes of one of the worst atrocities in human history and silence legitimate criticisms of capitalism and neoliberalism. The conjoined propaganda tools of finding a common enemy around which to unite and equating communism to the atrocities of Nazism allow reactionary cults to both delegitimize leftist movements and slip their own beliefs into conventional political discourse, ultimately serving their own end goal of consolidating power within mainstream institutions. 

  Fictitious tropes equating communism to Nazism have been widely disseminated and adopted within transnational mainstream political discourse, perpetuating misinformation, reinforcing negative stereotypes about leftist political movements, and legitimizing the views of reactionary cults. While the degree to which such attempts varies, in some parts of the world (especially in former Soviet states), reactionary cults have been able to “...[capitalize] on decades of anti-communism mainstream discourse built-up to develop a full-blown populist radical right narrative and politics,” (Popescu & Vesalon 5). In practice, this means that fascist sects such as the AUR in Romania and the OUN/UPA cult in Ukraine have been able to normalize their own beliefs and have massive impacts on public opinion and public policy (Crstocea). As previously discussed, cults have a tendency to rely on (among other things), informational social influence. In many instances, this can include followers accepting blatantly false information and shaping their perceptions of reality around lies (Corvaglia 9). Naturally, it’s not difficult why it would be undesirable for distorted worldviews to slip into mainstream politics, but in many instances, it already has. One such example can be seen in The Black Book of Communism (Courtois et al, 1999), which coined the “100 million deaths by communism” myth that has since been thoroughly debunked (Francois et al 4). Despite being categorically disproven, this myth is still perpetuated within mainstream conservative (and even many liberal) circles. As the views of reactionary cults with distorted worldviews gain traction within mainstream political discourse, they are enabled to both expand their influence and increase their numbers. 

The presence of anti-communist rhetoric in mainstream political discourse has led to the growth of reactionary cults characterized by informational isolation and a deference to authority. The use of anti-communist rhetoric fosters an atmosphere of apprehension and widespread suspicion toward leftist ideologies, which renders individuals more vulnerable to the perspectives of reactionary groups. The fear-mongering and demonization of communism that has pervaded Western political discourse for decades has created a fertile breeding ground for reactionary cults and movements that espouse radical anti-communist ideologies. These groups oftentimes promise protection against a supposed communist threat and frame themselves as protectors of freedom and traditional values. By stoking fears of a communist takeover of institutions, these cults and cult-like movements are able to tap into the anxieties of ordinary people who are disillusioned with mainstream neoliberal politics and searching for a sense of belonging and purpose. Further, the adoption of fictitious anti-communist tropes by mainstream political leaders and media figures can also serve as a means of legitimizing the views of these movements, leading to a further increase in their membership and influence. As reactionary cults continue to gain traction in mainstream political discourse, the consequences of anti-communist rhetoric are becoming increasingly evident. The aforementioned groups are given steadily more and more massive platforms to promote fringe ideologies and often resort to violence, as seen in the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, North Carolina, and the storming of the United States Capitol on January 6th, 2021. Additionally, the dissemination of anti-communist disinformation and conspiracy theories among these cults creates a pipeline toward radicalization and a complete rejection of objective, factual information, facilitating the exacerbation of societal divides. The normalization of radical, anti-communist rhetoric also perpetuates narrow-minded perspective ideologies, discouraging both critical thought and nuanced discussions about complex societal issues. In conclusion, the prevalence of anti-communist rhetoric in mainstream political discourse has led to a sharp rise in reactionary cults, posing a threat to the very institutions that underpin Western so-called “liberal democracy”. Acknowledging and rectifying the adverse consequences of the normalization of anti-communist rhetoric is vital in averting the proliferation of reactionary cults and the further degradation of the material conditions of everyday Americans.

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Fight the Virus, Not China! The History and Background of Trump’s Racist COVID-19 Rhetoric

(Getty images)

By Derek R. Ford

Many are increasingly and quite justifiably outraged at Trump’s repeated attempts to link the novel coronavirus known as COVID-19 to both the city of Wuhan and the entire country of China.

Meanwhile, others on the right link COVID-19 to China not just geographically but culturally. John Cornyn, a U.S. Senator from Texas said the pandemic stemmed from “the culture where people eat bats and snakes and dogs and things like that.” Some were quick to point out that in the state he represents, “several towns host annual festivals where residents milk rattlesnakes for venom to be used in antivenin and fry up filets of snake flesh as a novelty snack.” Others noted that “Mad Cow” disease originated in England, and the H1N1 flu originated in the U.S. and Mexico.

While mainstream journalists have, to some extent, pushed back against this racism, they’ve quickly backed down when Trump characteristically defends his position or refuses to comment. As Elie Mystal pointed out in The Nation, Philip Wegmann of RealClearPolitics quickly moved away from the topic by noting he was “switching gears to a larger question.” Mystal writes that, “If the media were doing their job, this would be the story: The president of the United States is putting lives at risk during a global pandemic by inciting violence against fellow Americans.”

Trump’s racism and xenophobia is nothing new. Yet neither is the imperialist and racist demonization of China and Chinese people. This history, both recent and stretching back a century ago, is one in which not only are Democrats and Republicans complicit, but so too are the corporate news media.

Coronavirus coverage was anti-China from the beginning

From the earliest coverage, US media and politicians did everything they could to mobilize the Coronavirus as part of a broader anti-China demonization campaign. Sometimes this included outright lies and fabrications, like when the New York Times reported that Dr. Li Wenliang, an early identifier of the novel coronavirus, was arrested by Chinese authorities in the middle of the night for “whistleblowing.”

As K.J. Noh reported for Counterpunch, Dr. Li wasn’t a “whistleblower.” He didn’t report anything to authorities but sent a private message to seven colleagues (that included a confidential medical record). Others had, however, reported early signs of a novel virus to the proper authorities, and they weren’t reprimanded at all. Perhaps the reason that Dr. Li didn’t notify even his own hospital administration was because he had no qualifications on the matter.

Of no small importance was that Dr. Li was never arrested! Instead, he “was called in, lightly reprimanded (talked to, and signed a document not to spread rumors) and went straight back to work.”

The coverage was part of an attempt to portray the government of the People’s Republic of China as ineffective, repressive, and chaotic, willing to do anything to hide the truth.

While China’s response was bound to entail errors, as any response would, the World Health Organization found it worthy of praise, including its transparency.

Indeed, China took extraordinary, coordinated, and swift efforts to contain the virus, including the importation of 20,000 medical workers to Hubei province, the emergency construction of hospitals, the provision of electricity to people even if they couldn’t pay (and not just a deferral of bills), the forbidding of price increases, free treatment of medical expenses, and more.

Instead of learning from and helping China (not to mention preparing for an outbreak in the U.S.), the US establishment focused all of its energy on China bashing. This had devastating consequences. In his important article for Liberation News, Saul Kanowitz documented just a few of them, from stores posting signs that exclude Chinese people from entering and Chinese restaurants being vandalized to high school students in California assaulting a classmate. China towns across the U.S. were empty. Even Asian people who weren’t Chinese were assaulted and harassed.

“Chinese Toy Terror”

In her 2012 book, Animacies, Mel Y. Chen (2012, Duke University Press) documents the racist and imperialist anti-China propaganda that dominated public discourse in the 2007 “lead panic.” The discovery of lead in toys made in China featured prominently in the domestic hysteria. News coverage and warnings, bolstered by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Fud and Drug Administration, and others, Chen notes, had three things in common:

“First, they pointed to the dangers of lead intoxication as opposed to other toxins. Second, they emphasized the vulnerability of American children to this toxin. Third, they had a common point of origination: China, for decades a major supplier of consumer products to the United States and responsible for various stages in the production stream” (160).

Chen gives a number of blog and news headlines clearly formulating lead as a weapon of China against poor U.S. children, like “Why is China Poisoning Our Babies?” and “Chinese Toy Terror.”

Not coincidentally, Chen observes, this was just one year after China superseded the U.S. in global exports.

This campaign itself drew on previous campaigns demonizing China and its people, perhaps most significantly the “Yellow Peril” of the early 20th century, during which the U.S. barred Asian immigration through the Immigration Act of 1917.

The racism of the anti-Chinese “lead panic” of 2007 is most apparent when contrasted with the long struggles against lead-based paint in the U.S. Grassroots campaigns were largely successful in creating awareness about lead paint and banning its future use. Yet lead poisoning continued in poor and working-class communities, particularly Black communities.

And, of course, lead continues to contaminate drinking water in cities across the U.S. In my own county of Marion, Indiana, school water tested positive for led in more than half of the schools and child care sites in the county. A 2019 health department report found that lead levels were between 20 and 8,630 parts per billion. The Environmental Protection Agency’s threshold is 15 parts per billion. This was included in the internal report obtained by IndyStar journalist Suzette Hackney, not the public report they released.

Fight the virus, not the people!

While it’s true that Trump is anxious for a scapegoat to blame for his administration’s appalling response to the current pandemic, this doesn’t entirely explain his efforts to identify COVID-19 with China.

The Democratic Party and the corporate media are mostly outraged at the blatancy of Trump’s anti-China racism, because when it comes to demonizing China, they play their dutiful role. The entire U.S. political establishment is firm in its orientation toward China: it must be defeated. Since the 1949 revolution that overthrew colonialism and established the People’s Republic of China, the consensus in Washington has been one of counterrevolution in China.

As China strength and importance continues to grow, the U.S. is increasingly in direct confrontation with China on military, economic, and political matters.

The response of progressive people in the U.S. has to be as deep and wide as the ruling class’ anti-China campaign. We must condemn not only the overtly racist rhetoric of Trump, but the entire demonization campaign against China, both right now and after the COVID-19 crisis has passed.

Citizenry, Inc.: The Ambiguous, Euphemistic Language of Corporate America and its Impact on Democracy

By Jesse Hamilton

Ambiguous, euphemistic language is common in corporate, bureaucratic environments and is used for a variety of rational reasons. This type of language may lead to ignorance among those who use it and those who consume it. As it becomes more prevalent in American society, ambiguous, euphemistic language is leading to a state where the lines between knowledge and ignorance are blurred. This paper explores how ambiguous, euphemistic language: 1) is used in corporate, bureaucratic settings and why it is accepted; 2) could be a cause of ignorance among those who create and consume it; and 3) has implications for the acquisition and transfer of knowledge in broader society.

Ignorance is often thought of as a barrier to the consolidation of power, so it would stand to reason that organizations, especially those with profit motives, are incentivized to avoid ignorance and pursue knowledge. However, as Linsey McCoy explains, "Ignorance serves as a productive asset, helping individuals and institutions to command resources, deny liability in the aftermath of crises, and to assert expertise in the face of unpredictable outcomes" (McGoey, 553).

In the 19th and 20th centuries, as the United States shifted from an agrarian society to an industrialized society, Americans have not only become more exposed to business culture and its language, but have also become dependent on it for their livelihood. Additionally, individuals are directly and indirectly exposed to the sort of ambiguous, euphemistic language commonly used in business settings in a variety of ways - at work, within social circles, through advertising, from public statements issued from business leaders to media organizations, and from public relations teams. Finally, as business leaders begin to assume more prominent roles in public office within federal, state, and local governments, the ambiguous, euphemistic language which comes naturally to them has begun to change the way elected and appointed officials communicate with the public. Put simply, the language of corporations seems to have permeated broader society, and this has implications for knowledge and ignorance in American society.

What is ambiguous, euphemistic language?

The language of business which will be addressed in this paper consists of two distinct parts which can be used independently or in combination: ambiguity and euphemisms. Ambiguous language is a powerful tool in business because it has the advantage of being interpreted in different ways, by different individuals/groups, at different times, both in the present and in the future. As Jackall notes, "The indirect and ambiguous linguistic frameworks that managers employ in public situations typify the symbolic complexity of the corporation" and serves as "a tentative way of communicating that reflects the peculiarly chancy and fluid character of their world." Basically, managers have learned that the best way to deal with the volatile nature of business, which is mainly driven by exogenous economic factors, is to communicate with ambiguity.

Euphemisms - "the substitution of an agreeable or inoffensive expression for one that may offend or suggest something unpleasant" - are used as well, for reasons that will be discussed in-depth in Section IV.

Why is ambiguity used?

Ambiguity is a powerful tool that is used to manage and/or avoid different types of risks inherent with a career at large, American corporations, and family businesses (Carmon, 87). All of the risks discussed in this section are related to uncertainty about the future. How ambiguity is used in corporate settings is important as it has implications for how it can be successfully applied in other American institutions; for example, in government and politics.

Avoidance of decision making

The future is uncertain, therefore managers are inclined to hedge their statements and actions against unforeseen events and outcomes. The simplest way to achieve this is through the use of ambiguous language and avoidance of making decisions. A manager interviewed by Jackall describes the avoidance of decision making: "The basic principles of decision making in this organization and probably any organization are: (1) avoid making any decision if at all possible; (2) if a decision has to be made, involve as many people as you can so that, if things go south, you're able to point in as many directions as possible" (Jackall). Given that the goals of a business are often very ambiguous and amorphous, by not committing to specific details, managers can pass responsibility (and therefore accountability) to subordinates, so that if goals are not achieved or laws are broken, managers reduce the risk that they themselves will be held accountable by their superiors and/or courts.

Organizational Contingency

Power within the hierarchy of a corporation is volatile, with managers regularly falling in and out of favor. As Jackall notes, "First of all, at the psychological level, managers have an acute sense of organizational contingency. Because of the interlocking ties between people, they know that a shake-up at or near the top of a hierarchy can trigger a widespread upheaval, bringing in its wake startling reversals of fortune, good and bad, throughout the structure" (Jackall). Therefore, it is rational for those who aspire to move up in the ranks to create allies and avoid creating enemies. After all, one never knows who will be handed a position of authority next. One way to achieve this is through providing ambiguous feedback (perhaps laced with euphemisms to soften the message) to superiors, peers, and subordinates alike. When feedback is provided in this way, the interpretation is left to the receiver, a strategy which will be discussed again in Section VII.

Finally, it should be noted that in an age where everything is filmed or recorded, and where bits can be combined and commingled (Negroponte, 18), ambiguity is an important defense against being undeniably connected to concrete statements and/or positions.

Why are euphemisms used?

Jackall notes that "managers' public language is, more than anything else, euphemistic" however "for the most part, euphemistic language is not used with the intent to deceive. Managers past a certain point, as suggested earlier, are assumed to be "maze-bright" and able to "read between the lines" of a conversation or a memorandum and to distinguish accurately suggestions from directives, inquiries from investigations, and bluffs from threats" (Jackall). Additionally, Jackall points out that euphemistic language is used internally for purposes of deniability and externally when dealing with the public.

An example from business

In 2006, Jeff Skilling was convicted on federal felony charges for his involvement in the collapse of Enron Corporation, where he served as CEO during the time in which fraudulent activity occurred. As documented by the New York Times, during the House Energy and Commerce subcommittee hearings in 2002, when questioned by Representative James Greenwood as to whether or not he was aware of any wrongdoing at the company during his time as CEO, Skilling stated:

"I do not believe -- I did not do anything that was not in the interest, in all of the time I worked for Enron Corporation, that wasn't in the interest of the shareholders of the company."

Skilling's response offers nothing more than his belief, thus positioning himself to plausibly deny any future evidence of wrongdoing. Interestingly, due to the clever wording, his statement might actually be true. During the time Skilling was CEO, Enron used deceptive accounting (among other fraudulent practices) to artificially inflate their earnings. During the time of the fraud, Enron's stock skyrocketed, often outperforming the broad market by a wide margin. This is, of course, good for the current shareholders in the short-term. However, it was not in the best interest of Enron's long-term shareholders, employees, and lenders, as the company declared bankruptcy in 2001. In short, Skilling's statement is disingenuous at best, but serves as an example of the malleability of ambiguously-worded statement.

When are individuals exposed to ambiguous, euphemistic language?

Individuals are exposed to ambiguous, euphemistic language in a few ways: internally through company communications, and externally through statements to the public.

Internal business communications

Internal company communications are often rife with ambiguity and euphemisms. In this capacity, the language can serve different purposes. For example, it is used to rally employees around core missions, especially if the mission is under public attack. Also, cleverly worded communications can be used to soften harsh messages/actions that employees might not find appealing. For example, instead of stating "we plan on firing people because we need to increase our profits," a typical communication may describe "a strategic, systematic restructuring and reallocation of resources to address ongoing shareholder interests at this point in the business cycle." Employees are more likely to be accepting of, or indifferent to, the latter; whereas the former would likely cause discomfort, anxiety, and anger.

External business communications

Public relations teams play a large role in the conveyance of messages to the public. Jackall sums up the subtleties of public relations best:

"…the essential task of public relations…is to transform expediency into altruism or even statesmanship. Second, the genius of public relations…consists to a great extent in its dexterity at inverting symbols and images. Whether it is hyping products, influencing legislation, transforming reputations, or erasing stigma, public relations tries to transform actually or potentially perceived weaknesses into strengths and subvert or at least call into question the strengths or particularly the credibility of opponents."

It should be noted that public relations tactics and strategies are not strictly confined to businesses - they can be applied to communications from government, academic institutions, and scientific research organizations when those institutions desire to transform weakness into strength and negativity into positivity.

What are the broad, societal implications associated with the increasing use of ambiguous language?

Individuals' exposure to ambiguous, euphemistic language has implications for how they think, speak, and interpret reality.

The effect of ambiguous language on how individuals think

The language we use shapes the way we think. According to Lera Boroditsky, "Language can be a powerful tool for shaping abstract thought. When sensory information is scarce or inconclusive, languages may play the most important role in shaping how their speakers think" (Boroditsky, 1). This may have important implications as we continue to be exposed to ambiguous, euphemistic language because we may begin viewing the world as a place with less certainty, where the lines of knowledge and ignorance are naturally blurred.

The effect of ambiguous language on ontological security, lay theories, and ignorant othering

To understand how ambiguous language affects broader society, it is important to understand how individuals establish a sense of what is real and true. Giddens' concept of ontological security is described as "a sense of continuity and order in events, including those not directly within the perceptual environment of the individual" (Giddens, 243). Ostertag builds on this further with the development of two other concepts: lay theories and ignorant othering (Ostertag, 828). Lay theories "serve as vital tools in developing social realities" and "allow people to ground and justify a sense of reality that they can trust as correct and true" (Ostertag, 828). When ambiguous language is used, knowledge may not be communicated with the same degree of fidelity as when clear, concise language is used. Therefore, the ambiguity is removed at the level of the receiver, as opposed to being removed at the level of the communicator. In this way, ambiguous statements have the potential to become personalized in the same way that advertising has become personalized (Baudrillard). By increasing the scope of what can be true, ambiguous language potentially increases the number different senses of reality, or lay theories, that exist in a given population. A wider variety of lay theories may, in turn, exacerbate the phenomena of ignorant othering, which Ostertag describes as when "people construct an image of the 'average' American whom they claim is often less informed of the news, less aware of the problems of the news, and therefore less aware of and knowledgeable about the world than they themselves are" (Ostertag, 828).

The effect of ambiguous language on conspiracy theories

Using the same rationale described above, ambiguous language may also be used to support and increase belief in conspiracy theories because it is malleable enough to fit into the conspiracy narrative. This might strengthen current and future conspiracy theories by making them more persuasive. Kay states that "the only characteristic that strongly correlates with belief in any conspiracy theory is a belief in other conspiracy theories" (Kay, 150). If individual conspiracy theories are made more persuasive by ambiguous language and thereby increase the number of individuals who believe any one conspiracy theory, this might lead to a cascading effect where belief in conspiracy theories becomes more prevalent. In order to support this hypothesis, more research is needed on why belief in any conspiracy is correlated to belief in others.

The effect of ambiguous language on fake news and alternative facts

Given the similarities between conspiracy theories and fake news, individuals who are more prone to believe in conspiracy theories may also be more prone to believe fake news. This may make fake news more influential. Also, individuals may be more prone to accept "alternative facts," not just due to the clever euphemism, but because they're more inclined to believe in conspiracy. More research is needed to understand the relationship between belief in any one conspiracy theory, piece of fake news, and "alternative fact" and belief in others.

Examples of ambiguous language in politics

Donald Trump

Donald Trump, a businessman turned politician, is a unique case study. Consider Trump's statement about his opponents' position on gun control:

"Hillary wants to abolish - essentially abolish - the Second Amendment. If she gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks. Although the Second Amendment people, maybe there is. I don't know."

Trump's ambiguous, and seemingly persuasive, language here is based in a false premise that Hillary Clinton would (1) have the power to abolish the Second Amendment, and (2) want to abolish the Second Amendment. Both are equally absurd on their own merit, with the latter relying on the reactionary conflation of gun-control laws with some mythological government confiscation of over 300 million guns. There are two different ways to interpret the purpose of Trump's statement. Proponents of the Second Amendment will either use votes or violence (which are wildly different mechanisms for change) to prevent his political opponent from taking away their gun rights. In this case, since the ambiguity of the statement is removed in the mind of the listener, there are two (or more) versions of reality.

According to NPR, Trump's use of ambiguous language follows a predictable pattern. He makes an ambiguous statement which is subsequently criticized by opponents, incessantly covered by the media. Trump then claims to be a victim of the "liberal media" claiming that his words were taken out of context (McCammon). The foundation of his strategy is ambiguity.

Hillary Clinton

During a 2016 Democratic Primary debate, Hillary Clinton and her opponent, Bernie Sanders were each asked by the moderator if they support fracking. Clinton's response displayed ambiguity and "talking in circles" when she stated:

"By the time we get through all my conditions, I do not think there will be many places in America where fracking will continue to take place."

Although not as egregious as Trump, Clinton's choice of wording and syntax indicate a propensity for unnecessarily complex language, something her opponent was quick to point out. Sanders stated, "My answer is a lot shorter. No, I do not support fracking."

Recent examples of euphemisms in American politics

Just as in business, euphemisms also prove useful in the realm of politics. For example, the Trump administration regularly uses euphemisms to downplay the negativity associated with its policies and/or past statements. The euphemisms "extreme vetting" and "locker room talk" provide useful examples. Many Americans can accept a policy of "extreme vetting," but some would be hesitant to accept it if it were stated for what it truly is - racial and religious discrimination. Additionally, some citizens might not be dissuaded from voting for a presidential candidate that uses "locker room talk," but might draw the line over a candidate who "[grabs women] by the pussy."

A cautionary warning from George Orwell

Given that individuals are becoming desensitized to ambiguous, euphemistic language, there is a greater likelihood that politicians can successfully employ Orwellian doublespeak, or "language used to deceive usually through concealment or misrepresentation of truth." In Politics and the English Language, George Orwell describes how politics may inevitably reach a point where it must serve this very purpose of shielding citizens from ugly truths by avoiding any clear "defense of the indefensible:"

"…political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them."

Political statements, like those used as examples by Orwell, are unnecessarily wordy, confusing, take time and effort to interpret, and do not overtly communicate the harsh nature of the message. While this paper is not proposing the inevitability of a totalitarian state due to corporate America's language and culture, it suggests that a population that has been desensitized to ambiguity may be more susceptible to being influenced by disingenuous language.

Conclusion

The use of ambiguous, euphemistic language, stemming from practical use within American corporations, may have implications for knowledge and ignorance in broader society. Most notably, ambiguous language is interpretable at the personal level, which may result in numerous individuals having personalized versions of reality. These versions of reality may be incompatible, leading to a state where no one knows what is really true.

Works cited

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